> On 28 Sep 2018, at 14:42, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 2:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 28 Sep 2018, at 00:34, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: >> >> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about >> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis: > > Yes, it was proved as a consequence of the Mechanist Hypothesis (well before > Tegmark introduced it as an hypothesis). > > > >> >> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences >> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the >> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures. > > What Tegmark missed is the first person indeterminacy, which makes the > physical reality into a sort of statistics on *all* mathematical structures. > The physical reality is not a mathematical structure among others, but a > precise mathematical phenomenon, occurring in arithmetic. > > > > > > >> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse >> structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide >> Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc. >> >> What are your thoughts. > > If mechanism is false, both substantial physicalism and non substantial > physicalism are wrong. Mechanism, in the cognitive science, makes the > physical reality not Turing emulbale (“digital physics” is incoherent). > Physics becomes reducible to machine’s psychology, or better, machine or > number theology. Unfortunately a giant gap remain between physicists (who > have the right question, but an inadequate metaphysics) and logician (who > have the right tool but run away from theology and metaphysics). > > The main advantage in using Mechanism (properly) is that incompleteness > justified all the modes of the self, and this makes possible to get a precise > theory of quanta and qualia. > > In this list, we are a bit in advance on this, to be short. I can give > references if asked. Actually I just gave them in some preceding posts. > > What some people missed, is that there has never been any evidence for > Aristotelian Primary Matter. Materialism will be abandoned as a lasting > supersitition. > > Bruno > > > > > On the other side it is held that numbers - universal numbers - actually > exist (arithmeticalism) is superstition.
With Turing’s definition (or any equivalent one (Church, Kleene, Post, …), the existence of universal number is a theorem of Peano Arithmetic. Robinson arithmetic is itself a universal number, but has not the cognitive ability to prove it. But Peano can, without any problem. It is has nothing to do with arithmeticalism. Most logicians are materialist (without necessarily vindicating it), but none doubt that the universal numbers exist in the same sense (of existence) than the prime numbers. > > Even the texts in which the definition of the universal numbers appear are > material: Yes, but that does not make it existing ontologically. Keep in mind that Plato and Aristotle differs on the very criterion of existence. To see, touch, observe, measure is not a criterion of existence, as we can dream this things, and then with mechanism we have a model where number existence is enough to have the dreams. Observing and touching matter is not an argument of existence, unless you assume materialism at the start. But when we do metaphysics seriously, we cannot assume any ontology other that what we need to develop the discourse. > They are seen as electronic dots on a screen in a PDF viewer, or ink glyphs > on paper in a printout, etc. But there is nothing more than that . > > There is nothing outside matter. That is strong materialism. That is a quite strong metaphysical assumption. It is incompatible with Mechanism in cognitive science. In fact, even weak materialism (matter exists ontologically and is not reducible to anything else) is incompatible with Mechanism. > > (Materialism is not physicalism.) Physicalism does not imply materialism. OK. Yet, I define matter by “the object of study of physics”, or the study of the observable mode, making strong materialism implying physicalism. Bruno > > - pt > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
