On Tuesday, March 27, 2018 at 11:34:41 AM UTC-4, agrays...@ gmail.com wrote: On Monday, March 26, 2018 at 5:25:59 PM UTC-4, [email protected] wrote: On Monday, March 26, 2018 at 4:20:02 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 3/26/2018 10:17 AM, John Clark
wrote:
Brent Meeker Wrote"
>
It seems to me there's something fishy about making
behavior and conscious thought functionally equivalent so
neither can change without a corresponding change in the
other. My intuition is that there is a lot of my thinking
that doesn't show up as observable behavior. No doubt
it's observable at the micro-level in my brain; but not at
the external level. The behavior of your
neurons at the micro-level is what I’m talking about. A
change in the brain corresponds with a change inconsciousness and a change in consciousness corresponds
with a change in the brain. So mind is what the brain
does. So unless there is some mystical reason that carbon
is conscious but silicon is not a intelligent computer is
also conscious.
I don't doubt that. But does equal intelligence imply equivalent
consciousness.
IMO, the way you pose the question confuses the issue. You could have two Rovers which do different tasks, and conclude they have different intelligences based on some well defined definition. But how could you ascertain whether either is conscious? AFAICT, there is no understanding of what "conscious" means. I suppose one can say it involves the perception of sensation, pain, pleasure, etc. If you tore off a Rover's arm, it might be programmed to complain or otherwise register the adverse modification of its body. But if it did, wouldn't it be just simulating or mimicking a human response without being "conscious"? What the hell are we talking about? TIA, AG
You could program both Rovers to do arithmetic, but only one to do calculus. So you could say one is more intelligent than the other. Or you could program both to see in visible wave lengths, but only only to see in IR. So you could say one has superior vision than the other. But what you can never do IMO, is determine whether either Rover, in any circumstance, has self knowledge or self perception, or can experience rudimentary or complex sensations. So I don't think we're any closer to an explanation or understanding of consciousness than when we started, however long ago that was. AG
If we had a clue how self-reference could result from a neural network such as the human brain, we could, perhaps, duplicate it in a Rover or whatever, But I see no evidence that we have such an insight to do the modeling. CMIIAW. AG
It can be proved that if the neuronal network is Turing complete (an that happens quickly), it has the precise self-reference ability which gives him the same theology (including physics) that the one of PA, ZF, or of any machine believing in any arithmetical or combinatoric induction axioms.
Self-reference is where computer science excels the most. It is indeed born from a reflexion on paradoxes due to the self-reference ability of many mathematical structures.
You added:
"And if we had such a clue, we could determine if carbon is necessary for self-reference, or if silicon would do just fine. But I seriously doubt we know enough now to make such a determination, or to even begin the analysis. CMIIAW. AG “
We do have the clues, and we can answer that carbon, silicon cannot make any difference, unless you disbelieve in Mechanism. It is up to you, to suggest what a continuous non mechanist matter could be, and how it links consciousness (first person, knowledge) and the observation (something that the materialist have failed to explain since about 1500 years).
Bruno
In other words could I design two Mars Rovers that
behaved very similarly (as similar as two different humans) and yet,
because of the way I implemented their memory or computers their
consciousness was very different? Of course this is related to the
question of how do I know that other people have consciousness like
mine; except in that case one relies in part on knowing that other
people are constructed similarly.
Brent
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