On Sat, 17 Mar 2018 at 12:36 pm, Lawrence Crowell < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Friday, March 16, 2018 at 6:14:22 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote: > >> >> >> On 16 March 2018 at 22:57, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> On Thursday, March 15, 2018 at 8:34:34 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, 15 Mar 2018 at 10:36 pm, Lawrence Crowell < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> The Aaronson discussion about soap bubbles and optimization is in line >>>>> with something I have maintained. Eternal black holes with the inner >>>>> horizon r_- continuous with I^+ means in principle a Turing machine >>>>> approaching r_- could receive an infinite stream of bits or qubits so it >>>>> could make a catalog of all Turing machines that halt and do not halt. >>>>> Quantum mechanics enters into the physics, such as Hawking radiation, that >>>>> separates r_- from I^+. However, this may adjust the Chaitan halting >>>>> probability. With NP-complete problems this would translate into the >>>>> existence of systems that approximate such solutions. >>>>> >>>>> I suspect the individual consciousness of a person or even animals is >>>>> wrapped up in some sort of code, that while it might be derived in some >>>>> approximate way it is tough to find from outside. The thesis that all of >>>>> consciousness is a manifestation of calculation presumes the brain is >>>>> primarily involved with computation. The problem is that the brain >>>>> computes >>>>> little in the way of mathematical solutions, but rather is involved with >>>>> maintenance of homeostasis of an organism. Further, consciousness is less >>>>> about solving problems than it is about maintaining a self-referenced >>>>> narrative that is a positive feedback and forms a meaning cycle. >>>>> >>>> >>>> The sequence of reasoning is not that the brain does computation, and >>>> that therefore consciousness is computation. It is that the brain >>>> apparently gives rise to consciousness, and if brain components can be >>>> replaced by a computer, then consciousness should be preserved, otherwise >>>> the implausible situation would occur where consciousness gradually fades >>>> or suddenly disappears during the replacement process despite no change in >>>> behaviour. Against this is the possibility that some component of the brain >>>> utilises non-computable physics, so the replacement would fail; but there >>>> is no evidence for this, and it seems to me the main reason such theories >>>> are entertained at all is a disdain for the idea that human beings are just >>>> ordinary matter. >>>> >>> >>> The point is not that neurological processes can't be modeled using >>> biophysical algorithms. Below is a neural circuit diagram that illustrates >>> a feedback structure. These neurons could be replaced by flip flop systems >>> and other electronic. In that way this system could be modeled. My main >>> point is there is a distinction between the territory and the map. Feynman >>> also made the quip that simulation is like masturbation; it is fine until >>> you start thinking it is the real thing. >>> >>> LC >>> >>> >>> <https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-UI-xEX4ZlC4/WquuXqqaX7I/AAAAAAAADQ4/oYYYNdMTQvIDc4isEF3myVIliqK2Mm5lACLcBGAs/s1600/thalamocortical%2Bcircuit.gif> >>> >>> >> You're suggesting that consciousness could be separated from the >> associated behaviour. That would be very strange. It would mean that you >> could replace part of a person's brain with an electronic system and the >> person would behave exactly the same, but their consciousness would be >> different. If their consciousness is different, they should be able to >> notice this and communicate it, at least if the difference is large enough. >> But if the neural replacement is functionally equivalent, they will not be >> able to communicate it, because their brain will continue sending signals >> to the muscles responsible for communication as if nothing had changed. So >> either the subject would be unable to notice a large change in >> consciousness, or they would notice it but, against their wishes, speech >> would continue coming out of their mouth indicating that everything was >> just the same. >> >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> > > Q: You're suggesting that consciousness could be separated from the > associated behaviour.[sic] > > I am not saying this is the case, but that we do not know otherwise. > I suggest that we *do* know otherwise, if we assume that consciousness is due to the physical brain and the behaviour of the brain can be simulated by a digital computer. If not, it would lead to absurdity, as per my original post. We are already simulating human functions with devices, say Alexis, and > people are increasingly interacting with these things as if they are > conscious. As time goes on we may find there are machines and robots that > are very close of human-like and difficult to separate from human. Clearly > is may be possible to replace small lost brain functions with digital > circuitry, and if small enough the machine aspect of things may not be > perceived by the patient. As one replaces more however, things might change. > > In this territory we really do not know. It does seem though we have a lot > of hot conjectures about this though. It also seems a bit of this has sum > hubris to it. > You failed to address the question of what exactly would happen if (non-hubristically?) the digital circuitry duplicated the observable behaviour of the neurones but not any associated consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
