On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 6:37:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 4 Dec 2018, at 11:39, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 4:25:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 3 Dec 2018, at 23:01, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also >>>>>> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement >>>>>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which >>>>>> behave >>>>>> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it >>>>>> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter >>>>>> is >>>>>> “magical”. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), >>>>> then *humans behave intelligently* means that (at least some) *matter >>>>> behaves intelligently*. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a >>>>> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing >>>>> complete. >>>>> >>>>> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what >>>>> this means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years >>>>> thought that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in >>>>> nature. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful >>>>> processing ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature >>>>> use a random oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which >>>>> computations run us, if I may say. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote >>>> >>>> *The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly >>>> entails higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect >>>> for embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic >>>> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.* >>>> >>>> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense >>>> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing >>>> sense (but could involve topology: *We can say that topology is >>>> precisely about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is >>>> relevant to computation.* [ >>>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf >>>> >>>> ]). >>>> >>>> >>>> I posit that *experience processing* is a "natural computing" that is >>>> non-Turing. >>>> >>>> This new article may be of interest: >>>> >>>> >>>> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist >>>> not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have >>>> them, too" >>>> ] >>>> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity >>>> >>>> ] >>>> >>>> >>>> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is >>>> provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is >>>> “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of >>>> mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be >>>> true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the >>> subject of >>> >>> Galileo's Error >>> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness >>> >>> by Philip Goff >>> (coming from Penguin Random House) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, >>> but present the idea and use it. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there >>> is no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of >>> matter (the subject of science). >>> >>> >>> There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, >>> and then infer relation between those measurable numbers. >>> >>> >>> Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you >>> assume matter, you need indeed a non computationalist theory of matter and >>> of mind, which will need actual infinities, making hard to refute it >>> experimentally, which is not a good sign. >>> >>> All matter theories assumes elementary arithmetic, you cannot avoid >>> assuming it when doping physics, so there is no need of assuming it outside >>> some primary matter. (I am the skeptical here). >>> >>> When assuming mechanism, we can’t assume more than arithmetic, without >>> empirical evidence for more, or we just make things harder to avoid solving >>> problems (that can prevent science). >>> >>> I claim no truth, I just show that we can test experimentally between >>> mechanism and materialism (shown incompatible), and that the current >>> evidences favour mechanism. I give the means to test if there is more than >>> numbers, and the test not only found nothing, but found what we need to >>> explain the appearances without doing an ontological commitment. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >> "physicists measure numbers" *isn't the case* from the perspective of >> "numbers do not exist”. >> >> >> OK. >> >> But “numbers do not exist” makes immediately computaionalism (digital >> mechanism) false or senseless. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ >> (Numbers belong to a Platonic realm. They do not exist in nature.) >> >> >> I agree. That is somehow justifiable with mechanism: if nature is >> ontological, numbers have to be higher order mental pattern, and mental has >> to be physical. But of course this makes Mechanism wrong. >> >> >> >> >> Physicists make instruments and get readings from them which they record >> in a language of "numbers". >> >> I don't know if we need matter that *hypercomputes* (like the >> hypothetical black hole computer) , or >> 1. *higher-order computing* (computations with infinite objects [ >> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf >> >> ]) >> 2. *experience processing* (programming with experiential semantics [ >> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ ]). >> are enough. >> >> >> I don’t know either, but what I do know is that IF mechanism is true, we >> have to explain matter and nature from the universal numbers’ >> “hallucination” in arithmetic. And that works enough well to get already a >> quantum logical structure on the observable, so it might be worth to >> continue the testing. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > > > On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that > *computationalism > is indeed false*, and it should be replaced by what I call *real > computationalism* (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen > Strawson): > > > I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real > computationalism”. If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be > computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my > opinion private, if I have one. > > Bruno >
> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ ] > > -pt > > > The background idea of real computationalism is: (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/>] — where *there are no such things as mathematical objects* — if computation is considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is fiction.) - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
