On Thursday, March 29, 2018 at 11:28:56 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 27 Mar 2018, at 19:49, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, March 27, 2018 at 11:34:41 AM UTC-4, [email protected] > wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, March 26, 2018 at 5:25:59 PM UTC-4, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, March 26, 2018 at 4:20:02 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 3/26/2018 10:17 AM, John Clark wrote: >>>> >>>> Brent Meeker Wrote" >>>> >>>>> *> It seems to me there's something fishy about making behavior and >>>>> conscious thought functionally equivalent so neither can change without a >>>>> corresponding change in the other. My intuition is that there is a lot >>>>> of >>>>> my thinking that doesn't show up as observable behavior. No doubt it's >>>>> observable at the micro-level in my brain; but not at the external level.* >>>> >>>> The behavior of your neurons at the micro-level is what I’m talking >>> about. A change in the brain corresponds with a change inconsciousness and >>> a change in consciousness corresponds with a change in the brain. So mind >>> is what the brain does. So unless there is some mystical reason that carbon >>> is conscious but silicon is not a intelligent computer is also conscious. >>> >>>> >>>> I don't doubt that. But does equal intelligence imply equivalent >>>> consciousness. >>>> >>> >>> >>> *IMO, the way you pose the question confuses the issue. You could have >>> two Rovers which do different tasks, and conclude they have different >>> intelligences based on some well defined definition. But how could you >>> ascertain whether either is conscious? AFAICT, there is no understanding >>> of what "conscious" means. I suppose one can say it involves the perception >>> of sensation, pain, pleasure, etc. If you tore off a Rover's arm, it might >>> be programmed to complain or otherwise register the adverse modification of >>> its body. But if it did, wouldn't it be just simulating or mimicking a >>> human response without being "conscious"? What the hell are we talking >>> about? TIA, AG* >>> >> >> *You could program both Rovers to do arithmetic, but only one to do >> calculus. So you could say one is more intelligent than the other. Or you >> could program both to see in visible wave lengths, but only only to see in >> IR. So you could say one has superior vision than the other. But what you >> can never do IMO, is determine whether either Rover, in any circumstance, >> has self knowledge or self perception, or can experience rudimentary or >> complex sensations. So I don't think we're any closer to an explanation or >> understanding of consciousness than when we started, however long ago that >> was. AG* >> > > *If we had a clue how self-reference could result from a neural network > such as the human brain, we could, perhaps, duplicate it in a Rover or > whatever, But I see no evidence that we have such an insight to do the > modeling. CMIIAW. AG * > > > > > It can be proved that if the neuronal network is Turing complete (an that > happens quickly), it has the precise self-reference ability which gives him > the same theology (including physics) that the one of PA, ZF, or of any > machine believing in any arithmetical or combinatoric induction axioms. > > Self-reference is where computer science excels the most. It is indeed > born from a reflexion on paradoxes due to the self-reference ability of > many mathematical structures. > > You added: > > *"And if we had such a clue, we could determine if carbon is necessary for > self-reference, or if silicon would do just fine. But I seriously doubt we > know enough now to make such a determination, or to even begin the > analysis. CMIIAW. AG “* > > > > We do have the clues, and we can answer that carbon, silicon cannot make > any difference, unless you disbelieve in Mechanism. It is up to you, to > suggest what a continuous non mechanist matter could be, and how it links > consciousness (first person, knowledge) and the observation (something that > the materialist have failed to explain since about 1500 years). > > > Bruno >
*I cannot connect to anything you claim. AG * > > > >>> >>> In other words could I design two Mars Rovers that behaved very >>>> similarly (as similar as two different humans) and yet, because of the way >>>> I implemented their memory or computers their consciousness was very >>>> different? Of course this is related to the question of how do I know >>>> that >>>> other people have consciousness like mine; except in that case one relies >>>> in part on knowing that other people are constructed similarly. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
