On Friday, March 16, 2018 at 6:14:22 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote: > > > > On 16 March 2018 at 22:57, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> On Thursday, March 15, 2018 at 8:34:34 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Thu, 15 Mar 2018 at 10:36 pm, Lawrence Crowell < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> The Aaronson discussion about soap bubbles and optimization is in line >>>> with something I have maintained. Eternal black holes with the inner >>>> horizon r_- continuous with I^+ means in principle a Turing machine >>>> approaching r_- could receive an infinite stream of bits or qubits so it >>>> could make a catalog of all Turing machines that halt and do not halt. >>>> Quantum mechanics enters into the physics, such as Hawking radiation, that >>>> separates r_- from I^+. However, this may adjust the Chaitan halting >>>> probability. With NP-complete problems this would translate into the >>>> existence of systems that approximate such solutions. >>>> >>>> I suspect the individual consciousness of a person or even animals is >>>> wrapped up in some sort of code, that while it might be derived in some >>>> approximate way it is tough to find from outside. The thesis that all of >>>> consciousness is a manifestation of calculation presumes the brain is >>>> primarily involved with computation. The problem is that the brain >>>> computes >>>> little in the way of mathematical solutions, but rather is involved with >>>> maintenance of homeostasis of an organism. Further, consciousness is less >>>> about solving problems than it is about maintaining a self-referenced >>>> narrative that is a positive feedback and forms a meaning cycle. >>>> >>> >>> The sequence of reasoning is not that the brain does computation, and >>> that therefore consciousness is computation. It is that the brain >>> apparently gives rise to consciousness, and if brain components can be >>> replaced by a computer, then consciousness should be preserved, otherwise >>> the implausible situation would occur where consciousness gradually fades >>> or suddenly disappears during the replacement process despite no change in >>> behaviour. Against this is the possibility that some component of the brain >>> utilises non-computable physics, so the replacement would fail; but there >>> is no evidence for this, and it seems to me the main reason such theories >>> are entertained at all is a disdain for the idea that human beings are just >>> ordinary matter. >>> >> >> The point is not that neurological processes can't be modeled using >> biophysical algorithms. Below is a neural circuit diagram that illustrates >> a feedback structure. These neurons could be replaced by flip flop systems >> and other electronic. In that way this system could be modeled. My main >> point is there is a distinction between the territory and the map. Feynman >> also made the quip that simulation is like masturbation; it is fine until >> you start thinking it is the real thing. >> >> LC >> >> >> <https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-UI-xEX4ZlC4/WquuXqqaX7I/AAAAAAAADQ4/oYYYNdMTQvIDc4isEF3myVIliqK2Mm5lACLcBGAs/s1600/thalamocortical%2Bcircuit.gif> >> >> > You're suggesting that consciousness could be separated from the > associated behaviour. That would be very strange. It would mean that you > could replace part of a person's brain with an electronic system and the > person would behave exactly the same, but their consciousness would be > different. If their consciousness is different, they should be able to > notice this and communicate it, at least if the difference is large enough. > But if the neural replacement is functionally equivalent, they will not be > able to communicate it, because their brain will continue sending signals > to the muscles responsible for communication as if nothing had changed. So > either the subject would be unable to notice a large change in > consciousness, or they would notice it but, against their wishes, speech > would continue coming out of their mouth indicating that everything was > just the same. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou >
Q: You're suggesting that consciousness could be separated from the associated behaviour.[sic] I am not saying this is the case, but that we do not know otherwise. We are already simulating human functions with devices, say Alexis, and people are increasingly interacting with these things as if they are conscious. As time goes on we may find there are machines and robots that are very close of human-like and difficult to separate from human. Clearly is may be possible to replace small lost brain functions with digital circuitry, and if small enough the machine aspect of things may not be perceived by the patient. As one replaces more however, things might change. In this territory we really do not know. It does seem though we have a lot of hot conjectures about this though. It also seems a bit of this has sum hubris to it. LC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
