> On 18 Dec 2018, at 21:28, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/18/2018 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> But mathematical objects are completely defined by their axioms.
>> 
>> No, they are not. All theories containing a bit of arithmetic have an 
>> infinity of  non isomorphic models/realities.
>> 
>> 
>> 
> OK.  Then how do you judge the truth of unprovable propositions? You can't 
> rely on a model when there are an infinity of different ones.

Of course. It is *because* I have a good intuition, like you, of what the 
standard model is, that I can dismiss the non standard model, and the 
no-standard numbers. Addition and multiplication are no more computable in the 
non standard model.

Your question is really, where do our intuition of the natural numbers come 
from? That is a deep philosophical question. It comes probably from the 
consciousness of the Löbian machine, but that requires some intuition of the 
infinities, Hilbertt spaces, complex analysis, etc…

As I said, after Gödel, we know that our intuition of the natural numbers comes 
from a deeper intuition of the infinities, and then, with mechanism, we can 
explain that such an intuition is already capture by the very concept of 
“universal machine”. That one cannot be justified by less, only by equivalent.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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