> On 8 Aug 2018, at 21:28, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 8/8/2018 10:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 8 Aug 2018, at 13:50, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >>>>> On 8 Aug 2018, at 01:39, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >>>>>> >>>>>> If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information >>>>>> transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality >>>>>> interpretation of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. >>>>>> Maudlin agrees that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” >>>>>> theory is close to what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to >>>>>> what I defended already from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, >>>>>> Albert and Lower Many-Minds assumes an infinity of mind for one body, >>>>>> where in mechanism we got an infinity of relative body for one mind, but >>>>>> the key issue is that all measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The >>>>>> measurement splits locally the observers, and propagate at subliminal >>>>>> speed. >>>>> >>>>> I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you would >>>>> want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the >>>>> superposition of all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in >>>>> such a superposition, >>>> >>>> That sides with Mechanism. In arithmetic there is an infinity of identical >>>> (at the relevant representation level) brains. Now Albert and Loewer seems >>>> to associate an infinity of mind with one body. >>> >>> The 'infinity of minds for each body' was postulated by Albert and Lowe to >>> avoid the 'mindless hulk' problem. In other words, it was just an ad hoc >>> fix for a problem in the theory. This alone should have been sufficient to >>> render the theory unacceptable. >> >> I agree. That is why I remain closer to Everett. This problem is >> automatically solved with Mechanism. There is no empty hulk, given that >> there is no hulk. >> >> >> >>> >>>> I do not understand this, and with the Mechanist “many-dreams” it is the >>>> contrary: each mind as an infinity of (virtual) bodies, and the >>>> consciousness will differentiate along their computational different >>>> continuations. Take the WM-duplication. After the reconstitution, but >>>> before the copies open the door, one mind is associated to two bodies, and >>>> then differentiates in W or in M from each location perspective. To say >>>> that the mind is not in a superposition is equivalent with Everett’s >>>> justification that the observer cannot feel the split, and it is where >>>> Everett use (more or less explicitly) the mechanist hypothesis. >>> >>> The splitting in Everett's theory at least makes some sort of sense, and is >>> not postulated ad hoc. >> >> I agree. >> >> >> >>> The real problem I see with many-minds theory is that it does not actually >>> explain the observed correlations. The correlations are presumed not to >>> exist in reality -- all possible combinations of experimental outcomes >>> happen, but when Alice and Bob meet, their bodies are still in indefinite >>> states -- no actual results are recorded by entanglement with their bodies >>> -- but their minds will be in definite states that agree with the quantum >>> correlations. This step seems to introduce yet more unreasonable magic into >>> the 'explanation'. Why are the minds like this when they communicate? >> >> Because all Alice and Bob are coupled in that way, by the singlet state. >> That works if we keep in mind that the singlet state (when not already >> observed by neither Alice nor Bob) describes an infinity of Alice and Bob, > > What does that mean? Alice chooses a measurement axis and Bob chooses a > measurement axis. That's two.
I am talking about the situation before Alice and Bob choose their measurement axis. > Where does the "infinity" come from? Are you postulating a multiverse in > which all possible measurement axes are chosen by ensembles of Alices and > Bobs? Yes. How do you interpret the singlet state when there is no collapse? Before any measurement is chosen, there are as many Alice/Bob couples than there are direction in space. We have that ud -du = u’d’ -d’u’, and the statistic cannot depend on the choice of u and d, or u’ and d’, etc. I am aware that Bruce criticise this. I will answer Bruce with more details, but I am not sure I will have time today, as it is a busy day. Bruno > > Brent > >> with the spin in all directions, but always correlated. When Alice and Bob >> make their measurement, if they are space separated, it makes no sense to >> ask if they are or not in the same world or branches. The result they >> obtained only entangle each of them with the environment, locally, and that >> spread on the whole universe (at subliminal speed) so that both of them will >> encounter only their “correlated” counterparts. >> >> >> >> >> >>> Especially since there are pairs of observers who get results that do not >>> agree with QM (the 'mindless hulks!’). >> >> Alice and Bob always get results which confirms QM. But when they are >> space-like separated, their consciousness will only be able to differentiate >> into histories which contains the correlation. >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Maudlin moved on in the years between the first edition of his book in 1994 >>> and the third edition in 2011. >> >> You told me. Maudlin is very good, but is not a fan of Everett, nor even of >> Mechanism. He argued also, and independently of me, that it makes no sense >> to keep both mechanism and materialism. The end of his paper “Computation >> and Consciousness” (Journal of Philosophy, 1989) suggests he is more willing >> to keep Materialism instead of Mechanism. I show that indeed the mechanist >> solution generalises Everett on the whole (sigma_1, semicomputable) part of >> the arithmetical reality/truth. I reduce the mind-body problem to the >> problem of recovering physics from a statistics on first person experience >> in arithmetic (where there is no hulk, nor need of hulk). >> >> >> >>> In his 2011 thinking I can only imagine that he would have seen many-minds >>> in much the same way as he later saw many-worlds -- if appeal is made to >>> the wave function to make sense of the correlations in many-worlds, then we >>> have to recognize that this is not a local account since the wave function >>> is not a local object. >> >> >> I don’t really understand what you mean by that. I am reading your paper, >> which is nice and well written, but too quick for me on both Tipler and >> Baylock. It helps me to better see how you interpret the wave, and where we >> might differ. >> >> It seems to me that when Alice and Bob prepare the singlet state, even >> before their long distance separation, there is no sense to say that they >> are still in the same world. They are only because their interact and >> entangle and re-entangle very quickly, but still always at light speed or >> slower. But even if there is only one cm between Alice and Bob, it makes no >> sense to say that they are in the same world. They might find uncorrelated >> results, but, at the speed of alight, each one will only be able to talk to >> its correctly correlated counterparts. >> >> >> >> >>> The same can clearly be said of the many-minds approach. >>> >>> The wave function is not local because the entangled singlet state is >>> non-separable. >> >> OK. >> >> >> >> >>> Non-separability means that if you interact with one part of the state, you >>> affect the whole state: >> >> >> I am not sure you affect any state. You just discover in which branch you >> are. The wave only described a multiplicity of realties(available history), >> and in this case, when someone, Alice say, look at something inseparable, >> she got information about her branche(s), and of course she knows that any >> possible future Bob will have the correlated result. But Bob, if >> space-separated, might very well find a non correlated result, which means >> that he localised itself in another branch, where him too will only be able >> to meet his corresponding correctly correlated Alice. >> >> That is how I interpret the QM wave, or the Heisenberg matrices. I am afraid >> that a “real” treatment would need a quantum theory of space itself, but >> this needs a solution to the quantum gravity problem. >> >> >> >> >>> the state cannot be split into separate non-interacting parts, one for each >>> particle in the singlet. >> >> I agree with this. But that can be interpreted by the fact that we are >> ignorant in which branch we are. Being in the same branch is an equivalence >> relation on the object with which we can interact with, and space separation >> entails that the measurement are truly uncorrelated “in the absolute”, yet >> all the Alices and Bobs couples localises themselves in the branches >> violating the Bell’s inequality. Alice would need to go quicker than the >> speed of light to see some Bob finding an uncorrelated result, like >> overpassing the decoherence time. >> >> >> >>> That is why the non-locality is unavoidable -- in many minds as in >>> many-worlds -- it is an intrinsic part of quantum theory, and is perhaps >>> the most significant way in which quantum mechanics differs from classical >>> mechanics (you don't get non-separable states in classical mechanics, >>> although you do get interference between classical waves). >> >> >> I agree with all this, but the many-worlds, or the relative states explains >> this without a physical action acting FTL. It is very special indeed, as the >> confirmation of that Bell’s Inequality violation confirms that LOCALITY + >> DETERMINACY (+ some amount of physical realism) makes the Relative States >> existence obligatory. >> Which of course I find nice, as it makes QM looking exactly like a solution >> of the Mechanist Mind-body problem, where the physical body can be shown to >> make sense only through a statistics on all computational states (structured >> by self-referential correctness). >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>>>> so stochastically chooses to record only one definite result from the >>>>> mix. In the Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, the >>>>> following comment might be relevant for you: >>>>> >>>>> "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction >>>>> between a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, so it >>>>> seems to require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis >>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis#Philosophical_implications> >>>>> or postulating a physical model for consciousness.” >>>> >>>> >>>> What does they mean by “Strong Church-Turing hypothesis”? >>> >>> I imagine that the Wikipedia author means that the strong CT hypothesis >>> supposes that the world is nothing more than a computation. >> >> >> STRONG CT would be Digital Physicalism. This has been refuted since long, if >> by world we mean the physical world. If my local body is Turing emulable >> (with consciousness preservation), then physics is reduced to a statistics >> on all computations, which can be shown to have non computable elements. >> The physical reality can be very well approximated by a computation, but in >> the limit (where the first person lives) it cannot be computable. To make >> some measurement and get all correct decimal in a theory for that >> measurement, you need to execute the whole universal dovetailing in an >> instant, which is impossible. > > That makes no sense. The UD is operating in Platonia, not in Einstein's > spacetime. "An instant" is a derivative, computed, concept in the output of > the UD. > > Brent > > >> Mechanism makes also matter trivially not clonable. You cannot clone your >> infinite ignorance about which computations execute you. >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> The above sentence does not make sense. The many-worlds theory is a direct >>>> consequence of the SWE + the mechanist theory theory of mind. It is the >>>> collapse of the wave which would be threat to Mechanism (and of >>>> Rationalism). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a >>>>> superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate >>>>> in any such superposition), >>>> >>>> The mind cannot NOT participate to the infinite superposition which is not >>>> eliminable from arithmetic. That is why we have an infinity of body in >>>> arithmetic, and why when we look closely to the environment, i.e. below >>>> our mechanist substitution level, we must find the sign of the presence >>>> of the alternate computations, like QM-without-collapse confirmed. >>> >>> So, contrary to what you said above, you do not really agree that the >>> supposedly local 'many-minds' account given by Maudlin in his book is close >>> to what you think? >> >> You can say that. Maudlin saw that the Many-Mind theory is local (at least >> in his 2009 book, I will buy the 2011 soon or later) but he surimposed a >> “one world” structure, which leads to empty hulk and zombie and to an >> infinity of mind for one body, which makes not much sense. I think all this >> comes from too much naive notion of mind and world. With computationalism we >> get the opposite: each mind get associated with an infinity of relative >> computational states, the different modes (true, believable, knowable, >> observable, sensible) result from the incompleteness of all universal >> theories. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>>>> the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- and you might not want to >>>>> say "Yes, Doctor". >>>> >>>> I think the complete opposite of this is correct. Church’s thesis go hand >>>> in hand with the non collapse (and non guiding potential) of the quantum >>>> wave. The only problem that Everett missed, is that, for all this to be >>>> consistent, extract the formalism of the Wave itself from the statistic on >>>> all computations. Then the logic of machine self-reference and its >>>> variants imposed by incompleteness gives the complete solution at the >>>> propositional level, and that works, in the sense that we get quantum >>>> logic where we should, making Mechanism not (yet) refuted by observations. >>> >>> But that is your theory of mechanism, which is not to be found in quantum >>> theory at all. >> >> Everett use Mechanism. Darwin uses Mechanism. Diderot defined rationalism by >> Mechanism, and when Milinda ask to Arjuna what Arjuna is, Arjuna explained >> what a machine is. >> It is not my theory of Mechanism. It is a very old idea. Then >> Incompleteness, which is a one-diagonalization consequence of the >> Church-Turing, shows that we are quite ignorant of what machine can and >> cannot do, and the execution of all computations in arithmetic invites us by >> itself to doubt physicalism. There is a non physical reason for the physical >> laws: they emerge from the logic of what the average universal machine (an >> arithmetical notion) can bet to live from its first person perspective. >> >> There is a many-dreams interpretation of arithmetic/combinator, and all >> universal number/combinator converges to it. >> >> And if that differ from the observations, it will be time to invoke magical >> things like primary matter or spooky action at a distance, or elves and gods >> and other actual infinities. But then I need strong evidence, and a >> departure of Nature from the machine’s observable mode might be such. But up >> to now, nature seems to obey the laws of the universal machine dreams. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Bruce > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. 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