On Tuesday, March 27, 2018 at 11:34:41 AM UTC-4, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Monday, March 26, 2018 at 5:25:59 PM UTC-4, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, March 26, 2018 at 4:20:02 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 3/26/2018 10:17 AM, John Clark wrote: >>> >>> Brent Meeker Wrote" >>> >>>> *> It seems to me there's something fishy about making behavior and >>>> conscious thought functionally equivalent so neither can change without a >>>> corresponding change in the other. My intuition is that there is a lot of >>>> my thinking that doesn't show up as observable behavior. No doubt it's >>>> observable at the micro-level in my brain; but not at the external level.* >>> >>> The behavior of your neurons at the micro-level is what I’m talking >> about. A change in the brain corresponds with a change inconsciousness and >> a change in consciousness corresponds with a change in the brain. So mind >> is what the brain does. So unless there is some mystical reason that carbon >> is conscious but silicon is not a intelligent computer is also conscious. >> >>> >>> I don't doubt that. But does equal intelligence imply equivalent >>> consciousness. >>> >> >> >> *IMO, the way you pose the question confuses the issue. You could have >> two Rovers which do different tasks, and conclude they have different >> intelligences based on some well defined definition. But how could you >> ascertain whether either is conscious? AFAICT, there is no understanding >> of what "conscious" means. I suppose one can say it involves the perception >> of sensation, pain, pleasure, etc. If you tore off a Rover's arm, it might >> be programmed to complain or otherwise register the adverse modification of >> its body. But if it did, wouldn't it be just simulating or mimicking a >> human response without being "conscious"? What the hell are we talking >> about? TIA, AG* >> > > *You could program both Rovers to do arithmetic, but only one to do > calculus. So you could say one is more intelligent than the other. Or you > could program both to see in visible wave lengths, but only only to see in > IR. So you could say one has superior vision than the other. But what you > can never do IMO, is determine whether either Rover, in any circumstance, > has self knowledge or self perception, or can experience rudimentary or > complex sensations. So I don't think we're any closer to an explanation or > understanding of consciousness than when we started, however long ago that > was. AG* >
*If we had a clue how self-reference could result from a neural network such as the human brain, we could, perhaps, duplicate it in a Rover or whatever, But I see no evidence that we have such an insight to do the modeling. CMIIAW. AG * > >> >> In other words could I design two Mars Rovers that behaved very similarly >>> (as similar as two different humans) and yet, because of the way I >>> implemented their memory or computers their consciousness was very >>> different? Of course this is related to the question of how do I know that >>> other people have consciousness like mine; except in that case one relies >>> in part on knowing that other people are constructed similarly. >>> >>> Brent >>> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
