> On 2 Jan 2019, at 21:09, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 1:07:37 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 12:30:22 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 8:44:36 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 30 Dec 2018, at 19:02, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 30, 2018 at 7:35:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 30 Dec 2018, at 08:33, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> There is no "even" or "odd" prior to the existence of matter.
>> 
>> With some act of faith in some notion of matter. No problem with this, 
>> unless this is used in conjunction with Mechanism.
>> 
>> But there is a problem with this view in the foundations of physics, as 
>> physicist presuppose numbers in their theories. That works FAPP, but is a 
>> problem, even without mechanism, in the materialistic ontologies.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> By "matter" I just mean all "the stuff" there is. 
> 
> 
> That leaves unclear if that “stuff which is” is primary or not. Up to now, 
> matter is a prediction of Mechanism, but not as stuff, more as element of 
> (sharable) long dreams (computation seen from “inside” (to be short).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> "Numbers" are merely (human-made) language entities used in communicating 
>> (human-made) theories about "the stuff”.  
> 
> I doubt less 2+2=4 than the existence of the humans. I need to assume 2+2=4 
> to understand any experiment and theory in physics. With mechanism, we 
> explain human from relations on which everybody (enough serious) agree on. If 
> numbers were creation by human, why does that creation hits back so strongly? 
> Personally, I tend to believe that elementary arithmetical statement, 
> provable or not, are true independently of us. Matter, human’s psychology, 
> etc… needs a simpler explanation than simply assuming them.
> 
> All what Mechanism needs to assume is one (any one) universal machine or 
> machinery.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> The relationship between mathematics and matter (or, really, between math and 
> science) - Why does math work so well? - the ‘indispensability question’ - is 
> discussed in depth:
> 
> SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ 
> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/>
> IEP:  https://www.iep.utm.edu/mathfict/ <https://www.iep.utm.edu/mathfict/>
> 
> I wrote a post on a my 'cheap' version:
> 
> Mathematical pulp fictionalism
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/08/26/mathematical-pulp-fictionalism/ 
> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/08/26/mathematical-pulp-fictionalism/>
> 
> I have no reason to believe that all of mathematics (numbers, ..., 
> (mathematical) Turing machines, ...) is nothing more than language - which is 
> something generated by material beings.
> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> I have no reason to believe that all of mathematics (numbers, ..., 
> (mathematical) Turing machines, ...) is anything more than language - which 
> is something generated by material beings.
> 
> 
> I caught that!
> 
> - pt
>  
> 
> When one thinks of "1+1=2", "|+|=||", etc. one thinks of, say, "There's a 
> stick and another stick side by side. What do you call that?"
> 
> Where do people get the idea that there are  numbers in heaven that they are 
> thinking about?

When we assume digital mechanism, only numbers (or equivalent) can think, and 
get deluded in confusing the (quite real) physical appearance, with an 
ontological being.

The idea that mathematics is just language does not make sense to me. 

It is a confusion between “2+2=4” and the fact that 2+2=4. 

Once a mathematical realm is enough to possess Turing universal numbers, it 
kicks strongly back, and indeed such a realm is not amenable completely to 
*any* theory or language. 

The mathematical theories used language, and are limited by the language to get 
the whole truth, which shows that such a truth is fundamentally above language 
and larger than syntactical or mechanical construction. 
The beauty, is that once a universal machine is Löbienne, like when believing 
in sufficiently powerful induction axioms, the machine get aware of its own 
limitations with respect to some truth. That is how and why they develop 
religion, i.e. a conception of reality with the idea that such a reality is 
beyond their rational means, but not necessarily beyond personal reflection and 
personal experience.

With mechanism, we have the proof that in between rationalism and 
irrationalism, there is a surrational corona, containing many true but 
unprovable (unjustifiable by purely rational means) statements.

There are tuns of evidence for a physical reality, but no evidence at all for 
the idea that such a physical reality is primary. That is only believed by many 
today due to 1500 years of brainwashing by pseudo-religious people. 

To confuse matter with primary matter is the dogma of Aristotle. There has 
never been one experience confirming this, and with mechanism, quantum physics 
provide strong experimental reason to believe that the mechanist immaterialism 
is more plausible than a primary matter. My work did give hope to no-mechanist 
people, but eventually, the experimental conclusions do not side with their 
materialist metaphysical wishes.

Materialism is just like “vitalism” in biology. It will disappear like all 
superstition get away with enough reflection, I think. Of course, that will 
take time, as the humans are not really interested in truth, and the religious 
field is, more than any others, a place driven by the wishful thinking. 

What many people misses is that computation is a purely arithmetical notion. 
Something I have been asked to put out of my thesis because it was judged to be 
too much easy and well known, ironically, as I have discovered since that this 
is not yet well grasped by most, except the expert in the field.

Bruno






> 
> - pt
> 
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