On 2/22/2018 1:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Feb 2018, at 00:48, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 2/18/2018 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If consciousness is invariant for a digital transplant, it is not much a matter
But that's simply assuming what is to be argued.
It is the working hypothesis. The argument is in showing that this enforces
Plato and refutes Aristotle. Physics becomes a branch of machine’s psychology
The argument must be that the doctor has done this before (maybe to humans,
maybe to mice) and there was not detectable change in behavior, so it's
reasonable to bet on the doctor.
The reason why you say “yes” to the doctor is private. It needs an act of faith
because no experience at all can confirm Computationalism.
That's moving the goal post. You can't convince me that if you knew the
doctor's work had no observable affect on the behavior of mice if would
not, for you, count as evidence in favor of consciousness being
retained. Nothing is ever "confirmed" with certainty.
Due to some possible anosognosia, even doing the digital transplant experience
oneself would prove nothing, even to yourself (despite the feeling). You can
know that you have survived, but you cannot know for sure that you have
survived integrally (but you can know that in the Theoretical sense, slightly
A doctor who claim that we survive such transplant, or that science has proven
we can survive such transplant is automatically a con-man.
Not at all. He may be going on the best available evidence. Just
because it's not proven in your axiomatic system doesn't mean it has no
The physical reality is given by a first person plural reality emerging from complex
compromises between truth and all universal numbers. The measure one, on which we hope some
day people get the equivalent of Gleason theorem, i.e. the one provided by p &
<>t (& p) with p sigma_1, obey(s) indeed quantum logic(s) where expected. Nature
confirms indexical comp, and indexical QM (we could rename also, then).
This is based on Kripke semantics, but I have not understood why its axioms do
not include that a world is necessarily accessible from itself?
All modal logic which have the axiom k ((p -> q) -> (p -> q)), and is close for the
necessitation rule (p / p) admits a Kripke semantics, and vice versa. The theory K has only k as
axiom. A modal frame respect p -> p if and only if each worlds is accessible to itself (a
frame respect a formula means that the formula is true in all worlds, for all valuations of the
atomic sentences). But p -> p is not validate in the model with one world, with p false in that
world, and having no accessibility arrow. So p -> p is not valid in an arbitrary Kripke model,
and p -> p is not a theorem of K.
That is nice, because the logic of provability (G) has cul-de-sac world (in which # is always valid
trivially, for any #, and such world do not access to themselves), and so p -> p is not a theorem,
and the relation cannot be reflexive. That p -> p is not valid in the provability logic is
immediate if you think to the arithmetical interpretation. f -> f, i.e. ~f , i.e. <>t,
i.e. consistency, would be provable, contrary to what the second incompleteness says. Or show that if
we have p -> p (as theorem), you can easily show that the Löb’s formula ((p -> p) ->
p), would entail a contradiction:
f -> f. (Let us assume we can prove that)
(f -> f). (By necessitation)
(f -> f) -> f. (By Löb)
f (modus ponens on second and third lines)
f (modus ponens on first and preceding line)
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