> On 27 Mar 2018, at 19:49, [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, March 27, 2018 at 11:34:41 AM UTC-4, [email protected] > <http://gmail.com/> wrote: > > > On Monday, March 26, 2018 at 5:25:59 PM UTC-4, [email protected] <> wrote: > > > On Monday, March 26, 2018 at 4:20:02 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: > > > On 3/26/2018 10:17 AM, John Clark wrote: >> Brent Meeker Wrote" >> >> > It seems to me there's something fishy about making behavior and conscious >> > thought functionally equivalent so neither can change without a >> > corresponding change in the other. My intuition is that there is a lot of >> > my thinking that doesn't show up as observable behavior. No doubt it's >> > observable at the micro-level in my brain; but not at the external level. > > The behavior of your neurons at the micro-level is what I’m talking about. A > change in the brain corresponds with a change inconsciousness and a change in > consciousness corresponds with a change in the brain. So mind is what the > brain does. So unless there is some mystical reason that carbon is conscious > but silicon is not a intelligent computer is also conscious. > > I don't doubt that. But does equal intelligence imply equivalent > consciousness. > > > IMO, the way you pose the question confuses the issue. You could have two > Rovers which do different tasks, and conclude they have different > intelligences based on some well defined definition. But how could you > ascertain whether either is conscious? AFAICT, there is no understanding of > what "conscious" means. I suppose one can say it involves the perception of > sensation, pain, pleasure, etc. If you tore off a Rover's arm, it might be > programmed to complain or otherwise register the adverse modification of its > body. But if it did, wouldn't it be just simulating or mimicking a human > response without being "conscious"? What the hell are we talking about? TIA, > AG > > You could program both Rovers to do arithmetic, but only one to do calculus. > So you could say one is more intelligent than the other. Or you could program > both to see in visible wave lengths, but only only to see in IR. So you could > say one has superior vision than the other. But what you can never do IMO, is > determine whether either Rover, in any circumstance, has self knowledge or > self perception, or can experience rudimentary or complex sensations. So I > don't think we're any closer to an explanation or understanding of > consciousness than when we started, however long ago that was. AG > > If we had a clue how self-reference could result from a neural network such > as the human brain, we could, perhaps, duplicate it in a Rover or whatever, > But I see no evidence that we have such an insight to do the modeling. > CMIIAW. AG
It can be proved that if the neuronal network is Turing complete (an that happens quickly), it has the precise self-reference ability which gives him the same theology (including physics) that the one of PA, ZF, or of any machine believing in any arithmetical or combinatoric induction axioms. Self-reference is where computer science excels the most. It is indeed born from a reflexion on paradoxes due to the self-reference ability of many mathematical structures. You added: "And if we had such a clue, we could determine if carbon is necessary for self-reference, or if silicon would do just fine. But I seriously doubt we know enough now to make such a determination, or to even begin the analysis. CMIIAW. AG “ We do have the clues, and we can answer that carbon, silicon cannot make any difference, unless you disbelieve in Mechanism. It is up to you, to suggest what a continuous non mechanist matter could be, and how it links consciousness (first person, knowledge) and the observation (something that the materialist have failed to explain since about 1500 years). Bruno > > > In other words could I design two Mars Rovers that behaved very similarly (as > similar as two different humans) and yet, because of the way I implemented > their memory or computers their consciousness was very different? Of course > this is related to the question of how do I know that other people have > consciousness like mine; except in that case one relies in part on knowing > that other people are constructed similarly. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
