> On 30 May 2018, at 20:29, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/30/2018 3:18 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> 2018-05-30 11:27 GMT+02:00 Lawrence Crowell >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>: >> On Tuesday, May 29, 2018 at 1:25:19 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> You miss my point that no one, no physicists, no philosopher, starts out by >> defining "primary matter". It is your invention as a straw man to be >> defeated by computationalism. Some physicists and some philosophers may >> suppose that the stuff described by physics is enough to explain the world >> we observe; but most also suppose that it is not "primary". They look for a >> deeper more unified ur-stuff and many physicists have followed Wheeler and >> Tegmark in thinking of the equations of mathematical physics as simply >> defining the ur-stuff. >> >> Brent >> >> This and other old philosophical ideas are of no utility in physics. There >> is no physical meaning to terms such as primary matter. >> >> Primary matter is a metaphysical idea about the reality... so of course it >> is of no utility in physics... but physics don't tell us anything about what >> is reality. > > Yet it tells us about how the world works and what we can and can't do. So > what exactly would it add know "what is reality". This is exactly like my > point about consciousness. When we can predict, construct, manipulate, > consciousness the way we do the physical world, then the "hard problem" of > consciousness will be as irrelevant as elan vitale is to biology and "primary > matter" is to physics. > >> >> Everythingism are metaphysical idea about what is reality... so if your >> concern is only in utility, philosophy doesn't concern you... >> >> Materialism, physicalim, computationalism, deism etc are metaphysical, >> philosophical and about what reality is... physics is about prediction on >> the reality, not about what ultimately reality is... it answers how, not >> what and why... >> >> The problem is with people equating physics whith physicalism... they're not >> the same, one is a metaphysical idea about the nature of reality. > > But I'm suggesting to you that this metaphysical idea is empty if it has no > consequences, but if it does have consequences then it's physics and not > metaphysics.
That does not work with computationalism. You would have to define “[]p & <>t & p” from scratch, and recover 1+1=2, all other hypostases, and this from the observations + an inconsistent identity link. Good luck! Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
