> On 8 Jun 2018, at 16:26, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 6:31 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> 
> >>  I said information was as close as you can get to the traditional 
> >> religious concept of the soul and still remain within the scientific 
> >> method. In the past I pointed out exactly what those similarities and 
> >> differences were, I will repeat them now:
> 
> * The soul is non material and so is information.
> * It's difficult to pin down a unique physical location for the soul, and the 
> same is true for information.
> *The soul is the essential, must have, part of consciousness, exactly the 
> same situation is true for information.
>  
> *The soul is immortal and so, potentially, is information.  
>  
> > Well. Thanks. Brent was quoting me, but your answer is not too bad.
>              
> >>But there are important differences too.
> 
> *A soul is unique but information can be duplicated.
> 
> >  With mechanism, obviously a soul, or a first person experience can be 
> > duplicated from a third person pov. But not from a first person pov,
> 
> And that is one (of many) problems with your “proof”. You start off by 
> assuming a physical mechanism can duplicate everything


False. I start from the assumption that I can survive from a digital emulation 
of my brain at some level. From this I have deduced many years ago the 
non-cloning theorem (without assuming quantum mechanics nor even an ontological 
 physical universe).




> EXCEPT for ​the​ first person pov,


EXCEPT *from*, not for.



> and then at the end you conclude you have proven mechanism can duplicate 
> everything EXCEPT for ​the​ first person pov .


Mechanism cannot duplicate or do something. Your phrasing is non sensical, and 
as often, you don’t seem to listen to what I say, and attribute me non sense 
that I have never asserted.



> 
> > you say that with Everett the observer does not feel the split.
> 
> Yes, but observers will feel things after both the Everett type split and the 
> duplicating machine type split, and if the environments they are put into are 
> different then what they feel will be different and they will become 
> different people from that point on, although both will remember being the 
> same person before the split (or walking into the copying machine).

OK then, but that entails the first person indeterminacy for the 
self-duplication. You make my point.



> 
> >> *The soul is and will always remain unfathomable, but information is 
> >> understandable, in fact, information is the ONLY thing that is 
> >> understandable.
> 
> > Theaetetus is *the* counterexample to this,
> 
> That is of course Bullshit, and like most of the wise men you recommend on 
> this list the guy who dreamed up Theaetetus would flunk a freshman algebra 
> test


No. He was a great mathematician. He proved the irrationality of all square 
root of non perfect square.

And his definition of knowledge is one of the main improvement in theology for 
that period.



> and didn't even know where the sun went at night. You've recommended many 
> many books on this list but only a very small number of them were written by 
> authors who have been dead for less than a century, but even those books are 
> unable to calculate 2+2.

<sigh>


Bruno



> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
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