> On 27 Sep 2018, at 03:31, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >>> On 26 Sep 2018, at 02:36, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> I agree that the quote does not make sense. But it is what you said. >> >> It does not make sense out of hits context. It is the the “…” which does not >> make sense. >> >> The real question is “have you grasped now?” >> >>>> I say that in the context of Mechanism. Then in the math part, I have >>>> (semi-) exiomatize consciousness as >>>> True, unjustifiable, undefinable, immediately knowable, indubitable, and >>>> show how the modes of self-reference makes any universal machine verifying >>>> the existence of this. >>> >>> This is an attempt at proof by definition. All it amounts to is your usual >>> "cat-dog" logic -- the argument that similarity implies identity. >> >> The question is “do you accept that your daughter marry a man who get a >> digital heart, and later, a digital brain”? > > My daughter can marry whomsoever she pleases.
Even a p-zombie? > >> No-one says that similarity implies identity, but only that we make the >> hypothesis that there is a level of description where digital similarity >> entails practical survival. >> >> Nobody defends the idea that this is true (except Clark). >> >> I just deduce from that that the materialist argument invoking a physical >> universe to get a brain-mind identity thesis is no more valid, and that the >> computationalist has to derive physics from self-reference. > > Your deduction fails. Where? > >> You must study before criticising. > > Only some level of study is necessary. Enough to know that you do not make > your case. Are you telling us that you don’t need to read an argument to say that it is mistaken? > > >>>>> A proof conveys truth only in so far as the axioms/assumptions that were >>>>> assumed at the start are true. >>>> >>>> Proof in general does not entails truth. >>> >>> I did not say that it did. Read what I say, and do not misquote me.... >>> I said that proof conveys truth only in so far as the axioms are true. >> >> That is what is not provable by any machine about a truth enough large to >> encompass itself. > > The machine does not have to prove this -- it is manifest that a valid proof > is "truth conserving", it does not entail truth. OK (being large on what you mean by “manifest”). > > > > >>>>> Your proof assumes arithmetical realism (platonism). >>>> >>>> Yes, that means it assumes that classical logic can be applied in >>>> elementary arithmetic. That is presupposed in *all* papers in the physics >>>> literature, and elsewhere. >>> >>> Now you are getting ridiculous. Elementary arithmetic, such as 2+2=4, is >>> tautologically true. >> >> It is true, but it needs a non purely logical theory to be proved. You >> cannot drive the numbers from logic alone. > > Who claims that you can? Bad people attributing me things I have never claim to do. > Whitehead and Russell tried, but failed. > > > >>> So arithmetic is used in physics, but that does not mean that anyone >>> necessarily assumes arithmetic >> >> Anyone capable to take a bus to go to an exam of math, like already in >> primary school, assumes arithmetic. > > I would suggest that you follow your own advice and not quote out of context! I never do that. I never suppress one quote, unless totally unrelated, to clean a post. I just push on enter. > Or jump into the middle of a sentence and treat it as though that were the > whole sentence. You might show me the courtesy of responding to what I > actually say, not some straw man. I still do not answer what you say when asserting arithmetic is used in physics, but not assume. > > I said that no one necessarily assumes arithmetical realism, or platonism. When using arithmetic in any thing (be it physics or paying taxes) we assume some arithmetic realism. And in physics, it is often classical arithmetic realism or intutionistoc realism. The notion of computer requires arithmetical realism, which is just that we accept the axiom I have given (above classical or intuitionnistic logic). I use “platonism” in metaphysics, but in the consequence. Platonism is in the consequence, and it is just a form of skepticism toward Aristotle’s primary matter. It is not “arithmetical realism”, which is no more than accepting the axioms that I have given. > > >> We are blase. And we learn by examples, so we forget that we build on >> assumption, but everyone capable of adding and multiplying, and believing in >> notion like “anniversary” assumes arithmetic. Quantum physics, the theory, >> assumes arithmetic. The definition of a digital machine assumes arithmetic. > > These thing use arithmetic -- that does not entail assuming arithmetical > realism. ? > > > >> You don’t seem to be aware that we can be skeptical about an ontological >> physical reality. >> >> But if you want matter, no problem. Given that you seem to disbelieve >> Mechanism. You are pertly coherent, but I doubt you are interested in mind, >> souls, and the origin of the physical realm. > > I am interested enough. But that does not mean that I have to accept your > account. “Account”? > I assume a mind-brain connection, so that mind and consciousness are purely > physical things. OK. That is indeed incompatible with Mechanism. We just work in different metaphysics. Now, what are your evidence for this? > They do not depend on some independently existing magical arithmetical realm. You need to believe that Ex(x = 2) to solve x - 2 = 0. I do not use more magic than that. I have the feeling that you attribute to me something I do not say. If you believe that 2+2 is not equal to 4 in any sense, you have to make clear your assumption, or it looks quite fuzzy. > As Brent says, there is no "hard problem of consciousness". It is purely an > engineering problem. Once we have built conscious robots we will wonder what > all the fuss was about. Of course not. The so called “easy part” of the consciousness problem is an engineering problem. The hard part is that if a pure functional account of consciousness exist, by should it be conscious? Please read my papers to understand the Mechanist “hard” problem of consciousness, which eventually makes physics into a branch of computer science (itself already branch of arithmetic, not necessarily just first order arithmetic). > > > >>> If you are prepared to say yes to the doctor, then you must believe that >>> the body and brain are Turing emulable, >> >> At some relevant level. Some might ask for the atomic level, other for the >> string level, etc. >> >>> and ipso facto, that consciousness is Turing emulable. >> >> That is a subtle point. It is correct from the third person view, but >> consciousness is not emulate by the physical things, > > I suggest that you try and prove that. That is the point of the papers I gave. As you said that you have not studied them. We can see that. Emulation is an arithmetical notion. > And while you are at it, prove that you are fully conscious under anaesthetic. That would contradict mechanism, unless by “you” you mean all 3-1 version of “me” in arithmetic, but that would make the statement trivially true. > > > >>> I might not say yes to the doctor for other reasons, but I certainly >>> believe in strong AI, i.e., that consciousness is recoverable in a Turing >>> machine. >> >> Nice. That is enough to listen to those machines, and they will explain to >> you that if you are yourself a consistent machine at some digital level, >> then physics can be use to test mechanism. > > Maybe they will actually explain to me that the so-called "hard problem of > consciousness" is an illusion. That is the problem. That is why the more a materialist is serious, the more he/she tend to eliminate first person notion and consciousness, like the Churchland, Dennett, etc. > > >> Stop the ad hominem please. > > You don't take kindly to criticism of your ideas, do you Bruno. You see every > criticism as a direct personal attack. On the contrary, I love criticism. You have not provide one. I see a dismissive tone, and even now, you admit not having study the papers. Let me be specific. Study the seven first steps of the UDA (in sane04), and tell me were it is wrong. The only “critics” is when you say your personal belief, which happen to be non relevant, as you take “arithmetical realism” is a stronger sense that I do. You must understand that my early and serious opponents were non realist on arithmetic, making me realise I should better make that hypothesis explicit. But they where just “literary philosopher” claiming that they do not believe that ExP(x) v ~ExP(x) even when P is decidable, or that a digital machine stops or not. The arithmetical realism I really used technically is only that. My thesis is in logic, and I just made clear that I use a bit more than intuitionistic logic. Have you another critic? > > > >>>> But most people conceive more easily that QM or GR might be false than >>>> elementary arithmetic, or the elementary combinator axioms. >>> >>> Who said anything about arithmetic being false? >> >> You said above hat you don’t assume arithmetic. > > You misquote again. I said that I did not believe in arithmetical realism or > platonism Sorry, just look above. You did say “using arithmetic does not mean we assume …”. But now, let us move forward. Stop saying “realism or platonism”, in pour metaphysical context this lead to misunderstanding. Assuming classical arithmetic = arithmetical realism. > -- an independently existing arithmetical realm. Once you take this away, the > universal dovetailer can do nothing, and your whole metaphysics collapses. Then tell me precisely on what depend arithmetic. At some point, it might help if you could formalise your theory, just to make sure I understand your critic. I have not yet seen one book in physics which do not assume a version of combinators or numbers relation. > >> You cannot believe it true if you don’t assume some of its theories. > > Arithmetical theorems are only tautologically true — That is either conventionalism or logicism. Please clarify. I doubt we would give 1 million of dollars for a tautology. (Or you mean tautology = theorem) And please reread my proof in this thread that Church’s thesis makes the arithmetical reality bigger than anything which can be generated by any machine. Usually we use “tautology" for “theorem" in classical logic (propositional, first order) and not for the non-logical axioms (like x + 0 = x). > true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved. One does not need to > assume any theories. In science we do not refer to the meaning, but only to theories. In practice, this can be circumscribe, but in the foundation, or in metaphysics, it is just better to make clear all what is presuppose. I decide to study mathematical logic for doing this in a proper way. > > > >>> Don't you dare tell me what I believe. I can tell you only that I do not >>> believe in arithmetical realism, so I do not accept the assumptions of >>> mechanism. >> >> Arithmetical realism is just the believe in the axiom above. > > Why should one "believe in axioms”? Believe = assume. Sorry if that is not yet clear. (I agree I use Gödel’s discovery implicitly here). Belief = assuming + keeping in mind that could be wrong/refuted. > Axioms are just a starting point. Indeed. But when we invoke them, usually we are studying something, and so believe them in that weaker sense. “Belief” is just used as an opposite of “knowledge”. Were just don’t know the axiom, but we believe them momentarily, if only for the sake of the argument. It is not “religious belief” (which is claimed by tyran to be knowledge). > They are neither true nor false in themselves, so to speak of believing in > them is a category error. That is so true, that “belief” means “assume" in mathematical metaphysics. > >> The “realism” part is basically in the (A v ~A). >> >> Without arithmetical realism, there is no Church Turing thesis, no computer >> science, and no physical theories at all. I mention it only because I put >> *all* the card on the table. > > Rubbish. Arithmetic is just a matter of some definitions, axioms, and rules > of inference. No realism involved. Realism = classical. Realism means that I use the axiom (A v ~A). Read book by constructivist arithmetician, and you will see what non realism means. Are you OK with this proof. Theorem: It exists x and y such that x and y are irrational and x^y is rational. Proof: I assume that you already know that sqrt(2) is irrational. sqrt(2) ^ sort(2) is either rational or irrational. If it is rational we have a solution: x = y = sqrt(2). If it is irrational we have a solution x = sqrt(2) ^ sqrt(2), and y = sqrt(2), as this x^y gives 2. So either x = sqrt(2) and y = sqrt(2) is a solution, and if not, x = sqrt(2) ^ sqrt(2) and y = sqrt(2) is a solution. So we can say that a solution exist. If you are OK with this proof, like most mathematicians, then you are arithmetical realist. An intuitionist criticises such a proof because it uses the excluded middle (in the use of the assumption that either a (real) number is rational or irrational). Since I have published all this, I have realised that my reasoning go through even for an intuitionist, just adding some double negation for the non constructive result. Intutionisme and realism get only genuinely different in analysis, and not in arithmetic. > > >> I did put arithmetical realism to avoid infinite tergiversation about 2+2=4, >> like some local people did already. >> >> >>>> But if this were true, you would have told us since long. >>> >>> I tell you this quite regularly. >> >> But you put in “arithmetical realism” something which is not there. > > It is there, you know. Without that, your whole enterprise collapses. Where? > >> Sometimes I add “2+2=4” independently of me. May be you believe that when >> you die 2+2=4 will cease to be true. That would not make sense, because it >> would a category error. The arithmetical proposition do not presuppose time >> or anything like that. > > No, they merely presuppose definitions and axioms. They do not presuppose an > independently existing "arithmetical realm”. What do you mean by “presupposing an axiom” if you don’t believe the axioms are satisfied by some structure/model/reality? > > > > >>>> Also, you talk in term of a theory being true or false, >>> >>> Once again, do not put words into my mouth. >> >> Oh, but what I say, I deduce or infer from what you say. > > Oh!, I see! It is OK for you to deduce or infer things from what I say, but > it is not OK for me to do the same? You were inferring, not deducing. > > > >>> What is epistemological inconsistency? I do not assume anything other than >>> the existence of an external world whose existence is independent of you, >>> me, or anyone else. >> >> Yes, I saw that. But then Mechanism is false, and as you accept arithmetical >> realism (and even Church’s thesis, without which “string AI” is not >> definable), the point is that you have to say no to the doctor (or find >> an error in my derivation). > > Yes, I maintain that mechanism is false. Who said that I accept arithmetical > realism? To say that mechanism is false consists in claiming that either the Church-Turing is false, or that accepting a brain transplant at any level generate an inanimate corpse, or a p-zombie. (A “philosophical zombie”, i.e. someone behaving like a conscious person, but lacking consciousness). > -- I thought I had denied that many times. Church's thesis does not require > arithmetical realism. It does. I use the Church-Turing thesis of Post, Kleene, Church, Turing, etc. (not to be confused with some intuitionist variants of it). You need it because to show the closure of the set of partial recursive functions, we use the idea that a program code for a total computable function or a non total computable function. > Nothing requires arithmetical realism, except your thesis. All scientific theories use arithmetical realism, but you are still using it in a philosophical/metaphysical sense, when it means simply that we accept the excluded middle principle in arithmetic. > One is perfectly free to reject arithmetical realism -- science does not > thereby collapse. Not using the excluded middle principle makes the proof constructive, and it is always nice if we can avoid its use, but few mathematician would say that only constructive proofs should be used. Today, the only place we have to use constructive OR is when we build a machine or a program. > Arithmetical realism is the error in your derivation. Of course, given what I mean by arithmetical realism (which I thought I already told you), this would mean that you reject the use of (A v ~A) in arithmetic, which is the place where only a few number of mathematician would claim it is an error. Indeed, Gödel did prove that both Peano arithmetic and Heyting Arithmetic are equiconsistent, and inter-translatable (by the famous “double negation” translation). The proof given above that there exist irrational numbers x and y such that x^y is rational is a simple three lines proof. That result can be proved without (A v ~A), but it is many pages long, and use highly non elementary method (like elliptic curves, modular functors, complex analysis, …). Arithmetical realism is needed with mechanism, because we are lead to the fact that Mechanism, if true, is necessarily NOT constructive (not intuitionist). No machine can ever know which machine she is. That is also the reason why I insist that Mechanism belongs to theology? We can only hope to be a machine and hope the surgeon choose a right level of substitution. If this is your only critics, it cannot work, or you put a large part of math and physics in the trash. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
