> On 19 Jul 2018, at 03:00, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Jul 15, 2018 at 7:14 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >>the way to measure distance was so intuitively obvious that we didn’t > even suspect there were other ways until a century ago. > > >Either your p-adic system is Turing universal, and then you can take it as > the primary theory, or it is not. > > Machines can be Turing complete but no number system
Machine are said Turing Universal. “Turing complete” is the wording used when we talk about theories. And it is proved in all textbook in theoretical computer science that very elementary arithmetic is Turing complete. > can be because the can't DO anything.When mathematicians say things like > "Conway's Game Of Life is Turing complete" what they mean is that a machine > can be built using Conway's principles in 2 dimensions that is functionally > equivalent to Turing's one dimensional machine that uses a paper tape, and > both are capable of calculating anything that can be calculated. > > > Theology, including physics, is [....] > > I've gotten to the point that whenever I see that imbecilic word I stop > reading and go to the next paragraph. OK I do the same. Bruno > > > >>So on a football field if the 2 yard line was closer to the 28814 yard > line than the 2 yard line was to the 3 yard line the game would not in anyway > be changed? I don’t think so, in the physical world its harder to go from 2 > to 28814 than 2 to 3, but in Plato’s heaven of pure numbers one is as easy as > another. And that’s why p-adic numbers are not taught in the second grade. > > >I was talking of non standard theory of the natural number. > > The natural numbers are well named, they were the first class of numbers that > humans invented because the conform naturally to the way we view the physical > words, in particular they conform with our intuitive ideas about distance, > but with p-adic numbers we know there are an infinite number of ways of > defining distance that are very far from intuitive but are just as logically > self consistent. Wiles used them in his proof of Fermat's Last Theorem but we > don't teach p-adic numbers much in school because they are of little use in > science or engineering or economics or anything else in our physical world. > > >> >>>>You can not point to one single example of a non-physical >> computation. Not one. > > >> >>>Here is one: >> s(0) +s(0) >> s(s(0) + 0) >> s(s(0)) >> Here is another one: >> SB(S(K(SM))K)AB >> Bx((S(K(SM)K)A)B >> A(S(K(SM))KAB) >> A(K(SM)A(KA)B) >> A(SM(KA)B) >> A(MB)(KAB) >> A(BBA) >> : >> >>I just asked both of your examples of ASCII sequences to add 1+1 but I >> haven't heard even a incorrect answer from either, so far all I hear is a >> deafening silence but if I ever do hear anything from either of them I >> shall inform Intel immediately. > > >Too late. Intel exist because they were aware of this. > > What Intel was aware of it that the squiggles you so proudly typed above > world not be finished calculating 1+1 even if it started trying to do so 13.8 > billion years ago at the instant of the Big Bang. But Intel was also aware > that unlike your ASCII characters the physical element Silicon could make > calculations and that's why they're so interested in it. > > >>So you concede that primary or not matter is needed to think. > > >For humans, > > So matter can do something that numbers can't, namely matter can DO things > and and change, but numbers can do neither. > > >>I don't know or care what the guy expects to happen > > >But that is the question we were studying. > > It sure as hell isn't the question I was studying!!! What the man EXPECTS > to happen has precisely zero philosophical significance.What actually DOES > happen has profound philosophical significance. > >> >>> and so he knows that once duplicated, the two copies will feel to be >> unique, >> >> >>NO!! > >Ah! I knew you were caring. But you contradict yourself. > > BULLSHIT. I said from day one of this endless debate that if 2 brains are > physically identical there is only one mind between them and it is only when > they see different things, like different cites, do they differentiate. > > >we have agreed that both are fully aware of their common identity with the > H-guy. > > Yes, and I thought we also agreed that doesn't mean they are each other if > they have seen different thing since the Helsinki days. > > > I am not physically identical with my “yesterday” self either. > > But you remember being your yesterday self. > > >the question is about what they expect to write in their personal > diary/memory > > Who knows, they could expect to see Santa Claus Workshop for all I know or > care. What matters is what they do end up seeing not what they expect to see. > > > >>The truth or falsehood of Computationalism has nothing to do with it and > the only definition that matters is the one you just gave. You said "the > H-guy" has the property of existing "before the duplication”, > > >Before, after, all the times, in this experiment. > > Then after the experiment one being has the H-man and the W-man property but > NOT the M-man property. And the other being has the H-man and the M-man > property but not the W-man property. Is that really so complicated and > difficult to comprehend? > > >By comp [blah blah blah.] > > Homemade baby-talk. > > >That contradicts your statement that we survive teleportation and > duplication when we assume computationalism. > > BULLSHIT! > > >The Lôbian machine? OK. > > No, more homemade baby-talk is not OK. > >> >Of course he remembers, that is why we can say he survived. >> >> Remembers? Memory was not involved in any way in your original definition of >> "the H-guy”, > > >I think you play with words. > > And I think you don't think with words. I say again, I gave a precise > unambitious definition of "the H-guy" so why can't you? > > John K Clark > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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