On Wed, Jun 06, 2018 at 06:41:35PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > One way of moving forward is that when you talk about the "Robust" > > universe case, you are effectively postulating Platonism of > > computations. > > ? > > I have used “robust” only for a physical universe. It is a physical universe in which we can run a UD.
This seems rather bizarre - so a non-robust universe can run a UD if it is immaterial, or can't run a UD at all (regardless of materiality). Sure the point of "robustness" is that it can instantiate a UD (actually I would argue, can instantiate enough of a UD for consious computations to be implemented). The point of step 7 is that materiality (which hasn't been defined) cannot have any observable influence over phenomenality if a UD is implementable. > Obviously, if our expansion continue for ever, we can make a case that our universe is not robust. I assume you're referring to Tiplers Omega point argument. However, if quantum computers are possible in our universe, then it is robust. > That would be a problem with step 7, but step 8 (or equivalent) makes this > non relevant. But step 8 only works for universes too feeble to run a UD. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellow [email protected] Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
