> On 4 Dec 2018, at 11:39, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 4:25:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 3 Dec 2018, at 23:01, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, >>>>> >>>>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also >>>>> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement >>>>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which >>>>> behave intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and >>>>> it behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of >>>>> matter is “magical”. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), >>>>> then humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter >>>>> behaves intelligently. >>>> >>>> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a >>>> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing >>>> complete. >>>> >>>> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this >>>> means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought >>>>> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature. >>>> >>>> >>>> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing >>>> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a >>>> random oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which >>>> computations run us, if I may say. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote >>>> >>>> The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails >>>> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for >>>> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic >>>> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface. >>>> >>>> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense >>>> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing >>>> sense (but could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely >>>> about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to >>>> computation. [ >>>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf >>>> >>>> <http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf> >>>> ]). >>>> >>>> >>>> I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is >>>> non-Turing. >>>> >>>> This new article may be of interest: >>>> >>>> >>>> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist >>>> not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have >>>> them, too" >>>> ] >>>> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity >>>> >>>> <https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity> >>>> ] >>> >>> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is >>> provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is >>> “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of >>> mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be >>> true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the subject >>> of >>> >>> Galileo's Error >>> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness >>> >>> by Philip Goff >>> (coming from Penguin Random House) >> >> >> >> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, but >> present the idea and use it. >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is >>> no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of >>> matter (the subject of science). >> >> There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, and >> then infer relation between those measurable numbers. >> >> >> Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you assume >> matter, you need indeed a non computationalist theory of matter and of mind, >> which will need actual infinities, making hard to refute it experimentally, >> which is not a good sign. >> >> All matter theories assumes elementary arithmetic, you cannot avoid assuming >> it when doping physics, so there is no need of assuming it outside some >> primary matter. (I am the skeptical here). >> >> When assuming mechanism, we can’t assume more than arithmetic, without >> empirical evidence for more, or we just make things harder to avoid solving >> problems (that can prevent science). >> >> I claim no truth, I just show that we can test experimentally between >> mechanism and materialism (shown incompatible), and that the current >> evidences favour mechanism. I give the means to test if there is more than >> numbers, and the test not only found nothing, but found what we need to >> explain the appearances without doing an ontological commitment. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> "physicists measure numbers" isn't the case from the perspective of "numbers >> do not exist”. > > OK. > > But “numbers do not exist” makes immediately computaionalism (digital > mechanism) false or senseless. > > > > > > >> - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ >> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/> >> (Numbers belong to a Platonic realm. They do not exist in nature.) > > I agree. That is somehow justifiable with mechanism: if nature is > ontological, numbers have to be higher order mental pattern, and mental has > to be physical. But of course this makes Mechanism wrong. > > > >> >> Physicists make instruments and get readings from them which they record in >> a language of "numbers". >> >> I don't know if we need matter that hypercomputes (like the hypothetical >> black hole computer) , or >> 1. higher-order computing (computations with infinite objects [ >> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf >> >> <http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf> >> ]) >> 2. experience processing (programming with experiential semantics [ >> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ >> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/> ]). >> are enough. > > I don’t know either, but what I do know is that IF mechanism is true, we have > to explain matter and nature from the universal numbers’ “hallucination” in > arithmetic. And that works enough well to get already a quantum logical > structure on the observable, so it might be worth to continue the testing. > > Bruno > > > > > > On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that > computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I call > real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen > Strawson):
I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real computationalism”. If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my opinion private, if I have one. Bruno > > [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ ] > > -pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
