> On 16 Jul 2018, at 19:09, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Sat, Jul 14, 2018 at 2:23 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com > <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > >Suppose Abby the guinea pig wants to travel long distance, say from Earth > to Mars. On Earth she enters the scanner which scans her body and brain cells > in great detail at an instant of time, down to all molecular details that are > functionally relevant. At the same time, her body is instantly destroyed, and > the scanned data is sent to the replicator station located at the journey’s > target. There, the replicator instantly builds a perfect copy of Abby’s body > and brain, based on the transmitted data. Clearly the material body is > destroyed (and rebuilt) in this process, which leads to instant feelings of > unease to most guinea pigs or humans who think about this scenario. > > There would be no logical reason for you being uneasy about this and there > wouldn't even be a illogical reason for being uneasy unless somebody told you > about the destruction and reconstruction of your body, and even then you > probably wouldn't believe them because subjectively you would feel no > different whatsoever. Our ancestors would be terrified at getting into an > aluminum tube and flying 40,000 feet up in the air at 600 mph, but if the > weather was calm they wouldn't even know they were doing so unless they > looked out the window. > > >a malfunction disturbs the daily routine: a malicious admirer of Abby > hacks into the transmitter’s computer system and causes the teleporter to > create two perfectly identical copies of Abby at exactly the same local time > on Mars, next to each other. How does Abby experience this situation? > > Abby #1 finds herself on Mars as usual but notices somebody who looks just > like her standing to her right. Abby #2 finds herself on Mars as usual but > notices somebody who looks just like her standing to her left. Looking > backward through time neither remembers experiencing any branching, > everything will seem perfectly continuous to both. Looking forward through > time neither remembers any branching, and in fact neither remembers anything > at all because we can remember the past but not the future, so the future can > not tell Abby what it means to be Abby, only the past can do that. And so > both Abbys will insist they are Abby. And both will be equally correct. > > >Directly after the replication, there will be two identical twins — let us > call them Abby-1 and Abby-2. An instant later, due to differing experiences, > Abby-1 and Abby-2 will become different in the information content of their > brain. > > Yes. > > > So how will Abby subjectively experience this situation? > > We're right back to Bruno's definition problem. I can't answer your question > until you make clear what you mean by "Abby". I can tell you exactly > precisely what I mean by "Abby", its whoever remembers being Abby before the > duplication. Yes its odd that there are 2 people that meet that criteria, but > odd is not the same thing as paradoxical. I've given you mine so what is your > precise definition of "Abby”?
It is my definition of “Abby”, since the beginning. It is exactly the one we need to understand that Abby is unable to predict what experience he will live after the duplication, because, assuming comp, both abby will remember being Abby before the duplication. It is odd, as now there are two people, but, OBVIOUSLY (with mechanism) both live a single experience in only one city, and OBVIOUSLY, as they are both abby, it makes that experience (seeing one city) different and incompatible after, which makes it necessary to be not predictible before. I am happy you insist so much on this. You do understand the first person indeterminacy. Time to move to step 4. Bruno > > >This seems like a tricky question, even in terms of our terminology of > successor states. According to the previous section, we must conclude that > Abby will (after the malfunction) experience a successor state. > > If you're interested in consciousness and subjectivity you will get nowhere > pondering on the nature of successor states, it would be like pushing on a > string. If you don't want to get tied up in logical knots and self > contradictions you've got to define personal identity based on previous > states not successor states; otherwise you wouldn't even know who you are > because you don't know what your successor state will be. But you do know > what your previous state was. We don't live in the future because we never > know what the future will be, we live in the present and the past through > memory because we know what the past was. > > >But now, there are two successor states in the world: that of Abby-1 and > that of Abby-2. > > That always happens when something has been duplicated. The only reason it > seems odd is that nothing as complex as a person has been duplicated before, > but this is only due to current technological limitations, it has nothing to > do with any fundamental scientific or philosophic limitation. > > >Thus Abby will end up as Abby-1 or Abby-2, but which one of them? > > One? There can't be one because Abby has been duplicated and when something > has been duplicated there is no longer just one. > > >And what about the other twin? > > What about her? > > >Abby-1 and Abby-2 will both behave as if they were legitimate successors > of pre-teleportation Abby. > > Because both will remember being Abby before the duplication. > > >In other words, Abby-1 and Abby-2 will both believe they are Abby > > And both will believe correctly by my definition of "Abby". But you haven't > given me your definition of "Abby". > > > However, they will both only experience themselves, and not the other one. > > Assuming they have experienced different things after the duplication and > thus differentiated that statement is true, but I don't understand why it > merits a "however". > > >That is, Abby-1 will experience herself as a person that is different from > Abby-2, and vice versa. > > Yes. > > >The only possible conclusion seems to be that, after the teleportation, > Abby will subjectively perceive to be one of the two, and of course not both > That statement is neither true nor false because you have not told us what > you mean by "Abby". I have but you haven't. > > > >So before the teleportation, should Abby prepare to become Abby-1 or > Abby-2? > > I don't understand the question. Forget teleportation and people duplicating > machines, we can guess but we can never know what the future will bring and > that's why we don't define ourselves by what will happen to us in the future. > But we do remember what has happened in the past. I can say with complete > confidence that I am John Clark because I remember being John Clark > yesterday, but I don't remember being John Clark tomorrow. > As for preparations, if I was told I was to be duplicated and teleported to > Hawaii and Antarctica I'd insist on taking BOTH a swimsuit AND (not or) a > heavy woolen jacket with me into the duplication chamber. > > > >there is no way for Abby to predict which one of the two options will be > realized in her subjective experience. > > It is certainly not unusual to be ignorant about future events, but in this > case an answer can't be given because a question was not asked. There is a > easy way to tell if this is a real exparament or even a real thought > exparament, ask yourself this question; "after the "exparament" is over and > the scientists have collected and analyzed all the data and then locked the > lab and gone home what one and only one thing did they conclude Abby ended up > seeing?". If the scientists STILL don't have an answer then there must be > something wrong with the question. The key problem is that for some strange > reason you insist there can only be one Abby but then you introduce a Abby > duplicating machine into the mix so there can't be only one. So it always > comes down to, what in the world do you mean by "Abby"? > > John K Clark > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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