On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 2:11:06 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 8:06 PM <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 1:41:08 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:28 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 11:04:55 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018, <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 9:28:32 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 12/15/2018 7:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker <[email protected]> 
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker <[email protected]> 
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are 
>>>>>>>>> provable.  But you ignore that what is false is also provable.  
>>>>>>>>> Provable is 
>>>>>>>>> only relative to axioms.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove 
>>>>>>>> whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth, 
>>>>>>>> proofs, and axioms?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> What do you think it tells us.  Does it tell us that a false axiom 
>>>>>>>> will not allow proof of a false proposition?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>> It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from 
>>>>>>> axioms. Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and refute 
>>>>>>> them 
>>>>>>> if they lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if they 
>>>>>>> predict a Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can reject 
>>>>>>> that axiom as an incorrect theory of mathematical truth.  Similarly, we 
>>>>>>> might find axioms that allow us to prove more things than some weaker 
>>>>>>> set 
>>>>>>> of axioms, thereby building a better theory, but we have no mechanical 
>>>>>>> way 
>>>>>>> of doing this. In that way it is like doing science, and requires trial 
>>>>>>> and 
>>>>>>> error, comparing our theories with our observations, etc.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Fine, except you've had to quailfy it as "mathematical truth", 
>>>>>>> meaning that it is relative to the axioms defining the Turning machine. 
>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>> Remember a Turing machine isn't a real device.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This seems to be the core problem with Bruno's proposal or model of 
>>>>>> reality; how does an imaginary device produce the illusion of matter 
>>>>>> (and 
>>>>>> space and time)? AG 
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Brent
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The solution us easy. Don't assume they're only imaginary.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *If they're responsible for the existence of the matter and spacetime 
>>>> illusion, then they aren't composed of matter and don't exist in 
>>>> spacetime. 
>>>> So, the only alternative is that they exist in our imagination; hence, 
>>>> they're imaginary. QED. AG *
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>> Imaginary mean exists only in imagination.
>>>
>>> Simple counter example to your proof: If this universe is a simulation 
>>> run on a computer by an advanced alien species, you would conclude that 
>>> computer and alien species is imaginary on the basis that it can't be 
>>> located in spacetime.  But clearly this computer and alien civilization 
>>> does not exist only in our heads, for if they didn't we wouldn't have heads 
>>> with which to imagine them.
>>>
>>
>> *If you insist on asserting something, anything, exists, but not in 
>> spacetime, you have a huge burden of proof since it's impossible to prove 
>> your assertion by any empirical test. So, you're not dealing with a 
>> scientific hypothesis, since it can't be falsified. AG *
>>
>>>
>>>
> It can be falsified. I think you missed the posts I wrote in response to 
> John.  The basic idea is this:
>
> Theories predict certain observations.  We can check for those 
> observations.  If we find them, the theory has passed a test. If we don't 
> find them we keep looking. If we find observations that contradict the 
> predictions of the theory, then we reject that theory and look for 
> something better.
>

*As I previously wrote, I could offer some information about the 
predictions of modern physics; not only what they are, and how they're 
tested, but how they came about. I wouldn't have refer to some paper. I 
haven't seen any plausibility arguments concerning predictions of 
arithmetic being the cause of the alleged illusion of matter and spacetime. 
Not one such argument as far as I can recall. None of the advocates of this 
theory are able to offer any motivational predictions and their 
plausibility BASED on your Platonic arithmetic theory; not one! AG *

>
> Jason 
>

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