> On 31 May 2018, at 02:33, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/30/2018 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> It is your invention as a straw man to be defeated by computationalism. >> >> >> ? (I have no clue why you say this) > >> .... >>> but most also suppose that it is not "primary”. >> >> Philosophers were more clear on this before +523. But since then, most take >> for granted primary matter. > > That's why I say it is a straw man you use rhetorically! If philosophers > don's explicitly repudiate matter and accept the reality of PA, you say they > are "taking for granted primary matter”.
I critique only those who use it to refute the consequence of mechanism. > >> >> >>> They look for a deeper more unified ur-stuff >> >> Which mean they still believe either in primary matter, and/or physicalism. > > No it doesn't mean that. How could you know that they mean that except by > noting that they don't reify mathematics...as you want them to. Please Brent! I do not want them anything more than *understanding* that the materialist paradigm is inconstant with the mechanist paradigm, and that the facts adds up to mechanism. > >> That cannot work with computationalism. Or, explain how anything can select >> the computations in arithmetic and makes them “real”, to how they make the >> arithmetical computation “unreal”. > > Of course something can make some computations unreal, namely their > non-existence in the world. Which World? You cannot appeal to an ontological commitment in science. Here is you god, selecting an histories, or a class of histories. How? Magical power? Then I can no more say yes to the doctor without praying or something. > All you have to do is note that some things exist and some don't; a very > simple and uncontroversial observation. That simplicity assume magical power that universal machine do not have. > >> >> >> >>> and many physicists have followed Wheeler and Tegmark in thinking of the >>> equations of mathematical physics as simply defining the ur-stuff. >> >> Reintroducing some primary matter in the picture. As I have explained >> “primary matter” does not need to be “material” for physicalism to be true, >> and with computationalism, physics *has* to be retrieved from the sigma_1 >> sentences, and their structures imposed by incompleteness. >> >> You seemed to have understood this awhile ago. I am unsure what you are >> missing now, of what could have change your mind. Physicalism just avoid the >> consciousness problem, and by this, missed the metaphysical or theological >> and non physical origin of the physical appearances and their laws. > > No, I didn't change. I noted sometime ago that your computationalism cannot > work without the physical world. Like the number 3 cannot “live” without the number 7777. It means that computationalism give a reason for the physical appearance. No universal (Gödel-Löbian) machine can miss this. > You say the physical world is recreated by computations implicit in > arithmetic. May be, but I did not say how much that those computations weigh on the measure. > To which I reply, "Fine, but then you have to also explain all the stuff that > doesn't happen. To explain everything, fails to explain at all.” On the contrary, the computations are explained by elementary arithmetic, and the measure which determine the physical reality is given by a special sum on *all* computations. Here the math are hard, but I have succeeded in showing that the “measure one” obeys a quantum logic. And there is an obvious intuitive “many-worlds” or “many-histories” interpretation of arithmetic provided by this. We need just to test this. Up to now, physicalism is quasi refuted, but mechanism is not. > >> >> I am patient, because I am aware of the 1500 years of brainwashing in the >> domain, which is an easy one, because it is a comfortable lies which please >> to the wishful thinkers. > > Don't play the victim. This philosophy, not politics. No philosopher should > care about public acceptance. All teachers have the right to despair when the kids refuse to do the homework. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Bruno >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
