On 9/18/2018 4:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Sep 2018, at 06:52, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 9/17/2018 10:21 AM, John Clark wrote:

    />It can be duplicated, but it cannot feel the split. /


If a brain can't feel the split when its duplicated, and I agree it can't, then EVERYTHING (my capitalization) was so successfully duplicated that what the 2 brains were doing, mind, was identical. So although there are 2 brains there is only 1 mind. It is only when the matter in the 2 brains starts to be arranged differently, such as would happen the instant the doors were opened and they saw different things, that 2 minds emerge where only 1 was before.

Is that even relevant.  Brains are presumably psuedo-classical objects.  But they can't be strictly classical, so it seems likely that it is impossible to exactly duplicate a brain.

If by brain you mean the physical object, then indeed it is not 100% duplicable.

Then one would not expect the Doctor to be 100% successful.

With mechanism, all physical object are actual infinities. Luckily that does not exist,

What does not exist?  infinities?

Brent

except as an appearances due to the first person indeterminacy on the arithmetical truth. That is why all modal nuances are so important in this context. It is the mechanist non cloning theorem.





So there will be a quick diveregence at the quantum level and that will eventually (30sec ?) be amplified to some classical/computational difference.  But no matter how great the difference there's no reason to suppose "the split" will be "felt”.

All right,


Bruno




Brent

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