On Wednesday, August 8, 2018 at 5:46:22 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 8 Aug 2018, at 13:50, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <javascript:>> > > On 8 Aug 2018, at 01:39, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <javascript:>> > > > If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information > transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality interpretation > of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. Maudlin agrees > that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close to > what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended already > from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds > assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we got an > infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is that all > measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement splits locally > the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed. > > > I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you would > want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the > superposition of all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such > a superposition, > > > That sides with Mechanism. In arithmetic there is an infinity of identical > (at the relevant representation level) brains. Now Albert and Loewer seems > to associate an infinity of mind with one body. > > > The 'infinity of minds for each body' was postulated by Albert and Lowe to > avoid the 'mindless hulk' problem. In other words, it was just an *ad hoc* > fix for a problem in the theory. This alone should have been sufficient to > render the theory unacceptable. > > > I agree. That is why I remain closer to Everett. This problem is > automatically solved with Mechanism. There is no empty hulk, given that > there is no hulk. > > > > > I do not understand this, and with the Mechanist “many-dreams” it is the > contrary: each mind as an infinity of (virtual) bodies, and the > consciousness will differentiate along their computational different > continuations. Take the WM-duplication. After the reconstitution, but > before the copies open the door, one mind is associated to two bodies, and > then differentiates in W or in M from each location perspective. To say > that the mind is not in a superposition is equivalent with Everett’s > justification that the observer cannot feel the split, and it is where > Everett use (more or less explicitly) the mechanist hypothesis. > > > The splitting in Everett's theory at least makes some sort of sense, and > is not postulated *ad hoc*. > > > I agree. > > > > The real problem I see with many-minds theory is that it does not actually > explain the observed correlations. The correlations are presumed not to > exist in reality -- all possible combinations of experimental outcomes > happen, but when Alice and Bob meet, their bodies are still in indefinite > states -- no actual results are recorded by entanglement with their bodies > -- but their minds will be in definite states that agree with the quantum > correlations. This step seems to introduce yet more unreasonable magic into > the 'explanation'. Why are the minds like this when they communicate? > > > Because all Alice and Bob are coupled in that way, by the singlet state. > That works if we keep in mind that the singlet state (when not already > observed by neither Alice nor Bob) describes an infinity of Alice and Bob, > with the spin in all directions, but always correlated. When Alice and Bob > make their measurement, if they are space separated, it makes no sense to > ask if they are or not in the same world or branches. The result they > obtained only entangle each of them with the environment, locally, and that > spread on the whole universe (at subliminal speed) so that both of them > will encounter only their “correlated” counterparts. > > > > > > Especially since there are pairs of observers who get results that do not > agree with QM (the 'mindless hulks!’). > > > Alice and Bob always get results which confirms QM. But when they are > space-like separated, their consciousness will only be able to > differentiate into histories which contains the correlation. > > > > > > Maudlin moved on in the years between the first edition of his book in > 1994 and the third edition in 2011. > > > You told me. Maudlin is very good, but is not a fan of Everett, nor even > of Mechanism. He argued also, and independently of me, that it makes no > sense to keep both mechanism and materialism. The end of his paper > “Computation and Consciousness” (Journal of Philosophy, 1989) suggests he > is more willing to keep Materialism instead of Mechanism. I show that > indeed the mechanist solution generalises Everett on the whole (sigma_1, > semicomputable) part of the arithmetical reality/truth. I reduce the > mind-body problem to the problem of recovering physics from a statistics on > first person experience in arithmetic (where there is no hulk, nor need of > hulk). > > > > In his 2011 thinking I can only imagine that he would have seen many-minds > in much the same way as he later saw many-worlds -- if appeal is made to > the wave function to make sense of the correlations in many-worlds, then we > have to recognize that this is not a *local* account since the wave > function is not a local object. > > > > I don’t really understand what you mean by that. I am reading your paper, > which is nice and well written, but too quick for me on both Tipler and > Baylock. It helps me to better see how you interpret the wave, and where we > might differ. > > It seems to me that when Alice and Bob prepare the singlet state, even > before their long distance separation, there is no sense to say that they > are still in the same world. They are only because their interact and > entangle and re-entangle very quickly, but still always at light speed or > slower. But even if there is only one cm between Alice and Bob, it makes no > sense to say that they are in the same world. >
*And when I didn't think the MWI could get more foolish, it does! AG* > They might find uncorrelated results, but, at the speed of alight, each > one will only be able to talk to its correctly correlated counterparts. > > > > > The same can clearly be said of the many-minds approach. > > The wave function is not local because the entangled singlet state is > non-separable. > > > OK. > > > > > Non-separability means that if you interact with one part of the state, > you affect the whole state: > > > > I am not sure you affect any state. You just discover in which branch you > are. The wave only described a multiplicity of realties(available history), > and in this case, when someone, Alice say, look at something inseparable, > she got information about her branche(s), and of course she knows that any > possible future Bob will have the correlated result. But Bob, if > space-separated, might very well find a non correlated result, which means > that he localised itself in another branch, where him too will only be able > to meet his corresponding correctly correlated Alice. > > That is how I interpret the QM wave, or the Heisenberg matrices. I am > afraid that a “real” treatment would need a quantum theory of space itself, > but this needs a solution to the quantum gravity problem. > > > > > the state cannot be split into separate non-interacting parts, one for > each particle in the singlet. > > > I agree with this. But that can be interpreted by the fact that we are > ignorant in which branch we are. Being in the same branch is an equivalence > relation on the object with which we can interact with, and space > separation entails that the measurement are truly uncorrelated “in the > absolute”, yet all the Alices and Bobs couples localises themselves in the > branches violating the Bell’s inequality. Alice would need to go quicker > than the speed of light to see some Bob finding an uncorrelated result, > like overpassing the decoherence time. > > > > That is why the non-locality is unavoidable -- in many minds as in > many-worlds -- it is an intrinsic part of quantum theory, and is perhaps > the most significant way in which quantum mechanics differs from classical > mechanics (you don't get non-separable states in classical mechanics, > although you do get interference between classical waves). > > > > I agree with all this, but the many-worlds, or the relative states > explains this without a physical action acting FTL. It is very special > indeed, as the confirmation of that Bell’s Inequality violation confirms > that LOCALITY + DETERMINACY (+ some amount of physical realism) makes the > Relative States existence obligatory. > Which of course I find nice, as it makes QM looking exactly like a > solution of the Mechanist Mind-body problem, where the physical body can be > shown to make sense only through a statistics on all computational states > (structured by self-referential correctness). > > > > > > > so stochastically chooses to record only one definite result from the mix. > In the Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, the following > comment might be relevant for you: > > "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction > between a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, so it > seems to require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis#Philosophical_implications> > or postulating a physical model for consciousness.” > > > > What does they mean by “Strong Church-Turing hypothesis”? > > > I imagine that the Wikipedia author means that the strong CT hypothesis > supposes that the world is nothing more than a computation. > > > > STRONG CT would be Digital Physicalism. This has been refuted since long, > if by world we mean the physical world. If my local body is Turing emulable > (with consciousness preservation), then physics is reduced to a statistics > on all computations, which can be shown to have non computable elements. > The physical reality can be very well approximated by a computation, but > in the limit (where the first person lives) it cannot be computable. To > make some measurement and get all correct decimal in a theory for that > measurement, you need to execute the whole universal dovetailing in an > instant, which is impossible. Mechanism makes also matter trivially not > clonable. You cannot clone your infinite ignorance about which computations > execute you. > > > > > > The above sentence does not make sense. The many-worlds theory is a direct > consequence of the SWE + the mechanist theory theory of mind. It is the > collapse of the wave which would be threat to Mechanism (and of > Rationalism). > > > > > If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a > superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate in > any such superposition), > > > The mind cannot NOT participate to the infinite superposition which is not > eliminable from arithmetic. That is why we have an infinity of body in > arithmetic, and why when we look closely to the environment, i.e. below our > mechanist substitution level, we must find the sign of the presence of the > alternate computations, like QM-without-collapse confirmed. > > > So, contrary to what you said above, you do not really agree that the > supposedly local 'many-minds' account given by Maudlin in his book is close > to what you think? > > > You can say that. Maudlin saw that the Many-Mind theory is local (at least > in his 2009 book, I will buy the 2011 soon or later) but he surimposed a > “one world” structure, which leads to empty hulk and zombie and to an > infinity of mind for one body, which makes not much sense. I think all this > comes from too much naive notion of mind and world. With computationalism > we get the opposite: each mind get associated with an infinity of relative > computational states, the different modes (true, believable, knowable, > observable, sensible) result from the incompleteness of all universal > theories. > > > > > > > > the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- and you might not want to > say "Yes, Doctor". > > > I think the complete opposite of this is correct. Church’s thesis go hand > in hand with the non collapse (and non guiding potential) of the quantum > wave. The only problem that Everett missed, is that, for all this to be > consistent, extract the formalism of the Wave itself from the statistic on > all computations. Then the logic of machine self-reference and its variants > imposed by incompleteness gives the complete solution at the propositional > level, and that works, in the sense that we get quantum logic where we > should, making Mechanism not (yet) refuted by observations. > > > But that is your theory of mechanism, which is not to be found in quantum > theory at all. > > > Everett use Mechanism. Darwin uses Mechanism. Diderot defined rationalism > by Mechanism, and when Milinda ask to Arjuna what Arjuna is, Arjuna > explained what a machine is. > It is not my theory of Mechanism. It is a very old idea. Then > Incompleteness, which is a one-diagonalization consequence of the > Church-Turing, shows that we are quite ignorant of what machine can and > cannot do, and the execution of all computations in arithmetic invites us > by itself to doubt physicalism. There is a non physical reason for the > physical laws: they emerge from the logic of what the average universal > machine (an arithmetical notion) can bet to live from its first person > perspective. > > There is a many-dreams interpretation of arithmetic/combinator, and all > universal number/combinator converges to it. > > And if that differ from the observations, it will be time to invoke > magical things like primary matter or spooky action at a distance, or elves > and gods and other actual infinities. But then I need strong evidence, and > a departure of Nature from the machine’s observable mode might be such. But > up to now, nature seems to obey the laws of the universal machine dreams. > > Bruno > > > > > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
