> On 9 Apr 2018, at 00:03, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com
> <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 8, 2018 at 9:32 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> > There is evidence for physical atoms, but there is no evidence that physics
> > describe the fundamental theory.
> We know for a fact that physics is not yet a fundamental theory because it
> can’t explain what Dark Energy or Dark Matter is
That has nothing to do with physics being a fundamental theory or not. The
metaphysical/theological question is the question of reductibility of physics
to another science.
It seems that you assume Aristotle’s metaphysics, or that you take it for
granted. It identifies the physical reality with the fundamental reality.
The antic dream argument already falsifies the necessity of this, in some sense
(which can be made precise in such or such metaphysical theory).
> or why there is so much more matter than antimatter or tell us whats going on
> at the singularity of a Black Hole. Our Physics is the most fundamental
> theory we know of but we don’t know if THE Fundamental Theory even exists, it
> might be like the layers of a onion or an infinite Matryoshka doll and then
> will always be a more fundamental theory to find.
It depends on the metaphysical/theological assumption.
Like Aristotle, you confuse physics and metaphysics. That explains probably why
you confuse the notion of computation with the notion of physical computation.
I guess you take the primary physical universe for granted.
> > That is just a metaphysical assumption which has been recently debunked.
> I'm tired of you saying that, stop tell me and show me! But don’t show me a
> textbook made of physical atoms and don’t send me a pulse of physical
> electrons than my physical computer interprets as pixels on a physical
> screen, show me a pure number and let me watch it while that pure number
> performs a calculation, 2+2 would be good enough. Just do that and I will
> concede the argument.
All what I see, when I observe physicians and their discourses are people
inferring from a finite number of personal but sharable experiences that there
exists measurable numbers, and which then infer, still from finite number of
experiences, that there are computable relations between those numbers, and
that indeed they get better and better in that sport. But I see only the
numbers, and usually they don’t even try to related them with the personal
A (serious) metaphysician, or theologian, bet that, indeed, there is some
Reality “out there”, but the question is what is it.
Aristotle’s answer was the rather intuitive answer: it is what we see, measure,
Plato, and the “mystics”, were those who were skeptical about this, and
believed in deeper (mathematical?) relations. They were searching for first
> >> In that sense, numbers can count given that all partial computable
> >> functions are representable in Robinson Arithmetic
> > Numbers can't count, but I can count numbers.
> So what, all computable functions are also representable on a blank sheet of
> paper if a pencil is available. But paper can't count and Robinson Arithmetic
> can’t count and a textbook on Robinson Arithmetic can count no better than a
> rock can because the atoms in the textbook and the rock and the blank paper
> are not arranged in a way that allows them to do so. However if the same
> atoms that were in the Robinson textbook or the rock were arranged
> differently, as for example in the form of a computer, then those same atoms
> could count.
Relatively to you, yes.
> Finding the proper way to arrange those atoms took thousands of years to
> figure out (the ancient Greeks who you’re always babbling about were
> completely clueless on how to do it) but we eventually got the hang of it.
But if the ways are digital, and if Church-thesis is correct, then those
computations are all emulated by anything satisfying the axiom of very
elementary arithmetic, and worst, when you will acknowledge that you did
understand the third step of the Universal Dovetailer argument, you will
if we are no more than universal
then we are distributed in a very complex way in the logical consequence of
that very elementary arithmetic, and physics has to be retrieved by the logic
of self-reference of the universal machine, even the Löbian one, that is those
who believe in the usual elementary arithmetic, which includes the induction
axioms. This makes the machine able to be aware (in precise technical sense)
that they are universal, and the know all the shit which comes with: more
exactly they get a measure on their abyssal ignorance of arithmetic.
> >> they are not arranged that way in a rock.
> > I agree with this. A rock cannot be said to think, because a rock does not
> > implement a universal numbers.
> "Universal number” is yet another of your homemade slang terms.
Actually I have just discovered that Raymond Smullyan uses that terminology in
his late book.
See page 80 of its “A Beginner’s s further Guide to Mathematical Logic”, World
A very nice book, which might require the reading of its very nice “A
Beginner’s s Guide to Mathematical Logic”
It does not really matter if you use number, or Turing machine (finite set of
quadruplets), or lambda expressions.
Anything that you can define inductively with some laws making the system
Turing universal will do.
It happens that very elementary arithmetic is already Turing universal, so
universal number makes as much sense than universal game-of-life pattern, or
universal quantum Turing machine. Once you have one of them, you have all of
That does not solve the mind problem, but that get toward a mathematical
formulation. (The “solution”, at the propositional is given by Solovay theorem).
The general definition of a universal number, in the Turing Church sense, is
that, in an enumeration a_i of all terms in such system, the number u is
universal if a_u (x, y) = a_x(y).
With the universal beast u (the “computer”), you can give the program x, the
input y, and it emulate the program a_x on y.
With the intensional Church-Thesis, which is an easy consequences of the usual
one (which concerns the computable functions(the intensional one concerns the
ways they are computed) what any of such system can do, any other system can
do. So every computations is realised, again in a mathematical precise sense,
in the standard model of arithmetic, and also in all non standard models.
Here you seem to invoke your ontological commitment in “a physical primitive
reality” to select some computations, or some type of computations, but that is
not valid when you assume indexical computationalism.
> Perhaps you’re saying the same thing I am just more opaquely, I say a rock or
> a Robinson Arithmetic textbook cannot count or think because they don't
> implement the atomic arrangement information that would allow them to do so.
A rock does not made it, but for a different reason. Somehow, a rock does not
exist; they will belong to the type “dream-able”, as you have probably already
understood in your dream where you get the the 3td step of the UD reasoning.
Now, Robinson Arithmetic can count, because it is a universal machine, and you
can program it to count, and you can do it in any mathematical or physical
Turing universal subset of the mathematical and/or physical reality.
Amazingly perhaps Robinson Arithmetic, the formal machinery, do implement all
the arrangement information that allow them to do so.
A precise definition of computation is given in Martin Davis first four
chapters of Martin Davis “Computability & Unsolvability”.
But there are infinitely other precise definitions, and they are all equivalent
(provably for the many one discovered by the humans in 2018, but all of them,
with Church-Turing thesis.
And that tiny part of arithmetic emulate all computations, which includes those
dovetailing on the reals, and we, I mean we the universal Löbian thing, are
distributed in those many computations.
And the math confirms that we lose “local locality”, get indeterminate on what
we are isolated from, that it looks, below our sharable level of substitution,
like the many-worlds, with a quantum mathematics, so it looks that it works,
and thanks to the theorem of Gödel and Löb and Solovay, we get the part that
the machine can prove, and the part which is true, but that the
machine/number/word cannot prove.
> > Or you mean that you have some magical soul which can count,
> I mean that generic atoms that obey the known laws of information can count
> if they are arranged in the correct way, a way that can only be characterized
> by information
That means a program, if you agree with Church-Turing-Kleene-Post thesis.
> > but then you are out of the Digital Indexical Mechanist thesis.
> That's OK, I never knew I was even in "the Digital Indexical Mechanist
You are even the only authentic practicer of indexical computationalism in this
list (that I know of). Perhaps Hal Finney?
You said already yes to unknown, most plauibily digitalist, doctors of the
future, trusting them for the choice of the substitution level.
Ironically, applied mechanism seems to be like procrastinating the Nirvana and
to avoid recognising genuinely the other.
We will go there, not for immortality (which only brings infinite toothache,
infinite headache, infinite taxes, infinite gossips, …), but by love and
curiosity toward our grand-grand-grand-grand-children, or to see the next
soccer cup and drink beer with friends.
I guess that what stuck you in the 3d step is only your big ego, I’m afraid. A
common problem with many humans since long...
…as well as your decision to not study what is a computation, in the standard
sense adopted since Emil Post, Stephen Kleene (which uses mainly the structure
of computabily generable sets) or Church, Turing, etc. (But here you are not
You keep confusing computation and physical computation, and you keep confusing
physics and metaphysics, like Aristotle, and of course like many since about
1500 years of metaphysical materialism brainwashing.
> John K Clark
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.