> On 27 Jun 2018, at 05:20, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/26/2018 7:14 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 10:57 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> Logic, laws, and principles are adopted after the fact to clean up problems >> perceived in intuitive inferences; and their solutions are not always >> consistent (c.f. Russell's definite descriptions vs free logics, or Graham >> Priest defense of para-consistent logics). >> >> >> But logically impossible things don't happen, and logically necessary things >> do happen. > > > The only logically impossible event is "X both happened and didn't happen." > The only logically necessary event is "X either happened or didn't happen." > Logic tells you nothing except what is already in the premises.
All theories do that. > >> In this sense, can we not view it as logic being responsible for those >> outcomes (in either preventing or necessitating something else)? >> >> >> >> >>> (Perhaps you would call this Logos) that is inherent to the structure of >>> reality. If logic governs the necessity of reality, and can give rise to >>> it, how do you see logic as isolated from true statements about arithmetic? >> >> I don't see formal logic as isolated from arithmetic. Informal logic is >> more like a theory of physics. It attempts to capture and >> clean up specific areas of discourse but it doesn't necessarily try to >> encompass everything. Just as physics leave geography alone. Logic doesn't >> govern anything. It describes usage of language (generally restricted to >> declarative sentences) that preserves "truth" (which formally just a >> marker). It has no more to do with reality than any other application of >> declarative sentences. >> >>> >> >> (I would ask the same question given above) >> >> At the very least, we could use the existence of logical law as part of ur >> explanation, in the same way physicists cite physical laws as part of an >> explanation for why apples fall from trees. > > Sure. We state some premises about mass-energy and metrics and force-free > geodesics and we can predict where the apple will land. But logic and > mathematics just bring out what is implicit in those premises. > >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Hawking: "What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a >>>>> universe for them to describe? The usual approach of science of >>>>> constructing a mathematical model cannot answer the questions of why >>>>> there should be a universe for the model to describe. Why does the >>>>> universe go to all the bother of existing?" >>>> "What is there? Everything! So what isn't there? Nothing!" >>>> --- Norm Levitt, after Quine >>>> >>>> Everything theories can explain away the arbitrariness of the equations. >>> >>> On the contrary, they make everything arbitrary. >>> >>> >>> This is only a problem for those theoretical physicists who still dream of >>> one day deriving a single unique set of physical laws (matching our laws) >>> directly from logic/mathematics. >> >> It is a problem for everyday physicists who are interested in why this >> rather than that >> >> >> Ahh. The Wheeler Question. >> >> >> and don't consider it satisfactory to say it's because this happened here >> while that happened in another world where you couldn't see...just like we >> predicted. >> >> >> We may not always get what we want. Reality may again surprise us with its >> size. > > "Only two things are infinite. The universe and human stupidity. And I'm > not so sure about the universe." > --- Albert Einstein > >> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Feynman: "It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we >>>>> understand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of >>>>> logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a >>>>> region of space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all >>>>> that be going on in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite >>>>> amount of logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going >>>>> to do?" >>>> >>>> "Because the world is made of physics, not logic." >>>> - Brent Meeker >>>> >>>> That's circular. You're defining physics as something that inherently >>>> should have the appearance of infinities, without a justification. I >>>> think it is is a mystery in want of an explanation. >>> >>> Oh, and mathematics makes it exist is not a mystery? >>> >>> In terms of providing an explanation from simpler assumptions, it reduces >>> the mystery, at least on that question. >>> >>> >>> I'm not defining anything. I'm just noting that Feynman's observation, if >>> true, is evidence against computationalism. >>> >>> >>> Evidence against digital physics, but not against computationalism. >> >> Oh, yes I forgot. Nothing can count as evidence against computationalism, >> it predicts everything and infinitely often. >> >> >> Many things would count as evidence against computationalism. But if we >> already had observations that ruled it out, we wouldn't be talking about it >> as we would abandon it as refuted. >> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Wheeler: "Why these equations, and not others?" >>>> >>>> "These are the ones we invented to describe what we've seen." >>>> - Vic Stenger >>>> >>>> >>>> That's not what Wheeler is asking. Of course if physics were different, >>>> our equations would be too. Wheeler is asking why is physics this way? >>> >>> And Stenger is answering, "Because these equations work and others don't." >>> >>> >>> Work for what? What makes this set of physical laws one that works (vs. >>> some other possible arrangement, which you think does not work)? >> >> They work because they predict what happens happens and what doesn't happen >> doesn't happen. I think that's how Socrates explained "true". You keep >> looking at the wrong end of the process. Nothing makes the "physical laws >> work". We make the physical laws so that they work. >> >> I think Wheeler understood this, but this isn't his question. You alluded >> to the mystery Wheeler was questioning up above, when talking about a search >> for a final (meta) theory. >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> If we're to answer these questions, we may need some kind of metaphysical >>>>> theory. Preferably one that is simple, and can explain/predict our >>>>> observations. >>>>> The existence of all possible computations may be one possible avenue for >>>>> this. >>>> >>>> How would that be any better or worse than "all possible set theory" >>>> >>>> Set's by themselves don't compute anything, >>> >>> So what. They include things. So they could include all observations. >>> >>> Under the computational theory of mind, the sets would have to include >>> computations, otherwise there could be no observations. >>> >>> If the set includes computations, then the set of all things would include >>> all computations, and in terms of being an explanatory theory of our >>> observations would be identical to the UD. >> >> I like the set of all phenomenon which exist. >> >> >> What can you tell us about this set? > > We see a sample of it. > >> What does it predict? > > Sets don't predict things. We do. > >> How can it be ruled out? > > It can't. It's like the integers, it "exists" by definition. > >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> and so are insufficient to explain observations under a computational >>>> theory of mind. >>>> >>>> or "all possible phsyics" >>>> >>>> That could work, if you define what is meant by a possible physics. With >>>> computations at least, we have a clearly defined notion of all possible >>>> computations. >>> >>> No, you don't. It's supposedly uncountably infinite. Do you have a clear >>> notion of that? >>> >>> >>> Programs are finite length integers. >>> There is only one program per integer. >>> So there is a countably infinite number of programs/computations. >> >> So what? Do you have a clear notion of countably infinite? >> >> About a clear a notion as I have for the number 5. I don't know everything >> there is to know about it, but I know a few things about each. > > It there a supremum of the digits of pi which will ever be known? > >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> or "all possible novels"? >>>> >>>> Novels by themselves don't compute anything, and so are insufficient to >>>> explain observations under a computational theory of mind. >>> >>> You keep saying "don't compute anything" as though it were a given that >>> computationalism is right. If you allow me to assume physicalism is right >>> I can prove computationalism is wrong. >>> >>> >>> I think you need to have some theory of consciousness to reason about or >>> have a TOEs (which necessarily must include as an explanation of >>> consciousness). >> >> So you could base a theory of consciousness on novels. In many novels you >> are told what the characters are thinking. >> >>> >> >> >> Perhaps that would work. Though language is quite ambiguous and I think >> there would be a lot of difficult in that path. >> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> So far, it is not ruled out, and might even be considered to be partially >>>>> confirmed. It has the power to answer questions 2, 3 and 4. And for >>>>> anyone who accepts arithmetical realism/no-cause needed for arithmetical >>>>> truth, then it can answer 1 as well. >>>> >>>> All your questions are number 1. >>>> >>>> (It looks like your e-mail client changed them when you separated them) >>>> >>>> However, I would point out that Feynman's question implies that >>>> computationalism must be false. >>>> >>>> No, this would be a consequence of computationalism as predicted >>> >>> Retrodicted. I'm still waiting for predicted. >>> >>> As far as theories go, the difference between prediction and retrodiction >>> is only an accident of history. >> >> Except one is infinitely easier than the other. >> >> >> I agree. But here Bruno didn't propose either theory, and computational >> theory of mind wasn't proposed as a theory of QM. Both theories were >> independently proposed by different people for different reasons. Bruno >> then showed one could follow from the other. > > Not really. He has only shown that, if his theory of consciousness is true, That is, if Digital Mechanism, or Indexical Computationalism is true. It is not my theory. I discovered in Molecular Biology, but Molecular biology used it implicitly. Mechanism is a very old idea. > then there will perceptions of superpositions. That is misleading. I guess you mean there will be indirect evidence for “superposition” or “many-worlds” or "many histories”. OK then. > But then he says we won't perceive them because computation is > classical...even though computation generated the superpositions. Well, now you do exploit the ambiguity I saw just above …. I just say that we can test mechanism by comparing the physics in the “head” of the universal Turing machine (the Löbian one can describe it) and the observation. Then, I show that mechanism works, which is NOT the case of physicalism. > >> >> >>> >>> >>>> by Bruno in his UDA. It is a confirmatiom, rather than a refutation, of >>>> computationalism. >>> >>> His UD produces an uncountable infinity of computations, but there's no >>> evidence it computes what goes on in a tiny piece of spacetime. >>> >>> >>> Under computationalism, it necessarily computes every possible experience, >>> infinitely often, in infinitely many ways. This explains the appearance of >>> infinites lurking under the floor when we peek too closely at what >>> underlies us. >> >> That's another of those sentences that start, "Assuming my theory is >> right...all things must be explained by it". >> >>> >> >> >> That's a necessary feature of any candidate TOE. > > But assuming it's right isn't. > >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> What about objective facts? Do objective facts always concern real objects? >> >> No, there is intersubjective agreement about theorems of mathematics. >> That's why people are tempted to see it as existing in the same way as >> perceived objects exist. >> >> >> >> I don't follow. Why do intersubjective facts about physical objects make >> them real, while intersubjective facts about mathematical objects does not >> make them real? > > I wrote intersubjective agreement. And intersubjective agreement about > experiences make them factual, i.e. that's how you tell you're not > halucinating, you ask your friend, "Do you see what I see?" Nobody > experiences mathematical objects, only descriptions and definitions and > proofs. Nobody experience primary physical objects either. > >> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> It tells us no matter how much we might build and develop our theories >>>>> (axioms) about the integers over time, we know that we will never finish >>>>> the job. >>>> >>>> So is being infinite a known attribute of reality? Space appears to be >>>> infinite too. >>>> >>>> >>>> An infinite thing cannot be created by finite creatures in finite time. >>> >>> Can it be discovered? >>> >>> >>> We can discover a finite number of things about it. >> >> Is "being infinite" one thing. >> >> >> >> If we take our current theories about them, yes, that is a consequence. We >> might find an error in our current theories and refine them, but I doubt >> that will happen. >> >> >>> >>> >>> That's right, except Einstein didn't "believe in" the equations, he >>> believed the equations were describing something real, but not completely. >>> Otherwise he would not have spent years looking for a unified field theory >>> that included spacetime, EM, and matter fields. >>> >>> I see that as the same motivation and goal of mathematicians. >> >> Except a mathematician wouldn't have cared that a theory didn't produce the >> observed matter fields. If a mathematician had invented SUSY he'd still be >> happy today; physicist are tearing their hair out because the LHC results >> are ruling SUSY out. >> >> >> They should be extra happy and excited. >> >> In any case, mathematicians faced a similar "hair pulling" event when Godel >> showed that Hilbert's effort to axiomatize all of math was a doomed venture. > > Because they thought that proving everything from a few axioms, hopefully > just from logic, Not that is impossible. You need to postulate a universal “thing”. > would show it was a unity like the physical world and so there could be a > Platonia. Now Platonia has divided into many worlds and Max Tegmark wants to > do the same to physics. As Everett showed to be the case. But Tegmark missed the universal machine’s theology and the fact that if Mechanism is true, physics is a branch of machine’s theology. Bruno > >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Integers exist independently of the axioms too. The axioms our just the >>>> mathematical analogue of our physical theories. They are our attempt to >>>> "compress" our knowledge of phenomenon down to the most compact possible >>>> form. In that compressed form, it helps us to then reason, explain and >>>> predict new phenomena. >>> >>> So they are an abstraction of our knowledge. Doesn't sound independent to >>> me. >>> >>> >>> The axioms are no more responsible for creating the integers than our >>> physical laws are for creating the universe. >> >> I'm glad you appreciate that physical laws don't create the universe, even >> if they are about it. So why then don't you appreciate that the axioms are >> just a theory of the integers and that the integers are infinite is just a >> part of that theory, not necessarily a fact about the integers (that exist >> independent of the axioms). This is the way physicists think about the >> universe being infinite: We have a theory in which it could be infinite and >> that theory says it will look locally flat and we see that it's locally >> flat. So it might be infinite...but we know that's just a possibility, not >> something we would rely on in a proof. >> >> Because I take the consequences of our current theoreis seriously. Don't >> you? > > To quote Trump, "Seriously but not literally." > >> >> Do you take it as irrelevant or inconsequential or probably wrong, when our >> physical theories tell us our universe is probably spatially infinite? Or >> does that lead you to consider the consequences of living in a spatially >> infinite universe seriously, and a (potentially/probably) real possibility? > > I consider what it might mean for observations. > >> >> >> >>> >>>>> >>>>> > Would you say that mathematics imposes "meta laws" which must be >>>>> true across all possible/imaginable universes? >>>>> >>>>> Yes I think so, but the meta laws would be physical not mathematical. >>>>> >>>>> So perhaps the better question to you is: "Might what we consider now as >>>>> physical laws ultimately be (or be derived from) mathematical laws"? >>>>> >>>>> If we're very lucky we might be able to describe those meta laws >>>>> mathematically (although almost certainly not with the mathematics we >>>>> have now) >>>>> >>>>> Why not? For example, If conscious experience is ultimately >>>>> computational in nature, then Turing machines are sufficient to explain >>>>> all possible experiences. >>>>> We can already describe Turing machines with our existing mathematics. >>>> >>>> First, that's confusing. A Turing machine is an abstract bit of >>>> mathematics. It isn't "described" as a real machine might be; it is >>>> mathematics. >>>> >>>> We use math to describe mathematical objects. What is the problem? >>>> >>>> >>>> Second, it's like saying English is sufficient to explain all possible >>>> experiences. The trouble of course is that good explanation explains the >>>> difference between the actual and the possible. >>>> >>>> >>>> The trouble with that is you can't use the limited set of experiences you >>>> have access to as evidence of a parsimony of actualized possibility. >>> >>> Well that certainly comes as a surprise to me. I thought my failure to >>> experience a mastadon in my back yard meant that possibility was not >>> actualized. I'll ask my wife to go look again. >>> >>> >>> "I" is indexical to a single instance of conscious experience, it does not >>> capture all of reality. >> >> True enough. But I've looked three times, so I'm going to generalize to a >> theory that there's no mastadon in my backyard. >> >> >> >> Maybe you need to start digging. :-) > > My dogs already did that. > >> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> but I don't think there is any chance of a pure mathematician ever >>>>> finding them, we're going to need physical experiments to give us some >>>>> hints and I just hope that doesn't require a particle accelerator the >>>>> size of the galaxy. >>>>> >>>>> It will take more work, no doubt. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> > It is physically impossible to arrange 7 stones into a rectangle >>>>> >>>>> If there were not 7 stones or 7 of anything in the entire physical >>>>> universe the entire concept of "7" would be meaningless. >>>>> >>>>> If there were 0 physical universes, then wouldn't 0 have meaning? Can >>>>> zero have meaning without the contrast of 1? Once you have "0 and 1" now >>>>> you have two unique concepts, so you get 2. Now you have 3 things, (and >>>>> so on). >>>> >>>> It's that "and so on" that is problematic. >>>> >>>> What is the problem? >>> >>> It introduces infinities which leads to diagonalization proofs that some >>> things are "true" but unprovable which leads to mysticism about where these >>> "true" things reside. >>> >>> What is the source of the infinite complexity (out of the ultimate >>> simplicity of "0 and its successors")? >>> Why do mathematicians struggle for hundreds of years to prove simple >>> statements, or to discover new reasonable axioms? >> >> Because it's fun. I also belong to an email called...wait for it...math-fun. >> >> >> Here is one for you (and that list): >> >> Tomorrow you and another prisoner are to be executed. But you will both be >> spared if you can succeed in the following game. You and the other prisoner >> have tonight to decide on a strategy for playing this game: Tomorrow you and >> your fellow prisoner will be put in different rooms, and both of you will >> observe two completely independent and separate sequences of 100 coin >> tosses. The goal is for each of you to choose a position in the other >> person’s sequence of coin tosses such that the results of the coin tosses in >> those two selected positions match. (i.e., both heads or both tails). What >> is your strategy? >> >> Example: >> Sequence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ... 100 >> You see: T H H T T H H H T ... T and choose position 3 in your partner's >> sequence >> They see: H H T T H T T H T ... T and choose position 5 in your sequence >> >> You are both spared as you both chose matching results: both Tails. > > So we each get to see all 100 results before we have to choose an index? > > Brent > >> >> Jason >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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