On Tue, Jul 17, 2018 at 6:25 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> >> We're right back to Bruno's definition problem. I can't answer your >> question until you make clear what you mean by "Abby". I can tell you >> exactly precisely what I mean by "Abby", its whoever remembers being Abby >> before the duplication. Yes its odd that there are 2 people that meet that >> criteria, but odd is not the same thing as paradoxical. I've given you mine >> so what is your precise definition of "Abby"? >> >> > > *>Given the "will" my assumption is the author is referring to Earth > Abby, the Abby before the teleportation. Let us work with that assumption > for now.* > OK but that sure doesn't leave us much to work with! If "Abbey" is the being before the teleportation then obviously by definition "Abbey" will not exist after the teleportation. Are you sure you really want to go with that definition? > >> >> If you're interested in consciousness and subjectivity you will get >> nowhere pondering on the nature of successor states, it would be like >> pushing on a string. If you don't want to get tied up in logical knots and >> self contradictions you've got to define personal identity based on >> previous states not successor states; otherwise you wouldn't even know who >> you are because you don't know what your successor state will be. But you >> do know what your previous state was. We don't live in the future because >> we never know what the future will be, we live in the present and the past >> through memory because we know what the past was. >> > > >** > *But we can have more than one precursor state too (e.g., the quantum > erasure experiment).* > There is only one one precursor state I am conscious of, and as consciousness is pretty much the only thing anybody on this list wants to talk about your objection is not relevant. > > Do you believe persons are duplicated ala many-worlds? > I believe people will be duplicated when technology becomes advanced enough and if many worlds is true they already are. >* * > *They identify themselves with Earth Abby.* > I define "Abby" as anyone who remembers being Abbey as anyone who remembers being Abby before the duplication. Do you disagree? > >> >> Forget teleportation and people duplicating machines, we can guess but we >> can never know what the future will bring and that's why we don't define >> ourselves by what will happen to us in the future. >> > > > > Do you not save money in the bank account for the future? > > If the future doesn't unfold as I expected and my retirement investments go bad then I will have lost some money, but if I develop Alzheimer's disease in retirement and lost my past then I will have lost far more than money, I will have lost my identity. The past and the future are not symmetrical, we can remember the past but not the future. > *> the only point in having a brain is to predict and prepare for the > future.* Yes but even so the future often turns out to be very different from what we expected, when that happens we are surprised but we don't feel that our identity has been lost; but Alzheimer's patients do feel their identity slipping away because they can no longer remember the past. >> >> But we do remember what has happened in the past. I can say with complete >> confidence that I am John Clark because I remember being John Clark >> yesterday, but I don't remember being John Clark tomorrow. >> > > > > Which John Clark were you before I ran the quantum erasure experiment? Or > before your memories were wiped and you were placed in a sensory > deprivation chamber? > I don't understand the question. >> >> As for preparations, if I was told I was to be duplicated and teleported >> to Hawaii and Antarctica I'd insist on taking BOTH a swimsuit AND (not or) >> a heavy woolen jacket with me into the duplication chamber. >> >> > *>Good! I see you understand first-person indeterminancy. * > So what was that one bit of information that "Abby" gained? Did "Abby" (and I am the only one who has given a precise definition of that word and stuck with it) end up seeing W or M? > > > *You don't know whether you will need the coat or the swimsuit.* > John Clark's expectation was that both would be used, and in the case John Clark's expectations turned out to be correct. > >> >> ask yourself this question; "after the " >> experiment >> " is over and the scientists have collected and analyzed all the data and >> then locked the lab and gone home what one and only one thing did they >> conclude Abby ended up seeing?". If the scientists STILL don't have an >> answer then there must be something wrong with the question. The key >> problem is that for some strange reason you insist there can only be one >> Abby but then you introduce a Abby duplicating machine into the mix so >> there can't be only one. So it always comes down to, what in the world do >> you mean by "Abby"? >> > > *>It concerns Abby's predictions concerning her subjective experience of > being duplicated. You are right from the scientist's POV it is > deterministic, nothing was learned by doing it. However, subjectively Abby > will gain 1 bit of information which she could not have gained without > executing the experiment.* > So what was that one bit of information that "Abby" gained? Did "Abby" (and I am the only one who has given a precise definition of that word and stuck with it) end up seeing W or M? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
