On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 9:05 PM Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 8/7/2018 5:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 6:39 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >> >> >> If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information >> transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality interpretation >> of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. Maudlin agrees >> that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close to >> what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended already >> from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds >> assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we got an >> infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is that all >> measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement splits locally >> the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed. >> >> >> I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you would >> want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the >> superposition of all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such >> a superposition, so stochastically chooses to record only one definite >> result from the mix. In the Wikipedia article on the many-minds >> interpretation, the following comment might be relevant for you: >> > > The mind is implemented by a classical computation (computed by the brain > which is a classical computer). Brain states don't interfere because the > brain is a macroscopic object. > > I think it is incorrect to say the mind choose to record one definite > result, because there is an infinity of minds, and each possible result is > recorded (by at least one of the infinity of minds). > > >> >> "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction >> between a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, >> > > While there may be a distinction, I think its a mistake to call it is a > physical distinction. Or at least, calling this a physical distinction can > easily lead to confusion. I would say that the distinction is between > non-physical entities (mind) and and physical (not mind) rather than > between an observer and a measuring device, as both are physical objects. > > Mind (consciousness), however, is non-physical in that it is more > accurately described as a computational/arithmetical/mathematical notion. > It is the difference between a story and a book. A story is non physical, > as it is abstract and informational, a book is however physical. A mind > has no physical location, mass, energy, etc., a brain does. > > >> so it seems to require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis#Philosophical_implications> >> or postulating a physical model for consciousness." >> > > I don't see how this follows. Could you explain? > > >> >> If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a >> superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate in >> any such superposition), the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- >> and you might not want to say "Yes, Doctor". >> > > Brains and bodies can be in superpositions, a conscious state, however > cannot be. > > > Conscious state of what?...a brain. > I mean a conscious state as in "what is the conscious state experiencing/aware of". Not in the sense of a physical brain state as a collection of physical particles. > If consciousness cannot be in a superposition then what is it's relation > to brains structures which can? > A one-to-many relationship. (one conscious computation state-to-many different instantiations and environments supporting that computation) > Why would we suppose that the doctor can implement this relation using > some other medium? > Faith. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
