> On 11 Jun 2018, at 18:08, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018 at 5:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be 
> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> ​> ​why in the world did you say " With mechanism, obviously a soul, or a 
> first person experience can be duplicated from a third person pov. But not 
> from a first person pov”?
> 
> ​> ​I think this has ben explained many times,
> 
> I think the internet must have failed many times because it failed to deliver 
> any of those explanations to me.
> 
> > With mechanism we can duplicate you, in W and M, say. For an external 
> > observer who accept mechanism, there is a you conscious in W and there is a 
> > you conscious in M. In that sense (the 3-1 sense) your soul has been 
> > duplicated relatively to the external observer.
> 
> OK, I have no problem with any of that.
> 
> > But let us ask both the you in M and the you in W: both confirms that from 
> > their point of view, they have not felt any duplication, [...] at no moment 
> > do they have a FIRST PERSON experience of a split.
> 
> Exactly! If the copy had noticed the duplication that would mean the 
> duplication process was imperfect and caused a large enough difference 
> between the copy and the original that the copy noticed a discontinuous 
> change the instant the copy button was pressed but the original noticed no 
> change; however this is NOT what happened, if there was any imperfections in 
> the copy process at all the change was too small for the copy to notice that 
> anything unusual happened when the copy button was pressed.     
> 
> > and the other copy is no more attached to their personal experience. It is 
> > a doppelgänger. They might feel intimate with their   dippelganger in some 
> > intellectual way, but without magic or telepathy, despite they re both the 
> > “H-guy”, they have become independent person,
> 
> Forget telepathy! If 2 identical grandfather clocks are running properly and 
> set to the same time and you come back an hour later and notice they still 
> show the same time you don’t need to invoke telepathy to explain it, indeed 
> if they DIDN’T show the same time then you’d need to resort to some new 
> spooky action at a distance effect previously unknown to science.
> 
> > Their soul has been maintained private and integral: no soul duplication in 
> > the soul’s first personal view.
> 
> Stating something is not the same as proving something. You start with the 
> axiom that the “soul” can’t be duplicated, and end your “proof” by claiming 
> you’ve proven it.


I start from the fact that any exact prediction is refuted in both copies’ 
diary/memory. 





> 
> > See above
> 
> Why?
> 
> >>There is nothing indeterminate about that, its all 100% predictable.
> 
> >Ok, what is your algorithm in Helsinki?
> 
> Seeing Moscow will turn the Helsinki man into the Moscow man and seeing 
> Washington will turn the Helsinki man into the Washington man with 100% 
> certainty and no indeterminacy whatsoever.

That fails to give the prediction made in Helsinki about the immediate future 
experience. The H-guy know that he will survive in both place, but also but 
that in both places he will felt like surviving in only one place from its 
first person point of view.
That is the reason why it cannot predict which one will be lived in particular, 

Again, you fail to address the first experience lived by the two copies.

Bruno


> 
> > how the H-person, when still in Helsinki could predict who he will feel to 
> > be?
> 
> A prediction can’t be made until it is clear exactly who Mr. He is. Forget 
> people duplicating machines, if Mr. He means the man experiencing Helsinki on 
> June 11 2018 at 14:36:09 Coordinated Universal Time then Mr. He will 
> experience no city and no nothing tomorrow because by definition Mr. He will 
> not exist then. However if Mr. He means the person who remembers experiencing 
> Helsinki on June 11 2018 at 14:36:09 Coordinated Universal Time and if Mr. He 
> is duplicated then the fact that there are 2 answers to your question is no 
> more metaphysical or indeterminate or profound than the fact that there and 2 
> correct answers to the question “What is the value of X in this quadratic 
> equation X^2=4 ?”. Don’t you think it would be silly to demand to know the 
> one and only one true answer?
> 
> > You ignore the work of Theaetetus,
> 
> Theaetetus wasn’t a person, Theaetetus was one of Plato’s dialogs. And the 
> time reading Plato is time spent not reading FAR more important things.
> 
> > and apparently even Diophantus, who founded Algebra
> 
> If this list existed one thousand eight hundred years ago I’d be talking a 
> lot about Diophantus too, but there have been a few interesting developments 
> since the days of Diophantus, such as the far more recent discovery made in 
> 1530 on how to solve cubic equations, something Diophantus had no idea how to 
> do.
> 
> >>why would anybody working on modern scientific problems be interested in 
> >>what they ancient Greeks had to say about anything?
> 
> > Because in theology [...]
> 
> I don’t give a tinkers damn what is in theology nor should anyone who is 
> interested in modern scientific problems.      
> 
>  > I use theology in the original sense, which is almost the opposite sense 
> than the one used by any religious institution
> 
> And why would Bruno deliberately cause confusion by giving familiar words 
> like “theology” and “God” very unfamiliar meanings that are the very opposite 
> of the meanings used by billions of people today? For the same reason Bruno 
> sprinkles personal pronouns around so liberally in thought experiments, if 
> your idea is bad precise language is not your friend. It is better to be 
> thought of as being unclear than to be thought of as being stupid.
> 
> ​ ​John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
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