> On 22 Mar 2018, at 02:34, Kim Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> What if we already live forever? Why in fact, do people think that just 
> because we die that we go away or cease to exist? What if Nature has already 
> solved the problem? Why would you spend a motza to ensure you lived forever 
> in the same boring universe when after 70 or 80 years you can be teleported 
> to a different universe in a pine box?

Yes, that makes sense, and the simples way to be immortal consists in having 
children. But then … you know … kids can be terrible … ;)

Then, we are also immortal already when we remember the “consciousness state 
which is out of time”, but that one is so counterintuitive that I prefer to not 
insist on it. I think we get it with salvia, but some describes it as the worst 
thing that they ever encountered, other as the most blissful thing they 
encountered. 

Mortality is a God self-delusion when bored from immortality, somehow … It is 
also a way to say Hello to Itself, or to play hide-and-seek.

Bruno



> 
> Kim Jones
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 22 Mar 2018, at 6:39 am, Brent Meeker <[email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 3/21/2018 8:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On 20 Mar 2018, at 00:56, Brent Meeker <[email protected] 
>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 3/19/2018 2:19 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>>>> On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 10:03 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected] 
>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote
>>>>> 
>>>>> > octopuses are fairly intelligent but their neural structure is 
>>>>> > distributed very differently from mammals of similar intelligence.  An 
>>>>> > artificial intelligence that was not modeled on mammalian brain 
>>>>> > structure might be intelligent but not conscious
>>>>> 
>>>>> Maybe maybe maybe. ​A​ nd you don't have have the exact same brain 
>>>>> structure as I have so you might be intelligent but not conscious. I said 
>>>>> it before I'll say it again, consciousness theories are useless, and not 
>>>>> just the ones on this list, all of them.
>>>> 
>>>> You're the one who floated a theory of consciousness based on evolution.  
>>>> I'm just pointing out that it only shows that consciousness exists in 
>>>> humans for some evolutionarily selected purpose.  It doesn't apply to 
>>>> intelligence that arises in some other evolutionary branch or intelligence 
>>>> like AI that doesn't evolve but is designed.
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Not sure that there is a genuine difference between design and evolution. 
>>> With the multicellular, there is an evolution of design. With the origin of 
>>> life, there has been a design of evolution, even if serendipitously. I am 
>>> not talking about some purposeful or intelligent design here. A cell is a 
>>> quite sophisticated "gigantic nano-machine”.
>>> 
>>> Then some technic in AI, like the genetic algorithm, or some technic 
>>> inspired by the study of the immune system, or self-reference, leads to 
>>> programs or machines evolving in some ways.
>>> 
>>> Now, I can argue that for consciousness nothing of this is needed. It is 
>>> the canonical knowledge associated with the fixed point of the embedding of 
>>> the universal machines in the arithmetical reality.
>>> 
>>> It differentiates into the many indexical first person scenarii.
>>> 
>>> Matter should be what gives rise to possibilities ([]p & ~[]f, []p & <>t).  
>>> That works as it is confirmed by QM without collapse, both intuitively 
>>> through the many computations, and formally as the three material modes do 
>>> provide a formal quantum logic, its arithmetical interpretation, and its 
>>> metamathematical interpretations. 
>>> 
>>> The universal machine rich enough to prove their own universality (like the 
>>> sound humans and Peano arithmetic, and ZF, …) are confronted to the 
>>> distinction between knowing and proof. They prove their own incompleteness 
>>> but still figure out some truth despite being non provable. 
>>> 
>>> The only mystery is where does the numbers (and/or the combinators, the 
>>> lambda expressions, the game of life, c++, etc.) come from?
>>> But here the sound löbian machine can prove that it is impossible to derive 
>>> a universal system from a non-universal theory. 
>>> 
>>> A weaker version of the Church-Turing-Post-Kleene thesis is: It exists a 
>>> Universal Machine. That is, a Machine which computes all computable 
>>> functions. The stronger usual version is that some formal system/definition 
>>> provides such a universal machine, meaning that the class of the functions 
>>> computable by some universal machine gives the class of all computable 
>>> functions, including those not everywhere defined (and non algorithmically 
>>> spared among those defined everywhere: the price of universality). 
>>> 
>>> That universal being has a rich theology, explaining the relation between 
>>> believing, knowing, observing, feeling and the truth.
>> 
>> That didn't address my question: Can you imagine different kinds of 
>> consciousness.  For example you have sometimes speculated that there is only 
>> one consciousness which is somehow compartmentalized in individuals.  That 
>> implies that the compartmentalization could be eliminated and a different 
>> kind of consciousness experienced...like the Borg.
>> 
>> Brent
>> "We are the Dyslexic of Borg. Futility is persistent. Your ass will be 
>> laminated."
>> 
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> Brent
>>>> 
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