On Mon, Jul 16, 2018 at 12:09 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 14, 2018 at 2:23 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > > >> *>Suppose Abby the guinea pig wants to travel long distance, say from >> Earth to Mars. On Earth she enters the scanner which scans her body and >> brain cells in great detail at an instant of time, down to all molecular >> details that are functionally relevant. At the same time, her body is >> instantly destroyed, and the scanned data is sent to the replicator station >> located at the journey’s target. There, the replicator instantly builds a >> perfect copy of Abby’s body and brain, based on the transmitted >> data. Clearly the material body is destroyed (and rebuilt) in this >> process, which leads to instant feelings of unease to most guinea pigs or >> humans who think about this scenario.* >> > > There would be no logical reason for you being uneasy about this and there > wouldn't even be a illogical reason for being uneasy unless somebody told > you about the destruction and reconstruction of your body, and even then > you probably wouldn't believe them because subjectively you would feel no > different whatsoever. Our ancestors would be terrified at getting into an > aluminum tube and flying 40,000 feet up in the air at 600 mph, but if the > weather was calm they wouldn't even know they were doing so unless they > looked out the window. > > >> *>a malfunction disturbs the daily routine: a malicious admirer of Abby >> hacks into the transmitter’s computer system and causes the teleporter to >> create two perfectly identical copies of Abby at exactly the same local >> time on Mars, next to each other. How does Abby experience this situation? * >> > > Abby #1 finds herself on Mars as usual but notices somebody who looks just > like her standing to her right. Abby #2 finds herself on Mars as usual but > notices somebody who looks just like her standing to her left. Looking > backward through time neither remembers experiencing any branching, > everything will seem perfectly continuous to both. Looking forward through > time neither remembers any branching, and in fact neither remembers > anything at all because we can remember the past but not the future, so the > future can not tell Abby what it means to be Abby, only the past can do > that. And so both Abbys will insist they are Abby. And both will be equally > correct. > > *>Directly after the replication, there will be two identical twins — >> let us call them Abby-1 and Abby-2. An instant later, due to differing >> experiences, Abby-1 and Abby-2 will become different in the information >> content of their brain.* >> > > Yes. > > > >> *So how will Abby subjectively experience this situation?* >> > > We're right back to Bruno's definition problem. I can't answer your > question until you make clear what you mean by "Abby". I can tell you > exactly precisely what I mean by "Abby", its whoever remembers being Abby > before the duplication. Yes its odd that there are 2 people that meet that > criteria, but odd is not the same thing as paradoxical. I've given you mine > so what is your precise definition of "Abby"? > > Given the "will" my assumption is the author is referring to Earth Abby, the Abby before the teleportation. Let us work with that assumption for now. > *>This seems like a tricky question, even in terms of our terminology of >> successor states. According to the previous section, we must conclude that >> Abby will (after the malfunction) experience a successor state.* >> > > If you're interested in consciousness and subjectivity you will get > nowhere pondering on the nature of successor states, it would be like > pushing on a string. If you don't want to get tied up in logical knots and > self contradictions you've got to define personal identity based on > previous states not successor states; otherwise you wouldn't even know who > you are because you don't know what your successor state will be. But you > do know what your previous state was. We don't live in the future because > we never know what the future will be, we live in the present and the past > through memory because we know what the past was. > But we can have more than one precursor state too (e.g., the quantum erasure experiment). Does this mean your theory of personal identity is like that of the Buddhists (i.e. we are no more than a single thought-moment and that is all we will ever be)? > > >> *>But now, there are two successor states in the world: that of Abby-1 >> and that of Abby-2.* >> > > That always happens when something has been duplicated. The only reason > it seems odd is that nothing as complex as a person has been duplicated > before, but this is only due to current technological limitations, it has > nothing to do with any fundamental scientific or philosophic limitation. > Do you believe persons are duplicated ala many-worlds? > > >> > >> Thus Abby will end up as Abby-1 or Abby-2, but which one of them? >> > > > One? There can't be one because Abby has been duplicated and when > something has been duplicated there is no longer just one. > >From the subjective viewpoint of both Abbys, they still consider themselves to be in one location, and experience life from that point forward from a singular perspective of either Abby-1 or Abby-2, as you indicated. I don't think we disagree here. > > >> *>And what about the other twin?* >> > > What about her? > > >> *>* >> *Abby-1 and Abby-2 will both behave as if they were legitimate successors >> of pre-teleportation Abby.* >> > > Because both will remember being Abby before the duplication. > > >> * >In other words, Abby-1 and Abby-2 will both believe they are Abby* >> > > And both will believe correctly by my definition of "Abby". But you > haven't given me your definition of "Abby". > They identify themselves with Earth Abby. > > *> However, they will both only experience themselves, and not the other >> one.* > > > Assuming they have experienced different things after the duplication and > thus differentiated that statement is true, but I don't understand why it > merits a "however". > > >> *>That is, Abby-1 will experience herself as a person that is different >> from Abby-2, and vice versa.* >> > > Yes. > > > >> *>The only possible conclusion seems to be that, after the >> teleportation, Abby will subjectively perceive to be one of the two, and of >> course not both* >> > That statement is neither true nor false because you have not told us what > you mean by "Abby". I have but you haven't. > > *>* >> *So before the teleportation, should Abby prepare to become Abby-1 or >> Abby-2?* >> > > I don't understand the question. Forget teleportation and people > duplicating machines, we can guess but we can never know what the > future will bring and that's why we don't define ourselves by what will > happen to us in the future. > Do you not save money in the bank account for the future? Not stock your fridge with food you won't eat today? All of physics is about making predictions (about the future, future experience, etc.). Indeed the only point in having a brain is to predict and prepare for the future. > But we do remember what has happened in the past. I can say with complete > confidence that I am John Clark because I remember being John Clark > yesterday, but I don't remember being John Clark tomorrow. > Which John Clark were you before I ran the quantum erasure experiment? Or before your memories were wiped and you were placed in a sensory deprivation chamber? > As for preparations, if I was told I was to be duplicated and teleported > to Hawaii and Antarctica I'd insist on taking BOTH a swimsuit AND (not or) > a heavy woolen jacket with me into the duplication chamber. > Good! I see you understand first-person indeterminancy. You don't know whether you will need the coat or the swimsuit. It is smart to pack both in that case. > > >> * >there is no way for Abby to predict which one of the two options >> will be realized in her subjective experience.* >> > > It is certainly not unusual to be ignorant about future events, but in > this case an answer can't be given because a question was not asked. There > is a easy way to tell if this is a real exparament or even a real thought > exparament, ask yourself this question; "after the "exparament" is over and > the scientists have collected and analyzed all the data and then locked the > lab and gone home what one and only one thing did they conclude Abby ended > up seeing?". If the scientists STILL don't have an answer then there must > be something wrong with the question. The key problem is that for some > strange reason you insist there can only be one Abby but then you introduce > a Abby duplicating machine into the mix so there can't be only one. So it > always comes down to, what in the world do you mean by "Abby"? > > It concerns Abby's predictions concerning her subjective experience of being duplicated. You are right from the scientist's POV it is deterministic, nothing was learned by doing it. However, subjectively Abby will gain 1 bit of information which she could not have gained without executing the experiment. 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