> On 20 Nov 2018, at 00:44, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Mon, Nov 19, 2018 at 6:24 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > > The notion of model “modelises” the notion of reality. > > I see. No I take that back I don't see. What does that mean, how would things > look different if it were the other way around, what if the notion of reality > realizes the notion of model?
In logic, a model is a reality. I will use “reality” instead of “model”, because physicists use “model” for theory. A reality is anything which satisfies a theory (i.e. each axioms, and all theorems). A theory is sound means that what we prove in the theory will be true in all models of the theory. A theory is complete if what is true in all models is proved in the theory. All first order theories are complete in that sense. A corollary is that a theory is consistent if and only if the theory has a model. > > >> that is like using English to talk about the English word "cat". Whenever > >> mathematics tries to model something that is not itself, like something > >> physical, > > > Which might be part of mathematics. > > If so you could make a calculation without the use of matter that obeys the > laws of physics and you would be the richest man who ever lived. By definition of computations, all computations are done without primary matter. The appearance of matter is explained by the way some computations are seen from inside. If you believe in some primary, non deductible matter, and that such primary matter has a role for consciousness, it is up to you to explain how that matter can select computation(s) in arithmetic. But either A) that matter role is not Turing emulable, but then mechanism is false. Or, B) that matter role is Turing emulable, but then it occurs in arithmetic (in all models of arithmetic), en you failed. > > > Unless you assume [...] > > What I assume is you are NOT the richest man who ever lived. > > >> But, I hear you say, the numbers 11 and 13 are prime and that fact is > >> unchanging and eternal! Well yes, but the English words "cat" and "bat" > >> rhyme and that fact is also unchanging and eternal. > > > Not in the same sense, and if you make things precise, for mechanism, a > > theory with bat and cat rhyming can be Turing universal, > > If both English and mathematics are Turing universal then both are just > languages and everything mathematics can do English can do, although perhaps > a little less eloquently . Neither English nor mathematics are defined precisely enough to assert that there are Turing universal. It can or cannot make sense without further precisions. > > >> Mathematics can't even identify all true sentences about arithmetic much > >> less become the master of physical reality. We know the sentence "the 4th > >> Busy Beaver number is 107" belongs in the set of true sentences, but what > >> about "the 5th Busy Beaver number is 47,176,870"? It's either true or its > >> not but will you or I anybody or anything ever know which one? Nobody > >> knows and nobody knows if we'll ever know, but we do know that nothing > >> will ever know what the 8000th Busy Beaver number is even though its well > >> defined and finite. > > > You make my point. The value of the busy beaver function is arithmetical > > well defined, but not computable, which illustrates that the arithmetical > > reality kicks back, > > Arithmetical reality "kicked back" by saying "I can NOT identify all true > sentences in arithmetic", and many many centuries before Godel or Turing > Arithmetical reality "kicked back" by saying "I can only predict > approximately what a physical system will do” Gödel’s theorem says nothing about the physical, and does not assume anything in physics, nor metaphysics. But this changes when we assume Mechanism; physics becomes a first person plural statistics on computation, and indeed quantum mechanics is recovered in the extraction of physics in arithmetic “seen from inside”. > and with the more recent development of Quantum Mechanics the approximations > have become even more approximate. And that is exactly what you'd expect to > happen if mathematics was the model and physics was the real thing because > models are always simpler and less complete than the thing they're modeling. > Model in the physicist sense. OK. But that is provably true for the arithmetical reality, which is provably infinitely more complex than any theories (model in the physicist sense) of arithmetic, by incompleteness. > > > your argument needs your ontological commitment in some primary matter, for > > which there is no evidence found yet. > > You've been saying shit like that for years and I still have no idea what > you're talking about. What exactly would you consider relevant evidence of > the existence of "primary matter"? I don't think you even know what "primary > matter" means. That is all normal, as you told me you stop at step 3. You have a lot of work to do, no doubt about that. But I do answer that question eventually. You can detect “primary matter” by comparing the logics S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1* with the logic of the observables. Up to now, nature confirms Mechanism, and the absence of primary matter. If you read the whole paper (sane04), you can have the gist of it, even if you have some doubt on some steps, on which we can come back. > > > 2+2=4 even if I was not born. > > But there would be no way for anything to think about 2+2=4 without matter > that obeys the laws of physics, Because you ignore that the arithmetical reality realises all computations. > there would be no way for that information to be encoded, x encodes phi_x in arithmetic through the Kleene’s predicate T(x, y, z). Or through any universal number u, and the universal function phI_u. You cannot know by pure introspection if you are in a brain in a vat, or a brain in arithmetic. You are the one assuming some primary matter and giving it a mysterious role in selecting consciousness. It is up to you to answer the question above. Is it A or B? You tell me. > and even if there were it would be meaningless if there were not at least 4 > things in the physical universe. > > > You seem to confuse [...] > > I'm not the one who is completely befuddled by personal pronouns. Have you follow the combinator thread? We are close to be able to explain the mathematical definition of all pronouns used. But most people find the informal explanation used in the UDA far easier, and you have not succeeded in explaining what is your problem with the 1p and 3p distinction. You talk sometimes like if we just die through set-duplication, and when you agree that we survive to it, you agree that each reconstituted person live the dissymmetrical changes as both see one city, and understand that mechanism precludes to have guess which one in advance. We need only to consider all copies as survivors equal in rights without privileging one of their discourse upon another. Here, you are the one that nobody understand. > > > You are only keeping Mouloud your personal materialist credo, > > That word is a bit too covfefe for my taste. > > > 2+2=4 is a description in the language of mathematics about how some > > physical properties behave. For example, the mass of 2 protons and the mass > > 2 more protons equals the mass of 4 protons. But 2+2=4 doesn't work for > > everything, the temperature of 2 hot water bottles and 2 hot water bottles > > does not equal the temperature of 4 hot water bottles. Temperature doesn't > > add up in the same way that mass does, a different description is needed to > > describe what's going on. > > No problem. 2+2=4 should not be applied in all context, of course. > > And physics tells mathematics when 2+2=4 should be applied and when it should > not be because physics is more fundamental. > > > A definition of a computation is not a computation. But can be used to show > > that all computation are done in the models of arithmetic. > > No computation can be shown to do anything without making use of matter that > obeys the laws of physics. Relatively to us? OK. But that relativity is embedded in arithmetic, or mechanism is wrong. > > > >> why in the world would you say the physics is modeling the mathematics > >> when its obvious that the mathematics is trying, with limited success, to > >> model the physics? > > > No one says that physics model mathematics. > > You still don't understand the significance of what Alan Turing did in 1936 Which is? I think you are the one having a revisionist account of the Church Turing thesis. You are using Deutshc physicalist thesis in metaphysics, or similar. Just give an evidence for primary matter. You cannot invoke directly terms like “real”, “reality”, “god”, or your “primary matter” when doing metaphysics with the scientific method. It is automatically invalid. You need to make your assumption clear. Are you able to doubt the ontological existence of a physical universe? Some years ago, you could, but it seems that you have change your mind on this. I have no clue why. Bruno > > >Assuming Aristotle theology [...] > > Yawn. > > > With mechanism, physics is reducible to the theology of [...] > > Sorry, I don't know what you said after this, I fell asleep. > > John K Clark > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org > <mailto:email@example.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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