> On 26 Sep 2018, at 02:36, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 24 Sep 2018, at 02:25, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
>>> <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
>>>
>>> From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>>>
>>>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:10, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
>>>>> <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>>>>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 08:53, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
>>>>>>> <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through
>>>>>>>> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically
>>>>>>>> predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable
>>>>>>>> sort of knowledge),
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> With that sort of logic
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Only standard classical logic is used in the derivation. + some
>>>>>> hypothesis.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I can prove that my cat is a dog:
>>>>>>> My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail; so my
>>>>>>> cat is a dog.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is invalid in all logic. I was not arguing, just remind the work
>>>>>> already done. The proof is longer, OBVIOUSLY. It shows that you have not
>>>>>> read the papers.
>>>>>
>>>>> No, you use exactly this logic all the time. You find some superficial
>>>>> similarity between things and then conclude that they are identical.
>>>>
>>>> Could you be specific? Did you read my papers?
>>>
>>> Quoting from above: "...the logic of self-reference basically predict
>>> consciousness…."
>>
>> That quote is too short to make sense.
>
> I agree that the quote does not make sense. But it is what you said.
It does not make sense out of hits context. It is the the “…” which does not
make sense.
The real question is “have you grasped now?”
>
>> I say that in the context of Mechanism. Then in the math part, I have
>> (semi-) exiomatize consciousness as
>> True, unjustifiable, undefinable, immediately knowable, indubitable, and
>> show how the modes of self-reference makes any universal machine verifying
>> the existence of this.
>
> This is an attempt at proof by definition. All it amounts to is your usual
> "cat-dog" logic -- the argument that similarity implies identity.
The question is “do you accept that your daughter marry a man who get a digital
heart, and later, a digital brain”?
No-one says that similarity implies identity, but only that we make the
hypothesis that there is a level of description where digital similarity
entails practical survival.
Nobody defends the idea that this is true (except Clark).
I just deduce from that that the materialist argument invoking a physical
universe to get a brain-mind identity thesis is no more valid, and that the
computationalist has to derive physics from self-reference.
You must study before criticising.
>
>
>>>>> Showing that the logic of self reference has some similarities with
>>>>> consciousness is not sufficient.
>>>>
>>>> Sufficient for what? I think you attribute me things I do not say.
>>>
>>> Sufficient to explain consciousness. I quote what you say…
>>
>> Qouting is not enough. You must study and understand the theory before. If
>> you don’t understand, ask a question.
>
> If you do not accept quotes of your own words as evidence, then we are in a
> sorry position……
I don’t accept quote out of the context. I reminded you of the context. You
seem to be the one talking like he knew some truth. In metaphysics, that makes
you invalid at the start.
>
>>>> I start from a precise hypothesis, then all what I say is first derive
>>>> informally, and then formally, using rather standard definition.
>>>>
>>>>> You have to show me a logic that has a coherent internal narrative and
>>>>> shows the signs of consciousness that I use to conclude that other people
>>>>> (and cats and dogs) are conscious.
>>>>
>>>> ?
>>>>
>>>> I will only give you a proof that any machine claiming such a proof is
>>>> inconsistent.
>>>>
>>>> I assume mechanism (the invariant of consciousness fr some
>>>> transformation), and derive from that, constructively, the appearances,
>>>> including the physical appearances, so that we can test.
>>>
>>> Proof is a formal concept.
>>
>> Both the notion of informal proof and formal proof are axiomatised in my
>> work. Indeed they correspond to the modes axiomatised by []p
>> & p, and []p. The first one is defined in term of arithmetical relations
>> that the subject concerned cannot formalised (like truth, if you have heard
>> of Tarski theorem).
>>
>>> A proof conveys truth only in so far as the axioms/assumptions that were
>>> assumed at the start are true.
>>
>> Proof in general does not entails truth.
>
> I did not say that it did. Read what I say, and do not misquote me....
> I said that proof conveys truth only in so far as the axioms are true.
That is what is not provable by any machine about a truth enough large to
encompass itself.
> Proof, of itself, does not demonstrate independent truth.
Probably. It is ambiguous.
>
>> That is the whole point of the Löb’s formula. No Löbian thjeorie or machine
>> can prove []p -> p in general, unless and only unless they have proof p.
>
> Perhaps you mean that only if p is true, independently.
I mean that the löbian entity are close for the rule
[]p -> p
————
p
And they know it: they prove []([]p -> p) -> []p.
>
>>> Your proof assumes arithmetical realism (platonism).
>>
>> Yes, that means it assumes that classical logic can be applied in elementary
>> arithmetic. That is presupposed in *all* papers in the physics literature,
>> and elsewhere.
>
> Now you are getting ridiculous. Elementary arithmetic, such as 2+2=4, is
> tautologically true.
It is true, but it needs a non purely logical theory to be proved. You cannot
drive the numbers from logic alone.
> In other words, if is true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved.
OK.
> It has no ontological content outside itself.
OK.
> So arithmetic is used in physics, but that does not mean that anyone
> necessarily assumes arithmetic
Anyone capable to take a bus to go to an exam of math, like already in primary
school, assumes arithmetic.
We are blase. And we learn by examples, so we forget that we build on
assumption, but everyone capable of adding and multiplying, and believing in
notion like “anniversary” assumes arithmetic. Quantum physics, the theory,
assumes arithmetic. The definition of a digital machine assumes arithmetic. The
amazing discovery is that its does not assume *more* than arithmetic (or Turing
equivalent).
> realism, or platonism.
Platonism enters in the theory at another place, not in the hypothesis, which
assumes only
Logic +
1) 0 ≠ s(x)
2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y))
4) x+0 = x
5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
6) x*0=0
7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
> Mathematics is used because it is useful, not because it is true in any sense
> other than tautologically.
Someone asked me on QUORA what physicists fail to see that mathematicians
usually see.
Here is my answer:
<<
The idea that mathematics kicks back, and is a reality all by itself, and not
just a language. Einstein got the idea, eventually, at the end of his life,
after many conversations with Gödel.
But even mathematicians have forgotten that at the time of the platonists;
“mathematician’ meant “skeptical that the physical reality is the real thing”.
Today’s, mathematicians and physicists might both be unaware that the original
doubt of those who created science, including theology/metaphysics, were
doubting about the ontological primitive existence of a physical universe, and
about physicalism. The term “God” was the nickname of what exists by
definition, but is unknown, and is indeed the object of the debate and
research, when we want to be serious in that domain.
>>
You don’t seem to be aware that we can be skeptical about an ontological
physical reality.
But if you want matter, no problem. Given that you seem to disbelieve
Mechanism. You are pertly coherent, but I doubt you are interested in mind,
souls, and the origin of the physical realm.
>
> Arithmetic (and, indeed, all of mathematics) can be regarded as a formal
> system,
No. It can’t.
> with a number of defined symbols and rules of inference. Any sequence of the
> allowed symbols can be written down. Any such sequence is a theorem if it can
> be derived from the basic axioms using the allowed rules of inference. If it
> cannot be so derived, it is not a theorem. The status of some sequences of
> symbols may be undecidable; and some sequences may be true for other reasons,
OK.
> even though they are not theorems.
Of this or that theory or machine. OK.
> There is little else to mathematics than this.
It might depends on the metaphysics, or even on hypothesis in some science,
like psychology/cognitive-science.
In which metaphysics. You should make clear what are your assumptions.
With mechanism, physics is the border of the universal mind, in a precise way,
making Mechanism testable/refutable.
>
>> This is just to avoid some form of ultra-finitisme. (I put all the cards on
>> the table).
>>
>>> I do not accept that arithmetical realism is true. Therefore your proof is
>>> irrelevant.
>>
>> Which arithmetical formula you believe to be neither true, nor false.
>
> Gödel sentences cannot be proved to be either true or false from within the
> system. They may be true in a wider formal system. But then, truth and/or
> falsity are not relevant concepts for arithmetical statements. They are
> either theorems or not, or undecidable.
In this or that theory. Yes. A theory, like a brain is associated with a set of
beliefs, but knowledge is not, it is associated to the connection of belief and
truth, and obeys different logics. Same for the observable.
> Arithmetic is evaluated according to whether or not it is useful -- concepts
> of truth and falsity have little relevance to the evaluation of arithmetic.
You should read the “Mathematician’s Apology” of Hardy, who apologise doing
mathematics (number theory) that he considered as totally not useful. It prays
only truth and beauty. Of course he was wrong, Number theory got many
application today …
You assume that there is something non mathematical, but you cannot invoke it
if you want to be serious in metaphysics.
>
>> But since then, my work has been shown valid in hey thing arithmetic. It is
>> just more complex.
>
> The typo makes this unintelligible.
Oops sorry. It is my spelling corrector who still don’t know Heyting. Read:
… since then, my work has been shown valid in Heyting arithmetic. It is just
more complex.
Heyting Arithmetic is the intuitionistic variant of Peano arithmetic. It is the
same theory, except for the (A v ~A) axioms which is deleted in Heyting
arithmetic. Heyting is a logician who was a student of Brouwer, the founder of
Intutionism (and a great topologist too).
>
>>>> I don’t think you have studied my papers, or my long version.
>>>
>>> If I do not accept the starting point, then studying the long version of
>>> your argument is not going to convince me.
>>
>> Well, if you believe that the body is not Turing emulable, you might tell me
>> what is not Turing emulable, nor FPI-recoverable.
>
> If you are prepared to say yes to the doctor, then you must believe that the
> body and brain are Turing emulable,
At some relevant level. Some might ask for the atomic level, other for the
string level, etc.
> and ipso facto, that consciousness is Turing emulable.
That is a subtle point. It is correct from the third person view, but
consciousness is not emulate by the physical things, and by its relation with
truth, as a sort of semantical fixed point, we will not be able to assert that
consciousness is Turing emulable … without committing a machine theological
blasphemy, somehow.
It is true, but not assertable, like all proposition in the corona G* minus G.
I could say more, but then you need to study both the Universal Dovetailer
Paradox or Argument, and have an idea how it is translated in
arithmetic/combinators/...
> I might not say yes to the doctor for other reasons, but I certainly believe
> in strong AI, i.e., that consciousness is recoverable in a Turing machine.
Nice. That is enough to listen to those machines, and they will explain to you
that if you are yourself a consistent machine at some digital level, then
physics can be use to test mechanism.
>
>> This makes QM wrong, and in fact all know physical theory wrong. It makes
>> Drawin theory of evolution wrong.
>
> Come on, this is just puerile nonsense.
?
QM implies Turing emulability, unless you discover a non computable physical
constant, and a process which used all decimals of it.
A Turing machine can emulate a quantum computer. There is no evidence for
non-mechanism in the physical reality, except the reduction of the wave packet,
if you take that idea seriously.
Stop the ad hominem please.
>
>> My hypothesis is basically Diderot definition of rationalism. Not invocation
>> of supernatural influence, nor of actual infinities. Oracle (à la Turing)
>> are permitted though.
>>
>>
>>>> I don’t claim any truth.
>>>
>>> Good. The conclusions of formal proofs are true only in so far as the
>>> premises are true. You can't prove the truth of arithmetical realism.
>>
>> I cannot prove that x + 0 = 0.
>
> I can. It is an axiom of arithmetic, so the proof is trivial.
So, 5 + 0 = 0.
Nice! All numbers are equal to 0. Not sure I will do business with you.
>
>> With mechanism, I have deduced the “theory of everything (that is of quanta
>> and qulaia and their relations).
>
> No, you haven’t.
?
> You make extravagant claims,
Only for an Aristotelian believer who seems to have forget to doubt, especially
the ontological commitments.
> but you have deduced very little.
Of course I just put myself on the shoulder of Gödel, Löb and Solovay, and
others. But still, I deduced the propositional base of all modes of the
machine. Given what you say, I doubt you have studied it.
> And the only connection with the real world is via cat=dog arguments.
Show me one, in the publications, without quoting little pieces, and so that I
can see what you mean, because the only "cat-dog" I see is the Mechanist
hypothesis.
>
>> And the theory is any first order definition of a Turing universal system. I
>> illustrate with Q and the SK-combinator.
>>
>>>> I give a proof, showing that the physical science are reduced to
>>>> arithmetic, once we assume the mechanist thesis in metaphysics, and the
>>>> proof is constructive, so I do provide the theorem prover programs for
>>>> each modes (including the physical) at the propositional level.
>>>
>>> So if we do not assume that mechanism is true then your proofs are
>>> valueless.
>>
>> You can say that for all theories.
>
> What can you say for all theories? Not all theories rely on the assumption of
> comp, or your "mechanism”.
That is not what I said.
I said that your argument works for all theories, All theories requires
assuming what they assume.
>
>
>> But most people conceive more easily that QM or GR might be false than
>> elementary arithmetic, or the elementary combinator axioms.
>
> Who said anything about arithmetic being false?
You said above hat you don’t assume arithmetic. You cannot believe it true if
you don’t assume some of its theories.
> It is only some simple definitions and rules of inference. These might not be
> complete, or might not be consistent even. But the concepts of truth and
> falsity do not apply here.
You might need to study a bit of mathematical logic, which provides a constant
back and forth between notion of proof and notion of truth.
>
>> So I guess you just say that you believe that the brain or the body is not
>> Turing emulable, or, put in another way, that you believe that you
>> consciousness has a supernatural origin.
>
> Don't you dare tell me what I believe. I can tell you only that I do not
> believe in arithmetical realism, so I do not accept the assumptions of
> mechanism.
Arithmetical realism is just the believe in the axiom above. The “realism” part
is basically in the (A v ~A).
Without arithmetical realism, there is no Church Turing thesis, no computer
science, and no physical theories at all. I mention it only because I put *all*
the card on the table.
I did put arithmetical realism to avoid infinite tergiversation about 2+2=4,
like some local people did already.
>
>> But if this were true, you would have told us since long.
>
> I tell you this quite regularly.
But you put in “arithmetical realism” something which is not there.
Sometimes I add “2+2=4” independently of me. May be you believe that when you
die 2+2=4 will cease to be true. That would not make sense, because it would a
category error. The arithmetical proposition do not presuppose time or anything
like that.
>
>> Anyway, you cannot use another theory to claim that an argument is not
>> valid. You could demolish group theory by claiming that N, 0, + * is not a
>> group. That is not valid.
>
> Don't misrepresent what I say. I have never claimed anything like this, As I
> said, a proof is either valid or invalid only in terms of the formal system
> in which it is cast.
Yes, that is why “provable” is better seen as “believable”.
> An argument is not necessarily a proof, and arguments can be shown to be
> unsound in any number of ways.
OK.
>
>> Also, you talk in term of a theory being true or false,
>
> Once again, do not put words into my mouth.
Oh, but what I say, I deduce or infer from what you say.
> This is your usual straw man argument.
>
>> but that is something that we never know, unless again, you told us that a
>> supernatural being has succeeded where science cannot, but again, we cannot
>> invoke a supernatural being to make an argument invalid.
>
> Attempts at ridicule do not add to the strength of your case, and do not
> become you.
>
>> My hypothesis are assumed by 99, 9998% of the scientists implicitly or
>> explicitly.
>
> Rubbish. Where did you collect your statistics? And what were the questions
> asked? Most scientists are not platonists.
I am not a mathematical platonism. Just arithmetical realist, which means I use
classical logic in arithmetic, like all physicist I know (except perhaps
Pincaré), and a large part of mathematicians (except in The Netherlands).
I am not a mathematical platonism for set theory, like Cantor and Gödel.
I assume less than most people.
>
>
>> I have found only two (series) authors studying alternative theory. Now,
>> many people who tend to assume mechanism assumes also materialism, but this
>> is shown to be logically or epistemologically inconsistent.
>
> What is epistemological inconsistency? I do not assume anything other than
> the existence of an external world whose existence is independent of you, me,
> or anyone else.
Yes, I saw that. But then Mechanism is false, and as you accept arithmetical
realism (and even Church’s thesis, without which “string AI” is not definable),
the point is that you have to say no to the doctor (or find an error in my
derivation).
Bruno
>
> Bruce
>
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