> On 19 Sep 2018, at 04:32, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/18/2018 4:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 18 Sep 2018, at 06:52, Brent Meeker <[email protected] 
>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 9/17/2018 10:21 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>>> >It can be duplicated, but it cannot feel the split.
>>>> 
>>>> If a brain can't feel the split when its duplicated, and I agree it can't, 
>>>> then EVERYTHING (my capitalization) was so successfully duplicated that 
>>>> what the 2 brains were doing, mind, was identical. So although there are 2 
>>>> brains there is only 1 mind. It is only when the matter in the 2 brains 
>>>> starts to be arranged differently, such as would happen the instant the 
>>>> doors were opened and they saw different things, that 2 minds emerge where 
>>>> only 1 was before.     
>>> 
>>> Is that even relevant.  Brains are presumably psuedo-classical objects.  
>>> But they can't be strictly classical, so it seems likely that it is 
>>> impossible to exactly duplicate a brain. 
>> 
>> If by brain you mean the physical object, then indeed it is not 100% 
>> duplicable.
> 
> Then one would not expect the Doctor to be 100% successful.
> 
>> With mechanism, all physical object are actual infinities. Luckily that does 
>> not exist,
> 
> What does not exist?  infinities?

Indeed. The theory is either Classical Logic +

1) 0 ≠ s(x)
2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
4) x+0 = x
5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
6) x*0=0
7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Or simply

1) Kxy = x
2) Sxyz = xz(yz)

And nothing else. No axiom of infinity. Like Judson Webb analyses correctly; 
Mechanism is a finitism.
Of course, the Löbian machine inside arithmetic will “invent” infinity, and it 
will be a powerful tool for figuring out what happens, but at some point, if 
they bet on computationalism, they will discard it at the ontic level.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> except as an appearances due to the first person indeterminacy on the 
>> arithmetical truth. That is why all modal nuances are so important in this 
>> context. It is the mechanist non cloning theorem. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> So there will be a quick diveregence at the quantum level and that will 
>>> eventually (30sec ?) be amplified to some classical/computational 
>>> difference.  But no matter how great the difference there's no reason to 
>>> suppose "the split" will be "felt”.
>> 
>> All right,
>> 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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