> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> >> >> >>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, >> >> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also that >> physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement >> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave >> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it >> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is >> “magical”. >> >> >> >> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), then >> humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter behaves >> intelligently. > > Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a > (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing > complete. > > It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this > means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!). > > > > >> >> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought that >> the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature. > > > If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing > ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random > oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations run > us, if I may say. > > Bruno > > > > > > Going by something Barry Cooper wrote > > The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails > higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for embodied > information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic content of > descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface. > > "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense that > doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing sense (but > could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely about the > relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to computation. > [ > http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf > ]). > > > I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is > non-Turing. > > This new article may be of interest: > > > "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist not > just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have them, too" > ] > https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity > ]
I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. Bruno > > > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
