> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 4, 2019 at 10:02:51 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 3 Jan 2019, at 15:41, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, January 3, 2019 at 7:46:58 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 2 Jan 2019, at 21:09, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 1:07:37 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 12:30:22 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 8:44:36 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On 30 Dec 2018, at 19:02, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Sunday, December 30, 2018 at 7:35:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> On 30 Dec 2018, at 08:33, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> There is no "even" or "odd" prior to the existence of matter.
>>>> 
>>>> With some act of faith in some notion of matter. No problem with this, 
>>>> unless this is used in conjunction with Mechanism.
>>>> 
>>>> But there is a problem with this view in the foundations of physics, as 
>>>> physicist presuppose numbers in their theories. That works FAPP, but is a 
>>>> problem, even without mechanism, in the materialistic ontologies.
>>>> 
>>>> Bruno
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> By "matter" I just mean all "the stuff" there is. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> That leaves unclear if that “stuff which is” is primary or not. Up to now, 
>>> matter is a prediction of Mechanism, but not as stuff, more as element of 
>>> (sharable) long dreams (computation seen from “inside” (to be short).
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> "Numbers" are merely (human-made) language entities used in communicating 
>>>> (human-made) theories about "the stuff”.  
>>> 
>>> I doubt less 2+2=4 than the existence of the humans. I need to assume 2+2=4 
>>> to understand any experiment and theory in physics. With mechanism, we 
>>> explain human from relations on which everybody (enough serious) agree on. 
>>> If numbers were creation by human, why does that creation hits back so 
>>> strongly? Personally, I tend to believe that elementary arithmetical 
>>> statement, provable or not, are true independently of us. Matter, human’s 
>>> psychology, etc… needs a simpler explanation than simply assuming them.
>>> 
>>> All what Mechanism needs to assume is one (any one) universal machine or 
>>> machinery.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The relationship between mathematics and matter (or, really, between math 
>>> and science) - Why does math work so well? - the ‘indispensability 
>>> question’ - is discussed in depth:
>>> 
>>> SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ 
>>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/>
>>> IEP:  https://www.iep.utm.edu/mathfict/ <https://www.iep.utm.edu/mathfict/>
>>> 
>>> I wrote a post on a my 'cheap' version:
>>> 
>>> Mathematical pulp fictionalism
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/08/26/mathematical-pulp-fictionalism/ 
>>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/08/26/mathematical-pulp-fictionalism/>
>>> 
>>> I have no reason to believe that all of mathematics (numbers, ..., 
>>> (mathematical) Turing machines, ...) is nothing more than language - which 
>>> is something generated by material beings.
>>> 
>>> - pt
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I have no reason to believe that all of mathematics (numbers, ..., 
>>> (mathematical) Turing machines, ...) is anything more than language - which 
>>> is something generated by material beings.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I caught that!
>>> 
>>> - pt
>>>  
>>> 
>>> When one thinks of "1+1=2", "|+|=||", etc. one thinks of, say, "There's a 
>>> stick and another stick side by side. What do you call that?"
>>> 
>>> Where do people get the idea that there are  numbers in heaven that they 
>>> are thinking about?
>> 
>> When we assume digital mechanism, only numbers (or equivalent) can think, 
>> and get deluded in confusing the (quite real) physical appearance, with an 
>> ontological being.
>> 
>> The idea that mathematics is just language does not make sense to me. 
>> 
>> It is a confusion between “2+2=4” and the fact that 2+2=4. 
>> 
>> Once a mathematical realm is enough to possess Turing universal numbers, it 
>> kicks strongly back, and indeed such a realm is not amenable completely to 
>> *any* theory or language. 
>> 
>> The mathematical theories used language, and are limited by the language to 
>> get the whole truth, which shows that such a truth is fundamentally above 
>> language and larger than syntactical or mechanical construction. 
>> The beauty, is that once a universal machine is Löbienne, like when 
>> believing in sufficiently powerful induction axioms, the machine get aware 
>> of its own limitations with respect to some truth. That is how and why they 
>> develop religion, i.e. a conception of reality with the idea that such a 
>> reality is beyond their rational means, but not necessarily beyond personal 
>> reflection and personal experience.
>> 
>> With mechanism, we have the proof that in between rationalism and 
>> irrationalism, there is a surrational corona, containing many true but 
>> unprovable (unjustifiable by purely rational means) statements.
>> 
>> There are tuns of evidence for a physical reality, but no evidence at all 
>> for the idea that such a physical reality is primary. That is only believed 
>> by many today due to 1500 years of brainwashing by pseudo-religious people. 
>> 
>> To confuse matter with primary matter is the dogma of Aristotle. There has 
>> never been one experience confirming this, and with mechanism, quantum 
>> physics provide strong experimental reason to believe that the mechanist 
>> immaterialism is more plausible than a primary matter. My work did give hope 
>> to no-mechanist people, but eventually, the experimental conclusions do not 
>> side with their materialist metaphysical wishes.
>> 
>> Materialism is just like “vitalism” in biology. It will disappear like all 
>> superstition get away with enough reflection, I think. Of course, that will 
>> take time, as the humans are not really interested in truth, and the 
>> religious field is, more than any others, a place driven by the wishful 
>> thinking. 
>> 
>> What many people misses is that computation is a purely arithmetical notion. 
>> Something I have been asked to put out of my thesis because it was judged to 
>> be too much easy and well known, ironically, as I have discovered since that 
>> this is not yet well grasped by most, except the expert in the field.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Like "You go to war with the army you have" (Donald Rumsfeld), you make 
>> reality out of the ontology you have.
> 
> By definition, the ontology describes the fundamental reality that we assume. 
> It is some primary matter for a materialist. It is any terms of a first order 
> Turing-complete theory for a Digital Mechanist (who understand its 
> consequences).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Of course if "Numbers is all there is", then everything - people, dogs, 
>> galaxies, ... - is a numerical entity (what I would call a numerical 
>> simulation). Everything that is and is true, is and is true in that ontology.
> 
> 
> ?
> 
> A dog or a galaxy is not a numerical entity. If mechanism is true, that is 
> provable. All piece of observable things is a perception coming from the 
> selection by consciousness on a non computable domain made of many 
> computations. There are few chance this could be computable, and it can be 
> shown that indeed a part of it cannot be computed.
> 
> Note also that the idea that what really exists are numbers is a consequence 
> of mechanism, not something assumed at the start. Mechanism is the 
> “theological” bet that we can survive in digital physical reincarnation. This 
> implied that we survive also in arithmetical reincarnation, and that physics 
> becomes a calculus on computations (“seen from inside”).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> And that's it and there's nothing more to say.
> 
> ?
> 
> No, it is only the beginning of the beginning. It is Platonic science, that 
> is, science which take into account the subject of experience.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> But if numbers do not exist (I don't believe they do), then there is 
>> something else that does. And that something else is matter. 
> 
> 
> Then you need to assume that digital mechanism is false. My point is only 
> that it is testable, and that contemporary physics confirms it.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But (as I think) contemporary physics is wrong - particularly when the thesis 
> is physics = information ("Physics as information processing", etc.)

“Information” is a very fuzzy word. There are many interesting commonalities 
between energy and information, but the term “information” is used somehow 
imprecisely (with not clear distinction between 1p and 3p). 


> 
> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real 
> materialists.


That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the consequence of 
Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but still physicalist 
(like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The physical reality would be a 
mathematical reality among others, but with computationalism, the physical 
reality comes from a more global mathematical phenomenon based on the 
behaviour/semantics of the material mode of self-rereyence (involving 
probabilities, i.e., for those who have studied the self-referential modes 
available, the []p & X modes, with X being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).

This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not exist, I would 
have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
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