Today I am busy. I will answer this at ease later. Have a good day,

Bruno > On 20 Nov 2018, at 00:44, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Mon, Nov 19, 2018 at 6:24 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > > The notion of model “modelises” the notion of reality. > > I see. No I take that back I don't see. What does that mean, how would things > look different if it were the other way around, what if the notion of reality > realizes the notion of model? > > >> that is like using English to talk about the English word "cat". Whenever > >> mathematics tries to model something that is not itself, like something > >> physical, > > > Which might be part of mathematics. > > If so you could make a calculation without the use of matter that obeys the > laws of physics and you would be the richest man who ever lived. > > > Unless you assume [...] > > What I assume is you are NOT the richest man who ever lived. > > >> But, I hear you say, the numbers 11 and 13 are prime and that fact is > >> unchanging and eternal! Well yes, but the English words "cat" and "bat" > >> rhyme and that fact is also unchanging and eternal. > > > Not in the same sense, and if you make things precise, for mechanism, a > > theory with bat and cat rhyming can be Turing universal, > > If both English and mathematics are Turing universal then both are just > languages and everything mathematics can do English can do, although perhaps > a little less eloquently . > > >> Mathematics can't even identify all true sentences about arithmetic much > >> less become the master of physical reality. We know the sentence "the 4th > >> Busy Beaver number is 107" belongs in the set of true sentences, but what > >> about "the 5th Busy Beaver number is 47,176,870"? It's either true or its > >> not but will you or I anybody or anything ever know which one? Nobody > >> knows and nobody knows if we'll ever know, but we do know that nothing > >> will ever know what the 8000th Busy Beaver number is even though its well > >> defined and finite. > > > You make my point. The value of the busy beaver function is arithmetical > > well defined, but not computable, which illustrates that the arithmetical > > reality kicks back, > > Arithmetical reality "kicked back" by saying "I can NOT identify all true > sentences in arithmetic", and many many centuries before Godel or Turing > Arithmetical reality "kicked back" by saying "I can only predict > approximately what a physical system will do" and with the more recent > development of Quantum Mechanics the approximations have become even more > approximate. And that is exactly what you'd expect to happen if mathematics > was the model and physics was the real thing because models are always > simpler and less complete than the thing they're modeling. > > > your argument needs your ontological commitment in some primary matter, for > > which there is no evidence found yet. > > You've been saying shit like that for years and I still have no idea what > you're talking about. What exactly would you consider relevant evidence of > the existence of "primary matter"? I don't think you even know what "primary > matter" means. > > > 2+2=4 even if I was not born. > > But there would be no way for anything to think about 2+2=4 without matter > that obeys the laws of physics, there would be no way for that information to > be encoded, and even if there were it would be meaningless if there were not > at least 4 things in the physical universe. > > > You seem to confuse [...] > > I'm not the one who is completely befuddled by personal pronouns. > > > You are only keeping Mouloud your personal materialist credo, > > That word is a bit too covfefe for my taste. > > > 2+2=4 is a description in the language of mathematics about how some > > physical properties behave. For example, the mass of 2 protons and the mass > > 2 more protons equals the mass of 4 protons. But 2+2=4 doesn't work for > > everything, the temperature of 2 hot water bottles and 2 hot water bottles > > does not equal the temperature of 4 hot water bottles. Temperature doesn't > > add up in the same way that mass does, a different description is needed to > > describe what's going on. > > No problem. 2+2=4 should not be applied in all context, of course. > > And physics tells mathematics when 2+2=4 should be applied and when it should > not be because physics is more fundamental. > > > A definition of a computation is not a computation. But can be used to show > > that all computation are done in the models of arithmetic. > > No computation can be shown to do anything without making use of matter that > obeys the laws of physics. > > > >> why in the world would you say the physics is modeling the mathematics > >> when its obvious that the mathematics is trying, with limited success, to > >> model the physics? > > > No one says that physics model mathematics. > > You still don't understand the significance of what Alan Turing did in 1936 > > >Assuming Aristotle theology [...] > > Yawn. > > > With mechanism, physics is reducible to the theology of [...] > > Sorry, I don't know what you said after this, I fell asleep. > > John K Clark > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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