On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:31:06 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 4:12 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] 
> <javascript:>> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 10:54 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] 
>> <javascript:>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:38 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] 
>>> <javascript:>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:26 PM Brent Meeker <[email protected] 
>>>> <javascript:>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But mathematical objects are completely defined by their axioms. 
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Are they?
>>>>
>>>> Two is a mathematical object.
>>>> One of the properties of two is the number of primes it separates.  For 
>>>> example "3 and 5", "5 and 7", etc.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Definitions do not necessarily specify all the relationships into which 
>>> things can enter -- if that was necessary for a definition, no definition 
>>> would be possible. Clearly, common ostensive definitions do not have to 
>>> specify all the properties of an object, or even what it is made of: "That 
>>> is a rock" is a useful ostensive definition, but it does not commit one to 
>>> a full geological understanding of rocks, their formation and properties.
>>>
>>
>> But shouldn't the system that "completely defines" some mathematical 
>> object, allow one to learn and discover those properties?  Would you be 
>> satisfied with a physical theory that billed itself as completely defining 
>> all any physical phenomena, but couldn't tell us what the mass of the 
>> electron was?
>>
>
> Definitions may be the starting point for a theory, but they are not the 
> complete theory.
>  
>
> If mathematical objects are completely defined by their axioms, then 
>>>> shouldn't this property be defined and known for two?  Yet we don't even 
>>>> know the answer to this question, we don't know if it is infinite or 
>>>> finite.  It might even be that no proof exists under the axioms we 
>>>> currently use.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Mathematical objects may be completely defined by their definitions, in 
>>> that the definition corresponds to that unique object. But that does not 
>>> commit one to knowledge of all the relationships that might be true about 
>>> that object. You are requiring too much from a definition.
>>>
>>
>> Let me update my example:
>> Instead of considering "2", consider "Object T" which is "The number of 
>> primes separated by 2".
>> Wouldn't this be a mathematical object that might be undefined by the 
>> axioms?
>>
>
> The concept of twin primes has a simple definition. And the definition 
> uniquely specifies the object -- one would know one whenever one met one, 
> and that without ambiguity or error. But that does not mean that the 
> definition, of itself, should tell you whether the number of primes that 
> satisfy this definition of twin primes is finite or infinite, or even if 
> there are any such pairs of primes.
>
> But we are talking about definitions of objects, not axioms of a theory. 
> We know that any axiomatic theory will necessarily be incomplete -- there 
> will be formulae in the theory that are neither theorems nor the negation 
> of theorems.
>

*Based on the examples I previously offered, that QM and SR are axiomatic 
theories, can we conclude they're incomplete? AG*

>
>  
>
>> There is no possibility of ostensive or empirical definition.  That's the 
>>>>> strength of mathematics; it's "truths" are independent of reality, they 
>>>>> are 
>>>>> part of language.
>>>>>
>>>>> But in any case, the axioms don't define arithmetical truth, which is 
>>>>> my only point.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> No, but they define arithmetic, without which "arithmetical truth" 
>>>>> would be meaningless.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Was the physical universe meaningless before Newton?
>>>>
>>>
>>> The physical universe is defined ostensively -- neither Newton not 
>>> Einstein brought it into  existence.
>>>
>>
>> I think that of the Integers.  I'm open to any arguments you have that 
>> could change my mind.
>>
>
> What is an ostensive definition of an integer?
>
> Bruce
>

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