On Wednesday, March 14, 2018 at 8:24:49 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 3/14/2018 6:33 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> It is not about believing anything. Our brains operate not just as 
> switching systems of neurons, but neurons are themselves biological. The 
> real computer analogue I think extends down to the molecular level, where 
> kinase and other actions are similar to computer chip logic. 
>
> I think it is a very extreme proposition to advance the idea that 
> emulating a brain on silicon or similar solid state physics systems will 
> conserve consciousness.
>
>
> But we're pretty sure we can implement *intelligence* on silicon; even 
> super-human intelligence.  So then the implication is that there can be a 
> being that we can interact with who seems to have human level intelligence 
> and emotion but who is a zombie (i.e. has no inner consciousness).  That 
> then calls into question whether other humans have and inner consciousness.
>
> I can very well imagine this could emulate the brain activity of a person, 
> but I think it is a bit much to voluntarily agree to death so your brain 
> can be uploaded in a machine. I suspect consciousness involves some sort of 
> uncomputable Godel type of number. 
>
>
> What would allow it to be computed by the brain?  Do you think the brain 
> could not be emulated down to, or even below the molecular level?
>
> Brent
>

*Since we really have no clue about what consciousness is, except that it 
can likely be simulated to such precision as to never pass a Turing Test 
(to distinguish artificial from natural intelligence), any attempt at 
implementing any of the proposals conjectured in this thread should be 
called THE FRANKENSTEIN PROJECT. AG *

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