On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 6/25/2018 5:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 1:54 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> >> >> On 6/24/2018 6:43 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 3:30 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >* * >>>> *The only thing I am asking is:* >>>> *1) Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.* >>>> *2) ??? -> Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.* >>>> *Do we have enough information to decide between the above two >>>> theories? Have we really ruled out anything sitting below physics?* >>>> >>> >>> If I define physics as the thing that can tell the difference between a >>> correct computation and a incorrect computation and between a corrupted >>> memory and a uncorrupted memory, and as long as we're at this philosophic >>> meta level that's not a b ad definition, then I don't think anything >>> is below physics. >>> >> >> Physical theories are based on induction from observations and >> experiences. >> >> That process won't give us answers to these famous questions, posed by >> physicists: >> >> 1. Leibniz: "*Why is there something rather than nothing?*" >> >> "The reason that there is Something rather than Nothing is that Nothing >> is unstable." >> -- Frank Wilczek, Nobel Laureate, physics 2004 >> > > That is perhaps a reasonable analogy for the "quantum vacuum", but not the > philosophical nothing. For something with the capacity to decay into > something else, cannot rightfully be called nothing. > > > As Lawrence Krauss says the vacuum is just the potential for not being > nothing. The philosopher's "nothing" is incoherent. > I agree the philosopher's nothing is incoherent. But the quantum vacuum's appearance is not really an answer to the question of why there is something rather than nothing. I think it is a much stronger statement to say "because nothing is incoherent" or "because nothing is impossible", but even then such explanations will depend on a logic/law/principal (Perhaps you would call this *Logos*) that is inherent to the structure of reality. If logic governs the necessity of reality, and can give rise to it, how do you see logic as isolated from true statements about arithmetic? > > > >> >> >> 1. Hawking: "*What is it that breathes fire into the equations* and >> makes a universe for them to describe? The usual approach of science of >> constructing a mathematical model cannot answer the questions of why there >> should be a universe for the model to describe. Why does the universe go >> to >> all the bother of existing?" >> >> "What is there? Everything! So what isn't there? Nothing!" >> --- Norm Levitt, after Quine >> > > Everything theories can explain away the arbitrariness of the equations. > > > On the contrary, they make everything arbitrary. > > This is only a problem for those theoretical physicists who still dream of one day deriving a single unique set of physical laws (matching our laws) directly from logic/mathematics. > > >> >> >> 1. Feynman: "It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we >> understand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of >> logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a >> region of space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that >> be going on in that tiny space? *Why should it take an infinite >> amount of logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going >> to >> do?*" >> >> >> "Because the world is made of physics, not logic." >> - Brent Meeker >> > > That's circular. You're defining physics as something that inherently > should have the appearance of infinities, without a justification. I think > it is is a mystery in want of an explanation. > > > Oh, and mathematics makes it exist is not a mystery? > In terms of providing an explanation from simpler assumptions, it reduces the mystery, at least on that question. > I'm not defining anything. I'm just noting that Feynman's observation, if > true, is evidence against computationalism. > > Evidence against digital physics, but not against computationalism. > > >> >> >> >> 1. Wheeler: "*Why these equations, and not others?*" >> >> >> "These are the ones we invented to describe what we've seen." >> - Vic Stenger >> >> > That's not what Wheeler is asking. Of course if physics were different, > our equations would be too. Wheeler is asking why is physics this way? > > > And Stenger is answering, "Because these equations work and others don't." > Work for what? What makes this set of physical laws one that works (vs. some other possible arrangement, which you think does not work)? > > > >> If we're to answer these questions, we may need some kind of >> *metaphysical* theory. Preferably one that is simple, and can >> explain/predict our observations. >> The existence of all possible computations may be one possible avenue for >> this. >> >> >> How would that be any better or worse than "all possible set theory" >> > > Set's by themselves don't compute anything, > > > So what. They include things. So they could include all observations. > Under the computational theory of mind, the sets would have to include computations, otherwise there could be no observations. If the set includes computations, then the set of all things would include all computations, and in terms of being an explanatory theory of our observations would be identical to the UD. > > and so are insufficient to explain observations under a computational > theory of mind. > > >> or "all possible phsyics" >> > > That could work, if you define what is meant by a possible physics. With > computations at least, we have a clearly defined notion of all possible > computations. > > > No, you don't. It's supposedly uncountably infinite. Do you have a clear > notion of that? > > Programs are finite length integers. There is only one program per integer. So there is a countably infinite number of programs/computations. > > >> or "all possible novels"? >> > > Novels by themselves don't compute anything, and so are insufficient to > explain observations under a computational theory of mind. > > > You keep saying "don't compute anything" as though it were a given that > computationalism is right. If you allow me to assume physicalism is right > I can prove computationalism is wrong. > > I think you need to have some theory of consciousness to reason about or have a TOEs (which necessarily must include as an explanation of consciousness). > > > >> >> >> So far, it is not ruled out, and might even be considered to be partially >> confirmed. It has the power to answer questions 2, 3 and 4. And for >> anyone who accepts arithmetical realism/no-cause needed for arithmetical >> truth, then it can answer 1 as well. >> >> >> All your questions are number 1. >> > > (It looks like your e-mail client changed them when you separated them) > > >> However, I would point out that Feynman's question implies that >> computationalism must be false. >> > > No, this would be a consequence of computationalism as predicted > > > Retrodicted. I'm still waiting for predicted. > As far as theories go, the difference between prediction and retrodiction is only an accident of history. > > by Bruno in his UDA. It is a confirmatiom, rather than a refutation, of > computationalism. > > > His UD produces an uncountable infinity of computations, but there's no > evidence it computes what goes on in a tiny piece of spacetime. > > Under computationalism, it necessarily computes every possible experience, infinitely often, in infinitely many ways. This explains the appearance of infinites lurking under the floor when we peek too closely at what underlies us. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >> >>>>> Then why is brain damage a big deal? Why do I need my brain to think? >>>>> >>>> >>>> >* * >>>> *The base computations that implement your brain may be sub-routines of >>>> a larger computation,* >>>> >>> >>> If true then that is an example of something physics can do but >>> mathematics can not. And I have to say that is a mighty damn important >>> sub-routine! >>> >> >> It's not truly doing something math is not, if you take the view that >> math is what is ultimately "doing physics". >> >> >> Sure, and it's not truly doing something that music is not, if you take >> the view that music is what is ultimately "doing physics". >> > > I don't follow. > > > There are many things that are not doing something that math is not doing. > > > > >> >> >> >> >>> >> >>>>> Without physics 2+2=3 would work just as well as 2+2=4 and insisting >>>>> the answer is 4 would just be an arbitrary convention of no more >>>>> profundity >>>>> than the rules that tell us when to say "who" and when to say "whom". >>>>> >>>> > >>>> *For any computation to make sense, you need to be working under some >>>> definitions of integers and relations between them. * >>>> >>> >>> Definitions are made for our convenience, they do not create physical >>> objects. >>> >> >> Physical theories are also made for our convenience and they do not tell >> physical objects what to do. >> Instead we study physical objects, and try to reason about what laws make >> sense and describe the phenomenon we observe. >> >> It is no different with mathematical theories (a.k.a. axioms and >> theorems). Mathematicians study mathematical objects, and reason about >> what laws make sense to describe the phenomenon we observe. When they find >> sufficient justification, they can amend or extend the fundamental theories >> (axioms), or even throw them out altogether. >> >> >>> And there are an infinite number of ways integers and the relations >>> between them could have been defined, >>> >> >> If they were defined differently, they wouldn't be the integers, but some >> other thing. >> >> >> That's not what Bruno says. He takes Peano's axioms to be just one >> possible axiomatization of the integers >> > > > We need to clarify between the subtle distinction between: > Defining something via two different means > vs. > Defining two different things having different properties > > Different axiomatic systems that describe the integers are defining the > same thing via different means. For example, Peano arithmetic with its > successors of 0: 2 = "S(S(0))" vs. sets having different cardinalities: 2 = > "{{}, {{}}}", but both are describing the non-negative integers. One > representation will not prove things about "2" that the other > representation proves false. So we can use either convention to access > true properties concerning the object in question. > > > > >> and he assumes the integers exist (somehow) independent of whatever >> definition may be given, i.e they are "a first class object". >> > > > This is because whatever convention we use to describe the integers is > incomplete. The object in question, (say the number "2"), transcends any > finite attempt to define all of its properties. > > > Only because you "define" it using "...and so on..." thus introducing > infinitely many axioms. > > > >> >> >> >>> so why did mathematicians pick the specific definition that they did? >>> Because that's the only one that conforms with the physical world, and >>> thats why mathematics is the best language to describe physics. >>> >> >> Here, we know the definitions are not primary, for we know (since Godel), >> that the integers are more complex than any finite set of axioms can >> describe. >> >> Is reality not "kicking back", when: >> It tells us there are things that are true about the integers which are >> not part of our starting definitions? >> >> >> That's not reality, it's logical inference...which never reaches anything >> not implicit in its premises. >> > > What in your view makes something objective? > > > That there is intersubjective agreement on it. Note objective =/= > exists. It's objectively true that Holmes friend was named Watson, but not > that he exists. > > What about objective facts? Do objective facts always concern real objects? > > >> >> >> It tells us no matter how much we might build and develop our theories >> (axioms) about the integers over time, we know that we will never finish >> the job. >> >> >> So is being infinite a known attribute of reality? Space appears to be >> infinite too. >> >> > An infinite thing cannot be created by finite creatures in finite time. > > > Can it be discovered? > > We can discover a finite number of things about it. > > >> >> To me, this is strong evidence that math is something objective, which >> humans explore, rather than define or invent. >> >> >> My mathematician friend, Norm Levitt used to say, "That's what >> mathematicians think Monday thru Friday. On the weekend they philosophize." >> >> > The statements "math is discovered" and "math is not discovered" cannot > both be true. > > > I'd say tell it to Norm, but he's dead now. > > > >> >> >>> >>>> * > Without that, you can't even define what a Turing machine or >>>> what a computation is.* >>>> >>> >>> I don't need to describe either one because I've got something much >>> much better than definitions, examples. >>> >>> * > I can imagine a computation without a physical universe. * >>>> >>> >>> I can't. >>> >>> >>> >* * >>>> *I can't imagine a computation without some form of arithmetical law.* >>>> >>> >>> I can. A Turing Machine will just keep on doing what its doing >>> regardless of the English words or mathematical equations you use to >>> describe its operation. >>> >> >> If arithmetical law breaks down, and 0 starts to equal 1, then a Turing >> machine will do something very different than what would otherwise be >> predicted. >> >> >> A Turing machine is a mathematical abstraction. It doesn't "do" >> anything. If it "exists", it "exists" in a timeless Platonia. >> > > > By this same logic, the spactime Einstein believed in (which is timeless, > unchanging and eternal) doesn't do anything either. It too belongs to > Platonia. > > > That's right, except Einstein didn't "believe in" the equations, he > believed the equations were describing something real, but not completely. > Otherwise he would not have spent years looking for a unified field theory > that included spacetime, EM, and matter fields. > I see that as the same motivation and goal of mathematicians. > > > >> >> >> >> >>> >> >>>>> As far as simulation is concerned in some circumstances we could >>>>> figure out that we live in a virtual reality, assuming the computer that >>>>> is >>>>> simulating us does not have finite capacity we might devise experiments >>>>> that stretch it to its limits and we'd start to see glitches. Or the >>>>> beings doing the simulating could simply tell us, as they have complete >>>>> control over everything in our world so they would certainly be able >>>>> to convince us they’re telling the truth. >>>>> >>>> >>>> > >>>> T >>>> *hey could convince us something strange is going on, but they couldn't >>>> convince us they weren't lying about whatever they might be telling us >>>> about the architecture that is running the simulation. This follows >>>> directly from the Church-Turing thesis. The Church-Turing thesis says any >>>> program or Turing Machine can be executed/emulated by any computer. >>>> Therefore, no program or machine can determine whether it is being computed >>>> by or emulated by any particular Turing machine vs. any other that might be >>>> emulating it.* >>>> >>> >>> OK, they could prove they're simulating us but they couldn't prove the >>> logical hardware architecture of their machine worked the way they said it >>> did, however in some circumstances they could provide some pretty >>> compelling evidence that they were telling the truth. For example suppose >>> they found out how to solve all non-deterministic polynomial time problems >>> in polynomial time and that's how they were able to make a computer >>> powerful enough to simulate our universe. And they said they themselves >>> were being simulated and their simulators told them how to do this and now >>> they are passing the secret on to us. We try it and pretty soon we have >>> made our own simulated universe with intelligent, and presumably conscious, >>> beings in it. After that I’d tend to believe what they said. >>> >> >> >> That would still be just an algorithm. But in any case, I think you >> understand my point: "software" can never be certain of the "hardware". >> Which means we must be humble on the question of where/how our >> consciousness is being computed. >> >> >> I'm glad they don't teach that to neurosurgeons. >> >> > True. > > >> >> >>> >>> >> >>>>> It was discovered more than 30 years ago that if Quarks didn't exist >>>>> inside protons then high speed electrons would scatter off protons >>>>> differently than the way they are observed to scatter. If you assume >>>>> Quarks >>>>> don't exist then there are consequences, those high speed electrons will >>>>> behave in ways that surprise you. In other words physics told you that >>>>> your >>>>> assumption was incorrect. >>>>> >>>> >>>> * > Okay. So you do accept relations between mathematical objects can >>>> support your consciousness?* >>>> >>> >>> A mathematical object is just something that has been defined in the >>> language of mathematics, >>> >> >> But humans weren't free to define Quarks any way they choose. >> Quarks are objective, independently existing, mathematical objects. >> >> >> ?? They can't be both mathematical objects defined within a theory and >> independently existing? >> > > I meant independent of us (humans). > > >> "Independently" can only refer to independence from theory. My chair >> exists independent of theory because I can define it ostensively. >> >> >> If the same is true of integers (that they are objective, independently >> existing, >> >> >> Independent of what? >> > > Of humans. > > >> Above you thought they were dependent on the axioms set. >> > > Integers exist independently of the axioms too. The axioms our just the > mathematical analogue of our physical theories. They are our attempt to > "compress" our knowledge of phenomenon down to the most compact possible > form. In that compressed form, it helps us to then reason, explain and > predict new phenomena. > > > So they are an abstraction of our knowledge. Doesn't sound independent to > me. > > The axioms are no more responsible for creating the integers than our physical laws are for creating the universe. > > >> >> >> mathematical objects), then it might be that we can >> explain/predict/derive the existence of quarks or other properties of our >> physical universe from those more basic and more fundamental laws. >> >> >>> J K Rowling defined Hogwarts Castle in the language of English but that >>> doesn't mean either of them must exist. There are an infinite number of >>> ways mathematicians could have defined a quark but they picked the one that >>> physics told them to, the one that scattered electrons the way we see in >>> experiments. >>> >>> >>>> > >>>> *Integers (let's go by normal definitions of 0, 1, 2, etc.) have >>>> properties.* >>>> >>> People invented numbers thousands of years ago to count things, if the >>> laws of physics were different and physical objects spontaneously >>> duplicated themselves and spontaneously disappeared our "normal definition" >>> of integers would be very different from what we have now. >>> >> Any civilization that must make rational decisions to increase its chance >> of survival is confronted with the logic of true and false. ("e.g. 'If we >> don't store food for winter we will starve.') If that civilization reasons >> logically about true and false, they will develop notions of "and" "or" >> "not", etc. This leads trivially to the notion of counting "not" >> operators. An even number of nots is equivalent to 0 nots, and any odd >> number of nots is equivalent to 1 not. This notion of counting leads >> directly to the same integers we know and love, regardless of the physics >> in which that civilization arose. >> >> >> No it doesn't. Counting is theory laden (as is all application of >> mathematics). If I plan a party for the high school swim team and the high >> school tennis team I need to count up the members. I count 8 on the swim >> team and I count 9 on the tennis team. So the party must be for 17. I'm >> sure you can see why this doesn't work. It's because one needs an >> interpretation of the theory to say what is a unit. >> > > In boolean algebra, which is the theory of true/false and/not/or, an > expression "¬¬¬¬¬true" has a very different meaning than "¬¬¬¬true". > > > I don't know what you're saying?? But I agree that "true/false" in logic > have quite different meanings than in ordinary discourse. > > Here boolean algebra leads to the unit of not operators ("¬"), which must > be counted to correctly parse and interpret the meaning of boolean > expressions. I don't see how ¬ operators can lead to two different > interpretations of what it means to count. > > > ??? > > Logic of true & false leads to (requires) counting. Counting requires distinctions of magnitudes. Distinctions of magnitude and counting yield the non-negative integers. > > >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> > >>>> *We can't arbitrarily say "2+2=5", this is playing with strings, not >>>> integers.* >>>> >>> >>> We can't be arbitrary if we don't want a conflict between mathematics >>> and physics, but if you take out physics then play away, you can let 2+2 >>> be anything you want and there are no consequences. >>> >>> >> >> If you have to assert that "0 = 1" to hold on to your ideas, I would >> question the legitimacy of those ideas. >> >> > 2+2=1 mod 3 > You're not really saying 2+2=1, you're using a convenient notation for expressing the truth that "2+2 / 3 has a remainder = 1" > > >> >>> >>> > >>>> * Would you say that mathematics imposes "meta laws" which must be true >>>> across all possible/imaginable universes?* >>>> >>> >>> Yes I think so, but the meta laws would be physical not mathematical. >>> >> >> So perhaps the better question to you is: "Might what we consider now as >> physical laws ultimately be (or be derived from) mathematical laws"? >> >> >>> If we're very lucky we might be able to describe those meta laws >>> mathematically (although almost certainly not with the mathematics we have >>> now) >>> >> >> Why not? For example, If conscious experience is ultimately >> computational in nature, then Turing machines are sufficient to explain all >> possible experiences. >> We can already describe Turing machines with our existing mathematics. >> >> >> First, that's confusing. A Turing machine is an abstract bit of >> mathematics. It isn't "described" as a real machine might be; it is >> mathematics. >> > > We use math to describe mathematical objects. What is the problem? > > > >> Second, it's like saying English is sufficient to explain all possible >> experiences. The trouble of course is that good explanation explains the >> difference between the actual and the possible. >> > > > The trouble with that is you can't use the limited set of experiences you > have access to as evidence of a parsimony of actualized possibility. > > > Well that certainly comes as a surprise to me. I thought my failure to > experience a mastadon in my back yard meant that possibility was not > actualized. I'll ask my wife to go look again. > > "I" is indexical to a single instance of conscious experience, it does not capture all of reality. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> but I don't think there is any chance of a pure mathematician ever >>> finding them, we're going to need physical experiments to give us some >>> hints and I just hope that doesn't require a particle accelerator the size >>> of the galaxy. >>> >> >> It will take more work, no doubt. >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >** >>>> * It is physically impossible to arrange 7 stones into a rectangle* >>>> >>> >>> If there were not 7 stones or 7 of anything in the entire physical >>> universe the entire concept of "7" would be meaningless. >>> >>> >> >> If there were 0 physical universes, then wouldn't 0 have meaning? Can >> zero have meaning without the contrast of 1? Once you have "0 and 1" now >> you have two unique concepts, so you get 2. Now you have 3 things, (and so >> on). >> >> >> It's that "and so on" that is problematic. >> > > What is the problem? > > > It introduces infinities which leads to diagonalization proofs that some > things are "true" but unprovable which leads to mysticism about where these > "true" things reside. > What is the source of the infinite complexity (out of the ultimate simplicity of "0 and its successors")? Why do mathematicians struggle for hundreds of years to prove simple statements, or to discover new reasonable axioms? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
