Awaiting the dodge... The oblivion... And round and round we go.. 15 years of fun.
Quentin Le jeu. 19 juil. 2018 à 15:18, Jason Resch <[email protected]> a écrit : > > > On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 9:15 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Tue, Jul 17, 2018 at 6:25 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> >>> >> >>>> We're right back to Bruno's definition problem. I can't answer your >>>> question until you make clear what you mean by "Abby". I can tell you >>>> exactly precisely what I mean by "Abby", its whoever remembers being Abby >>>> before the duplication. Yes its odd that there are 2 people that meet that >>>> criteria, but odd is not the same thing as paradoxical. I've given you mine >>>> so what is your precise definition of "Abby"? >>>> >>>> >>> >>> *>Given the "will" my assumption is the author is referring to Earth >>> Abby, the Abby before the teleportation. Let us work with that assumption >>> for now.* >>> >> >> OK but that sure doesn't leave us much to work with! If "Abbey" is the >> being before the teleportation then obviously by definition "Abbey" will >> not exist after the teleportation. Are you sure you really want to go with >> that definition? >> > > Okay we can go with your definition as anyone who remembers being Abby, > what is important is that our language and definitions are consistent. So > we have: > > "Earth Abby" - The Abby at time 0 on Earth > "Abby-1" - The Abby who ends up at her intended destination on Mars, at > time 1 > "Abby-2" - The Abby who ends up at her admirer's destination on Mars, at > time 1 > "Abby" - Anyone who remembers being Earth Abby (includes Earth Abby, > Abby-1, Abby-2) > > >> >> >> >>> >> >>>> If you're interested in consciousness and subjectivity you will get >>>> nowhere pondering on the nature of successor states, it would be like >>>> pushing on a string. If you don't want to get tied up in logical knots and >>>> self contradictions you've got to define personal identity based on >>>> previous states not successor states; otherwise you wouldn't even know who >>>> you are because you don't know what your successor state will be. But you >>>> do know what your previous state was. We don't live in the future because >>>> we never know what the future will be, we live in the present and the past >>>> through memory because we know what the past was. >>>> >>> >>> >** >>> *But we can have more than one precursor state too (e.g., the quantum >>> erasure experiment).* >>> >> >> There is only one one precursor state I am conscious of, and as >> consciousness is pretty much the only thing anybody on this list wants to >> talk about your objection is not relevant. >> > > Okay, I don't see this tangent as particularly important to the thought > experiment. We can drop it. > > >> >> > >>> Do you believe persons are duplicated ala many-worlds? >>> >> >> I believe people will be duplicated when >> >> technology becomes advanced enough and if many worlds is true they >> already are. >> >> >* * >>> *They identify themselves with Earth Abby.* >>> >> >> I define "Abby" as anyone who remembers being Abbey as anyone who >> remembers being Abby before the duplication. Do you disagree? >> >> > > No, we can go with that. > > > >> >> >>> >> >>>> Forget teleportation and people duplicating machines, we can guess but >>>> we can never know what the future will bring and that's why we don't define >>>> ourselves by what will happen to us in the future. >>>> >>> >>> > >>> Do you not save money in the bank account for the future? >>> >>> >> >> If the future doesn't unfold as I expected and my retirement investments >> go bad then I will have lost some money, but if I develop Alzheimer's >> disease in retirement and lost my past then I will have lost far more than >> money, I will have lost my identity. The past and the future are not >> symmetrical, we can remember the past but not the future. >> > > But the important point is we have expectations about the future, and > physical theories attempt to predict likelihoods of various future outcomes > which we (at time now) have no memory of, but nonetheless expect to > experience in the future. > Do you agree on this point? > > > >> >> >> >>> *> the only point in having a brain is to predict and prepare for the >>> future.* >> >> >> Yes but even so the future often turns out to be very different from what >> we expected, when that happens we are surprised but we don't feel that our >> identity has been lost; but Alzheimer's patients do feel their identity >> slipping away because they can no longer remember the past. >> >> >> >>>> But we do remember what has happened in the past. I can say with >>>> complete confidence that I am John Clark because I remember being John >>>> Clark yesterday, but I don't remember being John Clark tomorrow. >>>> >>> >>> > >>> Which John Clark were you before I ran the quantum erasure experiment? >>> Or before your memories were wiped and you were placed in a sensory >>> deprivation chamber? >>> >> >> I don't understand the question. >> > > I think I was suggesting the same thing as you did regarding Alzheimers. > If memories are erased and we have no access to other evidence, the past > can become indeterminant, similarly to the future. > > > >> >> >> >>>> As for preparations, if I was told I was to be duplicated and >>>> teleported to Hawaii and Antarctica I'd insist on taking BOTH a swimsuit >>>> AND (not or) a heavy woolen jacket with me into the duplication chamber. >>>> >>>> >>> *>Good! I see you understand first-person indeterminancy. * >>> >> >> >> So what was that one bit of information that "Abby" gained? Did "Abby" >> (and I am the only one who has given a precise definition of that word and >> stuck with it) end up seeing W or M? >> > > The bit is gained by "Abby-1" and "Abby-2". > Abby-1 will say "Huh, I am experiencing life as Abby-1 rather than Abby-2" > -- let's call this outcome "0" > Abby-2 will say "Huh, I am experiencing life as Abby-2 rather than Abby-1" > -- let's call this outcome "1" > Each of Abby-1 and Abby-2 have gained a bit of information. > > > > >> >> >>> > >>> *You don't know whether you will need the coat or the swimsuit.* >>> >> >> John Clark's expectation was that both would be used, and in the case >> John Clark's expectations turned out to be correct. >> >> >> >>> >> >>>> ask yourself this question; "after the " >>>> experiment >>>> " is over and the scientists have collected and analyzed all the data >>>> and then locked the lab and gone home what one and only one thing did they >>>> conclude Abby ended up seeing?". If the scientists STILL don't have an >>>> answer then there must be something wrong with the question. The key >>>> problem is that for some strange reason you insist there can only be one >>>> Abby but then you introduce a Abby duplicating machine into the mix so >>>> there can't be only one. So it always comes down to, what in the world do >>>> you mean by "Abby"? >>>> >>> >>> *>It concerns Abby's predictions concerning her subjective experience >>> of being duplicated. You are right from the scientist's POV it is >>> deterministic, nothing was learned by doing it. However, subjectively Abby >>> will gain 1 bit of information which she could not have gained without >>> executing the experiment.* >>> >> >> So what was that one bit of information that "Abby" gained? Did "Abby" >> (and I am the only one who has given a precise definition of that word and >> stuck with it) end up seeing W or M? >> > > The bit of information was "I got to use my swimsuit today" or "I had to > use my winter coat", as recorded in the memories of John Clark-1's and John > Clark-2's brains, respectively. > But you don't have to take my word for it. Max Tegmark explained the same > in a thought experiment he describes in "Our Mathematical Universe", > starting on page 194: > > "It gradually hit me that this illusion of randomness business really > wasn't specific to quantum mechanics at all. Suppose that some future > technology allows you to be cloned while you're sleeping, and that your two > copies are placed in rooms numbered 0 and 1 (Figure 8.3). When they wake > up, they'll both feel that the room number they read is completely > unpredictable and random. If in the future, it becomes possible for you to > upload your mind to a computer, then what I'm saying here will feel totally > obvious and intuitive to you, since cloning yourself will be as easy as > making a copy of your software. If you repeated the cloning experiment from > Figure 8.3 many times and wrote down your room number each time, you'd in > almost all cases find that the sequence of zeros and ones you'd written > looked random, with zeros occurring about 50% of the time. In other words, > causal physics will produce the illusion of randomness from your subjective > viewpoint in any circumstance where you're being cloned. The fundamental > reason that quantum mechanics appears random even though the wave function > evolves deterministically is that the Schrodinger equation can evolve a > wavefunction with a single you into one with clones of you in parallel > universes. So how does it feel when you get cloned? It feels random! And > every time something fundamentally random appears to happen to you, which > couldn't have been predicted even in principle, it's a sign that you've > been cloned." > > Do you find it strange, or at least interesting, that three different > scientists, independently are using a very similar thought experiment as > they explore fundamental questions concerning reality? We have Bruno with > the Washington and Moscow, Tegmark with being cloned while asleep, > and Markus Muller with his Abbys. Is it not also interesting, that they all > reach similar conclusions, namely, that computation sits at the basis of > reality, and moreover that "all computations exist" if taken as true, could > explain the appearance of our physical reality, that physics itself might > be explained from a more fundamental ensemble of computations? > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
