> On 16 Dec 2018, at 08:34, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 5:33:44 AM UTC, [email protected] wrote: > > > On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 2:11:06 AM UTC, Jason wrote: > > > On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 8:06 PM <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 1:41:08 AM UTC, Jason wrote: > > > On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:28 PM <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 11:04:55 PM UTC, Jason wrote: > > > On Saturday, December 15, 2018, <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 9:28:32 PM UTC, Brent wrote: > > > On 12/15/2018 7:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> >> >> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are provable. But >>> you ignore that what is false is also provable. Provable is only relative >>> to axioms. >>> >>> >>> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not? >>> >>> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove whether >>> or not any given Turing machine will halt or not? >>> >>> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth, proofs, and >>> axioms? >> >> What do you think it tells us. Does it tell us that a false axiom will not >> allow proof of a false proposition? >> >> It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from axioms. >> Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and refute them if they >> lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if they predict a >> Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can reject that axiom as >> an incorrect theory of mathematical truth. Similarly, we might find axioms >> that allow us to prove more things than some weaker set of axioms, thereby >> building a better theory, but we have no mechanical way of doing this. >> In that way it is like doing science, and requires trial and error, >> comparing our theories with our observations, etc. > > Fine, except you've had to quailfy it as "mathematical truth", meaning that > it is relative to the axioms defining the Turning machine. Remember a Turing > machine isn't a real device. > > This seems to be the core problem with Bruno's proposal or model of reality; > how does an imaginary device produce the illusion of matter (and space and > time)? AG > > Brent > > -- > > The solution us easy. Don't assume they're only imaginary. > > If they're responsible for the existence of the matter and spacetime > illusion, then they aren't composed of matter and don't exist in spacetime. > So, the only alternative is that they exist in our imagination; hence, > they're imaginary. QED. AG > > > Imaginary mean exists only in imagination. > > Simple counter example to your proof: If this universe is a simulation run on > a computer by an advanced alien species, you would conclude that computer and > alien species is imaginary on the basis that it can't be located in > spacetime. But clearly this computer and alien civilization does not exist > only in our heads, for if they didn't we wouldn't have heads with which to > imagine them. > > If you insist on asserting something, anything, exists, but not in spacetime, > you have a huge burden of proof since it's impossible to prove your assertion > by any empirical test. So, you're not dealing with a scientific hypothesis, > since it can't be falsified. AG > > > It can be falsified. I think you missed the posts I wrote in response to > John. The basic idea is this: > > Theories predict certain observations. We can check for those observations. > If we find them, the theory has passed a test. If we don't find them we keep > looking. If we find observations that contradict the predictions of the > theory, then we reject that theory and look for something better. > > Your Turing Machines don't exist in spacetime, so in principle they're > undetectable by beings existing in spacetime. They might as well be ghosts. > And regardless of what you claim, I don't see anything predictable by such a > theory. AG > > For Turing, his machine, albeit a model, was conceived as existing in the > physical world of spacetime (tapes, heads reading tapes, symbols being > manipulated, outputs being printed, etc.),
Turing’s “Turing machine” are pure mathematical objects (set of quintuplets of symbols). The tape, heads, … are introduced for pedagogical purpose, and were actually modelling humans doing a computation with pencil and paper, to accredit the thesis that mathematically computable = intuitively computable by humans. > but YOUR Turing machine exists in a Platonic realm. So, I don't think any of > this makes any sense. Because you assume fictionalism in mathematics. Which is a poor argument to avoid testing Mechanism. It is bad philosophy to invoke a personal opinion to refuse testing nature. Bruno > AG > > > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
