On 6/25/2018 5:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 1:54 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 6/24/2018 6:43 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 3:30 PM, John Clark <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Jason Resch
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>wrote:
>//
/The only thing I am asking is:/
/1) Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc./
/2) ??? -> Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc./
/Do we have enough information to decide between the
above two theories? Have we really ruled out anything
sitting below physics?/
If I define physics as the thing that can tell the difference
between a correct computation and a incorrect computation and
between a corrupted memory and a uncorrupted memory, and as
long as we're at this philosophic meta level that's not a b
ad definition, then I don't think anything is below physics.
Physical theories are based on induction from observations and
experiences.
That process won't give us answers to these famous questions,
posed by physicists:
1. Leibniz: "*Why is there something rather than nothing?*"
"The reason that there is Something rather than Nothing is that
Nothing is unstable."
-- Frank Wilczek, Nobel Laureate, physics 2004
That is perhaps a reasonable analogy for the "quantum vacuum", but not
the philosophical nothing. For something with the capacity to decay
into something else, cannot rightfully be called nothing.
As Lawrence Krauss says the vacuum is just the potential for not being
nothing. The philosopher's "nothing" is incoherent.
1. Hawking: "*What is it that breathes fire into the equations*
and makes a universe for them to describe? The usual approach
of science of constructing a mathematical model cannot answer
the questions of why there should be a universe for the model
to describe. Why does the universe go to all the bother of
existing?"
"What is there? Everything! So what isn't there? Nothing!"
--- Norm Levitt, after Quine
Everything theories can explain away the arbitrariness of the equations.
On the contrary, they make everything arbitrary.
1. Feynman: "It always bothers me that, according to the laws as
we understand them today, it takes a computing machine an
infinite number of logical operations to figure out what goes
on in no matter how tiny a region of space, and no matter how
tiny a region of time. How can all that be going on in that
tiny space? *Why should it take an infinite amount of logic
to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?*"
"Because the world is made of physics, not logic."
- Brent Meeker
That's circular. You're defining physics as something that inherently
should have the appearance of infinities, without a justification. I
think it is is a mystery in want of an explanation.
Oh, and mathematics makes it exist is not a mystery? I'm not defining
anything. I'm just noting that Feynman's observation, if true, is
evidence against computationalism.
1. Wheeler: "*Why these equations, and not others?*"
"These are the ones we invented to describe what we've seen."
- Vic Stenger
That's not what Wheeler is asking. Of course if physics were
different, our equations would be too. Wheeler is asking why is
physics this way?
And Stenger is answering, "Because these equations work and others don't."
If we're to answer these questions, we may need some kind of
/metaphysical/ theory. Preferably one that is simple, and can
explain/predict our observations.
The existence of all possible computations may be one possible
avenue for this.
How would that be any better or worse than "all possible set theory"
Set's by themselves don't compute anything,
So what. They include things. So they could include all observations.
and so are insufficient to explain observations under a computational
theory of mind.
or "all possible phsyics"
That could work, if you define what is meant by a possible physics.
With computations at least, we have a clearly defined notion of all
possible computations.
No, you don't. It's supposedly uncountably infinite. Do you have a
clear notion of that?
or "all possible novels"?
Novels by themselves don't compute anything, and so are insufficient
to explain observations under a computational theory of mind.
You keep saying "don't compute anything" as though it were a given that
computationalism is right. If you allow me to assume physicalism is
right I can prove computationalism is wrong.
So far, it is not ruled out, and might even be considered to be
partially confirmed. It has the power to answer questions 2, 3
and 4. And for anyone who accepts arithmetical realism/no-cause
needed for arithmetical truth, then it can answer 1 as well.
All your questions are number 1.
(It looks like your e-mail client changed them when you separated them)
However, I would point out that Feynman's question implies that
computationalism must be false.
No, this would be a consequence of computationalism as predicted
Retrodicted. I'm still waiting for predicted.
by Bruno in his UDA. It is a confirmatiom, rather than a refutation,
of computationalism.
His UD produces an uncountable infinity of computations, but there's no
evidence it computes what goes on in a tiny piece of spacetime.
>>
Then why is brain damage a big deal? Why do I need my
brain to think?
>//
/The base computations that implement your brain may be
sub-routines of a larger computation,/
If true then that is an example of something physics can do
but mathematics can not. And I have to say that is a mighty
damn important sub-routine!
It's not truly doing something math is not, if you take the view
that math is what is ultimately "doing physics".
Sure, and it's not truly doing something that music is not, if you
take the view that music is what is ultimately "doing physics".
I don't follow.
There are many things that are not doing something that math is not doing.
>>
Without physics 2+2=3 would work just as well as
2+2=4 and insisting the answer is 4 would just be an
arbitrary convention of no more profundity than
the rules that tell us when to say "who" and when to
say "whom".
>
/For any computation to make sense, you need to be
working under some definitions of integers and relations
between them. /
Definitions are made for our convenience, they do not create
physical objects.
Physical theories are also made for our convenience and they do
not tell physical objects what to do.
Instead we study physical objects, and try to reason about what
laws make sense and describe the phenomenon we observe.
It is no different with mathematical theories (a.k.a. axioms and
theorems). Mathematicians study mathematical objects, and reason
about what laws make sense to describe the phenomenon we
observe. When they find sufficient justification, they can amend
or extend the fundamental theories (axioms), or even throw them
out altogether.
And there are an infinite number of ways integers and
the relations between them could have been defined,
If they were defined differently, they wouldn't be the integers,
but some other thing.
That's not what Bruno says. He takes Peano's axioms to be just
one possible axiomatization of the integers
We need to clarify between the subtle distinction between:
Defining something via two different means
vs.
Defining two different things having different properties
Different axiomatic systems that describe the integers are defining
the same thing via different means. For example, Peano arithmetic with
its successors of 0: 2 = "S(S(0))" vs. sets having different
cardinalities: 2 = "{{}, {{}}}", but both are describing the
non-negative integers. One representation will not prove things about
"2" that the other representation proves false. So we can use either
convention to access true properties concerning the object in question.
and he assumes the integers exist (somehow) independent of
whatever definition may be given, i.e they are "a first class object".
This is because whatever convention we use to describe the integers is
incomplete. The object in question, (say the number "2"), transcends
any finite attempt to define all of its properties.
Only because you "define" it using "...and so on..." thus introducing
infinitely many axioms.
so why did mathematicians pick the specific definition that
they did? Because that's the only one that conforms with the
physical world, and thats why mathematics is the best
language to describe physics.
Here, we know the definitions are not primary, for we know (since
Godel), that the integers are more complex than any finite set of
axioms can describe.
Is reality not "kicking back", when:
It tells us there are things that are true about the integers
which are not part of our starting definitions?
That's not reality, it's logical inference...which never reaches
anything not implicit in its premises.
What in your view makes something objective?
That there is intersubjective agreement on it. Note objective =/=
exists. It's objectively true that Holmes friend was named Watson, but
not that he exists.
It tells us no matter how much we might build and develop our
theories (axioms) about the integers over time, we know that we
will never finish the job.
So is being infinite a known attribute of reality? Space appears
to be infinite too.
An infinite thing cannot be created by finite creatures in finite time.
Can it be discovered?
To me, this is strong evidence that math is something objective,
which humans explore, rather than define or invent.
My mathematician friend, Norm Levitt used to say, "That's what
mathematicians think Monday thru Friday. On the weekend they
philosophize."
The statements "math is discovered" and "math is not discovered"
cannot both be true.
I'd say tell it to Norm, but he's dead now.
/
>
Without that, you can't even define what a Turing machine
or what a computation is./
I don't need to describe either one because I've got
something much much better than definitions, examples.
/
>
I can imagine a computation without a physical universe. /
I can't.
>//
/I can't imagine a computation without some form of
arithmetical law./
I can. A Turing Machine will just keep on doing what its
doing regardless of the English words or mathematical
equations you use to describe its operation.
If arithmetical law breaks down, and 0 starts to equal 1, then a
Turing machine will do something very different than what would
otherwise be predicted.
A Turing machine is a mathematical abstraction. It doesn't "do"
anything. If it "exists", it "exists" in a timeless Platonia.
By this same logic, the spactime Einstein believed in (which is
timeless, unchanging and eternal) doesn't do anything either. It too
belongs to Platonia.
That's right, except Einstein didn't "believe in" the equations, he
believed the equations were describing something real, but not
completely. Otherwise he would not have spent years looking for a
unified field theory that included spacetime, EM, and matter fields.
>>
As far as simulation is concerned in some
circumstances we could figure out that we live in a
virtual reality, assuming the computer that is
simulating us does not have finite capacity we might
devise experiments that stretch it to its limits and
we'd start to see glitches. Or the beings doing the
simulating could simply tell us, as they have
complete control over everything in our world so they
would certainly be able to convince us they’re
telling the truth.
>
T/hey could convince us something strange is going on,
but they couldn't convince us they weren't lying about
whatever they might be telling us about the architecture
that is running the simulation.
This follows directly from the Church-Turing thesis. The
Church-Turing thesis says any program or Turing Machine
can be executed/emulated by any computer. Therefore, no
program or machine can determine whether it is being
computed by or emulated by any particular Turing machine
vs. any other that might be emulating it./
OK, they could prove they're simulating us but they couldn't
prove the logical hardware architecture of their machine
worked the way they said it did, however in some
circumstances they could provide some pretty compelling
evidence that they were telling the truth. For example
suppose they found out how to solve all non-deterministic
polynomial time problems in polynomial time and that's how
they were able to make a computer powerful enough to simulate
our universe. And they said they themselves were being
simulated and their simulators told them how to do this and
now they are passing the secret on to us. We try it and
pretty soon we have made our own simulated universe with
intelligent, and presumably conscious, beings in it. After
that I’d tend to believe what they said.
That would still be just an algorithm. But in any case, I think
you understand my point: "software" can never be certain of the
"hardware". Which means we must be humble on the question of
where/how our consciousness is being computed.
I'm glad they don't teach that to neurosurgeons.
True.
>>
It was discovered more than 30 years ago that if
Quarks didn't exist inside protons then high speed
electrons would scatter off protons differently than
the way they are observed to scatter. If you assume
Quarks don't exist then there are consequences, those
high speed electrons will behave in ways that
surprise you. In other words physics told you that
your assumption was incorrect.
/
>
Okay. So you do accept relations between mathematical
objects can support your consciousness?/
A mathematical object is just something that has been
defined in the language of mathematics,
But humans weren't free to define Quarks any way they choose.
Quarks are objective, independently existing, mathematical objects.
?? They can't be both mathematical objects defined within a theory
and independently existing?
I meant independent of us (humans).
"Independently" can only refer to independence from theory. My
chair exists independent of theory because I can define it
ostensively.
If the same is true of integers (that they are objective,
independently existing,
Independent of what?
Of humans.
Above you thought they were dependent on the axioms set.
Integers exist independently of the axioms too. The axioms our just
the mathematical analogue of our physical theories. They are our
attempt to "compress" our knowledge of phenomenon down to the most
compact possible form. In that compressed form, it helps us to then
reason, explain and predict new phenomena.
So they are an abstraction of our knowledge. Doesn't sound independent
to me.
mathematical objects), then it might be that we can
explain/predict/derive the existence of quarks or other
properties of our physical universe from those more basic and
more fundamental laws.
J K Rowling defined Hogwarts Castle in the language of
English but that doesn't mean either of them must exist.
There are an infinite number of ways mathematicians could
have defined a quark but they picked the one that physics
told them to, the one that scattered electrons the way we see
in experiments.
>
/Integers (let's go by normal definitions of 0, 1, 2,
etc.) have properties./
People invented numbers thousands of years ago to count
things, if the laws of physics were different and physical
objects spontaneously duplicated themselves and spontaneously
disappeared our "normal definition" of integers would be very
different from what we have now.
Any civilization that must make rational decisions to increase
its chance of survival is confronted with the logic of true and
false. ("e.g. 'If we don't store food for winter we will
starve.') If that civilization reasons logically about true and
false, they will develop notions of "and" "or" "not", etc. This
leads trivially to the notion of counting "not" operators. An
even number of nots is equivalent to 0 nots, and any odd number
of nots is equivalent to 1 not. This notion of counting leads
directly to the same integers we know and love, regardless of the
physics in which that civilization arose.
No it doesn't. Counting is theory laden (as is all application of
mathematics). If I plan a party for the high school swim team and
the high school tennis team I need to count up the members. I
count 8 on the swim team and I count 9 on the tennis team. So the
party must be for 17. I'm sure you can see why this doesn't
work. It's because one needs an interpretation of the theory to
say what is a unit.
In boolean algebra, which is the theory of true/false and/not/or, an
expression "¬¬¬¬¬true" has a very different meaning than "¬¬¬¬true".
I don't know what you're saying?? But I agree that "true/false" in
logic have quite different meanings than in ordinary discourse.
Here boolean algebra leads to the unit of not operators ("¬"), which
must be counted to correctly parse and interpret the meaning of
boolean expressions. I don't see how ¬ operators can lead to two
different interpretations of what it means to count.
???
>
/We can't arbitrarily say "2+2=5", this is playing with
strings, not integers./
We can't be arbitrary if we don't want a conflict between
mathematics and physics, but if you take out physics then
play away, you can let 2+2 be anything you want and there are
no consequences.
If you have to assert that "0 = 1" to hold on to your ideas, I
would question the legitimacy of those ideas.
2+2=1 mod 3
>
/ Would you say that mathematics imposes "meta laws"
which must be true across all possible/imaginable universes?/
Yes I think so, but the meta laws would be physical not
mathematical.
So perhaps the better question to you is: "Might what we consider
now as physical laws ultimately be (or be derived from)
mathematical laws"?
If we're very lucky we might be able to describe those meta
laws mathematically (although almost certainly not with the
mathematics we have now)
Why not? For example, If conscious experience is ultimately
computational in nature, then Turing machines are sufficient to
explain all possible experiences.
We can already describe Turing machines with our existing
mathematics.
First, that's confusing. A Turing machine is an abstract bit of
mathematics. It isn't "described" as a real machine might be; it
is mathematics.
We use math to describe mathematical objects. What is the problem?
Second, it's like saying English is sufficient to explain all
possible experiences. The trouble of course is that good
explanation explains the difference between the actual and the
possible.
The trouble with that is you can't use the limited set of experiences
you have access to as evidence of a parsimony of actualized possibility.
Well that certainly comes as a surprise to me. I thought my failure to
experience a mastadon in my back yard meant that possibility was not
actualized. I'll ask my wife to go look again.
but I don't think there is any chance of a pure mathematician
ever finding them, we're going to need physical experiments
to give us some hints and I just hope that doesn't require a
particle accelerator the size of the galaxy.
It will take more work, no doubt.
>//
/ It is physically impossible to arrange 7 stones into a
rectangle/
If there were not 7 stones or 7 of anything in the entire
physical universe the entire concept of "7" would be
meaningless.
If there were 0 physical universes, then wouldn't 0 have
meaning? Can zero have meaning without the contrast of 1? Once
you have "0 and 1" now you have two unique concepts, so you get
2. Now you have 3 things, (and so on).
It's that "and so on" that is problematic.
What is the problem?
It introduces infinities which leads to diagonalization proofs that some
things are "true" but unprovable which leads to mysticism about where
these "true" things reside.
Brent
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