From: *Bruno Marchal* <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
On 24 Sep 2018, at 02:25, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
From: *Bruno Marchal* <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:10, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
From: *Bruno Marchal* <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
On 23 Sep 2018, at 08:53, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
From: *Bruno Marchal* <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness,
through computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which
basically predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and
non definable sort of knowledge),
With that sort of logic
Only standard classical logic is used in the derivation. + some
hypothesis.
I can prove that my cat is a dog:
My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail;
so my cat is a dog.
That is invalid in all logic. I was not arguing, just remind the
work already done. The proof is longer, OBVIOUSLY. It shows that
you have not read the papers.
No, you use exactly this logic all the time. You find some
superficial similarity between things and then conclude that they
are identical.
Could you be specific? Did you read my papers?
Quoting from above: "...the logic of self-reference basically predict
consciousness…."
That quote is too short to make sense.
I agree that the quote does not make sense. But it is what you said.
I say that in the context of Mechanism. Then in the math part, I have
(semi-) exiomatize consciousness as
True, unjustifiable, undefinable, immediately knowable, indubitable,
and show how the modes of self-reference makes any universal machine
verifying the existence of this.
This is an attempt at proof by definition. All it amounts to is your
usual "cat-dog" logic -- the argument that similarity implies identity.
Showing that the logic of self reference has some similarities with
consciousness is not sufficient.
Sufficient for what? I think you attribute me things I do not say.
Sufficient to explain consciousness. I quote what you say…
Qouting is not enough. You must study and understand the theory
before. If you don’t understand, ask a question.
If you do not accept quotes of your own words as evidence, then we are
in a sorry position......
I start from a precise hypothesis, then all what I say is first
derive informally, and then formally, using rather standard definition.
You have to show me a logic that has a coherent internal narrative
and shows the signs of consciousness that I use to conclude that
other people (and cats and dogs) are conscious.
?
I will only give you a proof that any machine claiming such a proof
is inconsistent.
I assume mechanism (the invariant of consciousness fr some
transformation), and derive from that, constructively, the
appearances, including the physical appearances, so that we can test.
Proof is a formal concept.
Both the notion of informal proof and formal proof are axiomatised in
my work. Indeed they correspond to the modes axiomatised by []p & p,
and []p. The first one is defined in term of arithmetical relations
that the subject concerned cannot formalised (like truth, if you have
heard of Tarski theorem).
A proof conveys truth only in so far as the axioms/assumptions that
were assumed at the start are true.
Proof in general does not entails truth.
I did not say that it did. Read what I say, and do not misquote me....
I said that proof conveys truth only in so far as the axioms are true.
Proof, of itself, does not demonstrate independent truth.
That is the whole point of the Löb’s formula. No Löbian thjeorie or
machine can prove []p -> p in general, unless and only unless they
have proof p.
Perhaps you mean that only if p is true, independently.
Your proof assumes arithmetical realism (platonism).
Yes, that means it assumes that classical logic can be applied in
elementary arithmetic. That is presupposed in *all* papers in the
physics literature, and elsewhere.
Now you are getting ridiculous. Elementary arithmetic, such as 2+2=4, is
tautologically true. In other words, if is true by virtue of the meaning
of the terms involved. It has no ontological content outside itself. So
arithmetic is used in physics, but that does not mean that anyone
necessarily assumes arithmetic realism, or platonism. Mathematics is
used because it is useful, not because it is true in any sense other
than tautologically.
Arithmetic (and, indeed, all of mathematics) can be regarded as a formal
system, with a number of defined symbols and rules of inference. Any
sequence of the allowed symbols can be written down. Any such sequence
is a theorem if it can be derived from the basic axioms using the
allowed rules of inference. If it cannot be so derived, it is not a
theorem. The status of some sequences of symbols may be undecidable; and
some sequences may be true for other reasons, even though they are not
theorems. There is little else to mathematics than this.
This is just to avoid some form of ultra-finitisme. (I put all the
cards on the table).
I do not accept that arithmetical realism is true. Therefore your
proof is irrelevant.
Which arithmetical formula you believe to be neither true, nor false.
Gödel sentences cannot be proved to be either true or false from within
the system. They may be true in a wider formal system. But then, truth
and/or falsity are not relevant concepts for arithmetical statements.
They are either theorems or not, or undecidable. Arithmetic is evaluated
according to whether or not it is useful -- concepts of truth and
falsity have little relevance to the evaluation of arithmetic.
But since then, my work has been shown valid in hey thing arithmetic.
It is just more complex.
The typo makes this unintelligible.
I don’t think you have studied my papers, or my long version.
If I do not accept the starting point, then studying the long version
of your argument is not going to convince me.
Well, if you believe that the body is not Turing emulable, you might
tell me what is not Turing emulable, nor FPI-recoverable.
If you are prepared to say yes to the doctor, then you must believe that
the body and brain are Turing emulable, and /ipso facto/, that
consciousness is Turing emulable. I might not say yes to the doctor for
other reasons, but I certainly believe in strong AI, i.e., that
consciousness is recoverable in a Turing machine.
This makes QM wrong, and in fact all know physical theory wrong. It
makes Drawin theory of evolution wrong.
Come on, this is just puerile nonsense.
My hypothesis is basically Diderot definition of rationalism. Not
invocation of supernatural influence, nor of actual infinities. Oracle
(à la Turing) are permitted though.
I don’t claim any truth.
Good. The conclusions of formal proofs are true only in so far as the
premises are true. You can't prove the truth of arithmetical realism.
I cannot prove that x + 0 = 0.
I can. It is an axiom of arithmetic, so the proof is trivial.
With mechanism, I have deduced the “theory of everything (that is of
quanta and qulaia and their relations).
No, you haven't. You make extravagant claims, but you have deduced very
little. And the only connection with the real world is via cat=dog
arguments.
And the theory is any first order definition of a Turing universal
system. I illustrate with Q and the SK-combinator.
I give a proof, showing that the physical science are reduced to
arithmetic, once we assume the mechanist thesis in metaphysics, and
the proof is constructive, so I do provide the theorem prover
programs for each modes (including the physical) at the
propositional level.
So if we do not assume that mechanism is true then your proofs are
valueless.
You can say that for all theories.
What can you say for all theories? Not all theories rely on the
assumption of comp, or your "mechanism".
But most people conceive more easily that QM or GR might be false than
elementary arithmetic, or the elementary combinator axioms.
Who said anything about arithmetic being false? It is only some simple
definitions and rules of inference. These might not be complete, or
might not be consistent even. But the concepts of truth and falsity do
not apply here.
So I guess you just say that you believe that the brain or the body is
not Turing emulable, or, put in another way, that you believe that you
consciousness has a supernatural origin.
Don't you dare tell me what I believe. I can tell you only that I do not
believe in arithmetical realism, so I do not accept the assumptions of
mechanism.
But if this were true, you would have told us since long.
I tell you this quite regularly.
Anyway, you cannot use another theory to claim that an argument is not
valid. You could demolish group theory by claiming that N, 0, + * is
not a group. That is not valid.
Don't misrepresent what I say. I have never claimed anything like this,
As I said, a proof is either valid or invalid only in terms of the
formal system in which it is cast. An argument is not necessarily a
proof, and arguments can be shown to be unsound in any number of ways.
Also, you talk in term of a theory being true or false,
Once again, do not put words into my mouth. This is your usual straw man
argument.
but that is something that we never know, unless again, you told us
that a supernatural being has succeeded where science cannot, but
again, we cannot invoke a supernatural being to make an argument invalid.
Attempts at ridicule do not add to the strength of your case, and do not
become you.
My hypothesis are assumed by 99, 9998% of the scientists implicitly or
explicitly.
Rubbish. Where did you collect your statistics? And what were the
questions asked? Most scientists are not platonists.
I have found only two (series) authors studying alternative theory.
Now, many people who tend to assume mechanism assumes also
materialism, but this is shown to be logically or epistemologically
inconsistent.
What is epistemological inconsistency? I do not assume anything other
than the existence of an external world whose existence is independent
of you, me, or anyone else.
Bruce
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