On 2/22/2018 1:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Feb 2018, at 00:48, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:



On 2/18/2018 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If consciousness is invariant for a digital transplant, it is not much a matter 
of choice.
But that's simply assuming what is to be argued.

?

It is the working hypothesis. The argument is in showing that this enforces 
Plato and refutes Aristotle. Physics becomes a branch of machine’s psychology 
or theology.




The argument must be that the doctor has done this before (maybe to humans, 
maybe to mice) and there was not detectable change in behavior, so it's 
reasonable to bet on the doctor.
The reason why you say “yes” to the doctor is private. It needs an act of faith 
because no experience at all can confirm Computationalism.

That's moving the goal post.  You can't convince me that if you knew the doctor's work had no observable affect on the behavior of mice if would not, for you, count as evidence in favor of consciousness being retained.  Nothing is ever "confirmed" with certainty.

Due to some possible anosognosia, even doing the digital transplant experience 
oneself would prove nothing, even to yourself (despite the feeling). You can 
know that you have survived, but you cannot know for sure that you have 
survived integrally (but you can know that in the Theoretical sense, slightly 
weakened).

A doctor who claim that we survive such transplant, or that science has proven 
we can survive such transplant is automatically a con-man.

Not at all.  He may be going on the best available evidence.  Just because it's not proven in your axiomatic system doesn't mean it has no credence.


The physical reality is given by a first person plural reality emerging from complex 
compromises between truth and all universal numbers. The measure one, on which we hope some 
day people get the equivalent of Gleason theorem, i.e. the one provided by []p & 
<>t (& p) with p sigma_1, obey(s) indeed quantum logic(s) where expected. Nature 
confirms indexical comp, and indexical QM (we could rename also, then).
This is based on Kripke semantics, but I have not understood why its axioms do 
not include that a world is necessarily accessible from itself?
All modal logic which have the axiom k ([](p -> q) -> ([]p -> []q)), and is close for the 
necessitation rule (p / []p) admits a Kripke semantics, and vice versa. The theory K has only k as 
axiom. A modal frame respect  []p -> p if and only if each worlds is accessible to itself (a 
frame respect a formula means that the formula is true in all worlds, for all valuations of the 
atomic sentences). But []p -> p is not validate in the model with one world, with p false in that 
world, and having no accessibility arrow. So []p -> p is not valid in an arbitrary Kripke model, 
and []p -> p is not a theorem of K.

That is nice, because the logic of provability (G) has cul-de-sac world (in which []# is always valid 
trivially, for any #, and such world do not access to themselves), and so []p -> p is not a theorem, 
and the relation cannot be reflexive. That []p -> p is not valid in the provability logic is 
immediate if you think to the arithmetical interpretation. []f -> f, i.e. ~[]f , i.e. <>t, 
i.e. consistency, would be provable, contrary to what the second incompleteness says. Or show that if 
we have []p -> p (as theorem), you can easily show that the Löb’s formula ([]([]p -> p) -> 
[]p), would entail a contradiction:

[]f -> f. (Let us assume we can prove that)
[]([]f -> f).  (By necessitation)
[]([]f -> f) -> []f. (By Löb)
[]f (modus ponens on second and third lines)
f   (modus ponens on first and preceding line)

Bruno

OK, thanks.

Brent

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