> On 26 Jun 2018, at 16:14, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 10:57 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > Logic, laws, and principles are adopted after the fact to clean up problems > perceived in intuitive inferences; and their solutions are not always > consistent (c.f. Russell's definite descriptions vs free logics, or Graham > Priest defense of para-consistent logics). > > > But logically impossible things don't happen, and logically necessary things > do happen. > In this sense, can we not view it as logic being responsible for those > outcomes (in either preventing or necessitating something else)?
But logic per se cannot even produces the numbers, combinators or any universal machine. So we have to postulate at least one (Turing) universal “thing”. Now, postulating the K and S laws, or addition and multiplication, are enough. > > > > >> (Perhaps you would call this Logos) that is inherent to the structure of >> reality. If logic governs the necessity of reality, and can give rise to >> it, how do you see logic as isolated from true statements about arithmetic? > > I don't see formal logic as isolated from arithmetic. Informal logic is more > like a theory of physics. It attempts to capture and clean up specific areas > of discourse but it doesn't necessarily try to encompass everything. Just as > physics leave geography alone. Logic doesn't govern anything. It describes > usage of language (generally restricted to declarative sentences) that > preserves "truth" (which formally just a marker). It has no more to do with > reality than any other application of declarative sentences. > >> > > (I would ask the same question given above) > > At the very least, we could use the existence of logical law as part of ur > explanation, in the same way physicists cite physical laws as part of an > explanation for why apples fall from trees. Using also logic. The theory of everything coming from computationalism is a sub theory of most theories in math and physics. Bruno > > >> >> >>> >>> >>>> Hawking: "What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a >>>> universe for them to describe? The usual approach of science of >>>> constructing a mathematical model cannot answer the questions of why there >>>> should be a universe for the model to describe. Why does the universe go >>>> to all the bother of existing?" >>> "What is there? Everything! So what isn't there? Nothing!" >>> --- Norm Levitt, after Quine >>> >>> Everything theories can explain away the arbitrariness of the equations. >> >> On the contrary, they make everything arbitrary. >> >> >> This is only a problem for those theoretical physicists who still dream of >> one day deriving a single unique set of physical laws (matching our laws) >> directly from logic/mathematics. > > It is a problem for everyday physicists who are interested in why this rather > than that > > > Ahh. The Wheeler Question. > > > and don't consider it satisfactory to say it's because this happened here > while that happened in another world where you couldn't see...just like we > predicted. > > > We may not always get what we want. Reality may again surprise us with its > size. > >> >>> >>> >>>> Feynman: "It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we >>>> understand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of >>>> logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a >>>> region of space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that >>>> be going on in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite amount of >>>> logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?" >>> >>> "Because the world is made of physics, not logic." >>> - Brent Meeker >>> >>> That's circular. You're defining physics as something that inherently >>> should have the appearance of infinities, without a justification. I think >>> it is is a mystery in want of an explanation. >> >> Oh, and mathematics makes it exist is not a mystery? >> >> In terms of providing an explanation from simpler assumptions, it reduces >> the mystery, at least on that question. >> >> >> I'm not defining anything. I'm just noting that Feynman's observation, if >> true, is evidence against computationalism. >> >> >> Evidence against digital physics, but not against computationalism. > > Oh, yes I forgot. Nothing can count as evidence against computationalism, it > predicts everything and infinitely often. > > > Many things would count as evidence against computationalism. But if we > already had observations that ruled it out, we wouldn't be talking about it > as we would abandon it as refuted. > >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Wheeler: "Why these equations, and not others?" >>> >>> "These are the ones we invented to describe what we've seen." >>> - Vic Stenger >>> >>> >>> That's not what Wheeler is asking. Of course if physics were different, >>> our equations would be too. Wheeler is asking why is physics this way? >> >> And Stenger is answering, "Because these equations work and others don't." >> >> >> Work for what? What makes this set of physical laws one that works (vs. >> some other possible arrangement, which you think does not work)? > > They work because they predict what happens happens and what doesn't happen > doesn't happen. I think that's how Socrates explained "true". You keep > looking at the wrong end of the process. Nothing makes the "physical laws > work". We make the physical laws so that they work. > > I think Wheeler understood this, but this isn't his question. You alluded to > the mystery Wheeler was questioning up above, when talking about a search for > a final (meta) theory. > > >> >> >>> >>>> If we're to answer these questions, we may need some kind of metaphysical >>>> theory. Preferably one that is simple, and can explain/predict our >>>> observations. >>>> The existence of all possible computations may be one possible avenue for >>>> this. >>> >>> How would that be any better or worse than "all possible set theory" >>> >>> Set's by themselves don't compute anything, >> >> So what. They include things. So they could include all observations. >> >> Under the computational theory of mind, the sets would have to include >> computations, otherwise there could be no observations. >> >> If the set includes computations, then the set of all things would include >> all computations, and in terms of being an explanatory theory of our >> observations would be identical to the UD. > > I like the set of all phenomenon which exist. > > > What can you tell us about this set? > What does it predict? > How can it be ruled out? > >> >> >> >>> and so are insufficient to explain observations under a computational >>> theory of mind. >>> >>> or "all possible phsyics" >>> >>> That could work, if you define what is meant by a possible physics. With >>> computations at least, we have a clearly defined notion of all possible >>> computations. >> >> No, you don't. It's supposedly uncountably infinite. Do you have a clear >> notion of that? >> >> >> Programs are finite length integers. >> There is only one program per integer. >> So there is a countably infinite number of programs/computations. > > So what? Do you have a clear notion of countably infinite? > > About a clear a notion as I have for the number 5. I don't know everything > there is to know about it, but I know a few things about each. > > >> >> >>> >>> or "all possible novels"? >>> >>> Novels by themselves don't compute anything, and so are insufficient to >>> explain observations under a computational theory of mind. >> >> You keep saying "don't compute anything" as though it were a given that >> computationalism is right. If you allow me to assume physicalism is right I >> can prove computationalism is wrong. >> >> >> I think you need to have some theory of consciousness to reason about or >> have a TOEs (which necessarily must include as an explanation of >> consciousness). > > So you could base a theory of consciousness on novels. In many novels you > are told what the characters are thinking. > >> > > > Perhaps that would work. Though language is quite ambiguous and I think there > would be a lot of difficult in that path. > >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> So far, it is not ruled out, and might even be considered to be partially >>>> confirmed. It has the power to answer questions 2, 3 and 4. And for >>>> anyone who accepts arithmetical realism/no-cause needed for arithmetical >>>> truth, then it can answer 1 as well. >>> >>> All your questions are number 1. >>> >>> (It looks like your e-mail client changed them when you separated them) >>> >>> However, I would point out that Feynman's question implies that >>> computationalism must be false. >>> >>> No, this would be a consequence of computationalism as predicted >> >> Retrodicted. I'm still waiting for predicted. >> >> As far as theories go, the difference between prediction and retrodiction is >> only an accident of history. > > Except one is infinitely easier than the other. > > > I agree. But here Bruno didn't propose either theory, and computational > theory of mind wasn't proposed as a theory of QM. Both theories were > independently proposed by different people for different reasons. Bruno then > showed one could follow from the other. > > >> >> >>> by Bruno in his UDA. It is a confirmatiom, rather than a refutation, of >>> computationalism. >> >> His UD produces an uncountable infinity of computations, but there's no >> evidence it computes what goes on in a tiny piece of spacetime. >> >> >> Under computationalism, it necessarily computes every possible experience, >> infinitely often, in infinitely many ways. This explains the appearance of >> infinites lurking under the floor when we peek too closely at what underlies >> us. > > That's another of those sentences that start, "Assuming my theory is > right...all things must be explained by it". > >> > > > That's a necessary feature of any candidate TOE. > >> >> >> >> >> What about objective facts? Do objective facts always concern real objects? > > No, there is intersubjective agreement about theorems of mathematics. That's > why people are tempted to see it as existing in the same way as perceived > objects exist. > > > > I don't follow. Why do intersubjective facts about physical objects make > them real, while intersubjective facts about mathematical objects does not > make them real? > >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> It tells us no matter how much we might build and develop our theories >>>> (axioms) about the integers over time, we know that we will never finish >>>> the job. >>> >>> So is being infinite a known attribute of reality? Space appears to be >>> infinite too. >>> >>> >>> An infinite thing cannot be created by finite creatures in finite time. >> >> Can it be discovered? >> >> >> We can discover a finite number of things about it. > > Is "being infinite" one thing. > > > > If we take our current theories about them, yes, that is a consequence. We > might find an error in our current theories and refine them, but I doubt that > will happen. > > >> >> >> That's right, except Einstein didn't "believe in" the equations, he believed >> the equations were describing something real, but not completely. Otherwise >> he would not have spent years looking for a unified field theory that >> included spacetime, EM, and matter fields. >> >> I see that as the same motivation and goal of mathematicians. > > Except a mathematician wouldn't have cared that a theory didn't produce the > observed matter fields. If a mathematician had invented SUSY he'd still be > happy today; physicist are tearing their hair out because the LHC results are > ruling SUSY out. > > > They should be extra happy and excited. > > In any case, mathematicians faced a similar "hair pulling" event when Godel > showed that Hilbert's effort to axiomatize all of math was a doomed venture. > >> >> >>> >>> >>> Integers exist independently of the axioms too. The axioms our just the >>> mathematical analogue of our physical theories. They are our attempt to >>> "compress" our knowledge of phenomenon down to the most compact possible >>> form. In that compressed form, it helps us to then reason, explain and >>> predict new phenomena. >> >> So they are an abstraction of our knowledge. Doesn't sound independent to >> me. >> >> >> The axioms are no more responsible for creating the integers than our >> physical laws are for creating the universe. > > I'm glad you appreciate that physical laws don't create the universe, even if > they are about it. So why then don't you appreciate that the axioms are just > a theory of the integers and that the integers are infinite is just a part of > that theory, not necessarily a fact about the integers (that exist > independent of the axioms). This is the way physicists think about the > universe being infinite: We have a theory in which it could be infinite and > that theory says it will look locally flat and we see that it's locally flat. > So it might be infinite...but we know that's just a possibility, not > something we would rely on in a proof. > > Because I take the consequences of our current theoreis seriously. Don't you? > > Do you take it as irrelevant or inconsequential or probably wrong, when our > physical theories tell us our universe is probably spatially infinite? Or > does that lead you to consider the consequences of living in a spatially > infinite universe seriously, and a (potentially/probably) real possibility? > > > >> >>>> >>>> > Would you say that mathematics imposes "meta laws" which must be true >>>> across all possible/imaginable universes? >>>> >>>> Yes I think so, but the meta laws would be physical not mathematical. >>>> >>>> So perhaps the better question to you is: "Might what we consider now as >>>> physical laws ultimately be (or be derived from) mathematical laws"? >>>> >>>> If we're very lucky we might be able to describe those meta >>>> laws mathematically (although almost >>>> certainly not with the mathematics we have now) >>>> >>>> Why not? For example, If conscious experience is ultimately computational >>>> in nature, then Turing machines are sufficient to explain all possible >>>> experiences. >>>> We can already describe Turing machines with our existing mathematics. >>> >>> First, that's confusing. A Turing machine is an abstract bit of >>> mathematics. It isn't "described" as a real machine might be; it is >>> mathematics. >>> >>> We use math to describe mathematical objects. What is the problem? >>> >>> >>> Second, it's like saying English is sufficient to explain all possible >>> experiences. The trouble of course is that good explanation explains the >>> difference between the actual and the possible. >>> >>> >>> The trouble with that is you can't use the limited set of experiences you >>> have access to as evidence of a parsimony of actualized possibility. >> >> Well that certainly comes as a surprise to me. I thought my failure to >> experience a mastadon in my back yard meant that possibility was not >> actualized. I'll ask my wife to go look again. >> >> >> "I" is indexical to a single instance of conscious experience, it does not >> capture all of reality. > > True enough. But I've looked three times, so I'm going to generalize to a > theory that there's no mastadon in my backyard. > > > > Maybe you need to start digging. :-) > >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> but I don't think there is any chance of a pure mathematician ever finding >>>> them, we're going to need physical experiments to give us some hints and I >>>> just hope that doesn't require a particle accelerator the size of the >>>> galaxy. >>>> >>>> It will take more work, no doubt. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> > It is physically impossible to arrange 7 stones into a rectangle >>>> >>>> If there were not 7 stones or 7 of anything in the entire physical >>>> universe the entire concept of "7" would be meaningless. >>>> >>>> If there were 0 physical universes, then wouldn't 0 have meaning? Can >>>> zero have meaning without the >>>> contrast of 1? Once you have "0 and 1" now you have two unique concepts, >>>> so you get 2. Now you have 3 things, (and so on). >>> >>> It's that "and so on" that is problematic. >>> >>> What is the problem? >> >> It introduces infinities which leads to diagonalization proofs that some >> things are "true" but unprovable which leads to mysticism about where these >> "true" things reside. >> >> What is the source of the infinite complexity (out of the ultimate >> simplicity of "0 and its successors")? >> Why do mathematicians struggle for hundreds of years to prove simple >> statements, or to discover new reasonable axioms? > > Because it's fun. I also belong to an email called...wait for it...math-fun. > > > Here is one for you (and that list): > > Tomorrow you and another prisoner are to be executed. But you will both be > spared if you can succeed in the following game. You and the other prisoner > have tonight to decide on a strategy for playing this game: Tomorrow you and > your fellow prisoner will be put in different rooms, and both of you will > observe two completely independent and separate sequences of 100 coin tosses. > The goal is for each of you to choose a position in the other person’s > sequence of coin tosses such that the results of the coin tosses in those two > selected positions match. (i.e., both heads or both tails). What is your > strategy? > > Example: > Sequence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ... 100 > You see: T H H T T H H H T ... T and choose position 3 in your partner's > sequence > They see: H H T T H T T H T ... T and choose position 5 in your sequence > > You are both spared as you both chose matching results: both Tails. > > Jason > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
