On Friday, January 4, 2019 at 10:02:51 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 3 Jan 2019, at 15:41, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Thursday, January 3, 2019 at 7:46:58 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 2 Jan 2019, at 21:09, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 1:07:37 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 12:30:22 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 8:44:36 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 30 Dec 2018, at 19:02, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sunday, December 30, 2018 at 7:35:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 30 Dec 2018, at 08:33, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> There is no "even" or "odd" prior to the existence of* matter.* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> With some act of faith in some notion of matter. No problem with >>>>>> this, unless this is used in conjunction with Mechanism. >>>>>> >>>>>> But there is a problem with this view in the foundations of physics, >>>>>> as physicist presuppose numbers in their theories. That works FAPP, but >>>>>> is >>>>>> a problem, even without mechanism, in the materialistic ontologies. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> By "matter" I just mean all "the stuff" there is. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That leaves unclear if that “stuff which is” is primary or not. Up to >>>>> now, matter is a prediction of Mechanism, but not as stuff, more as >>>>> element >>>>> of (sharable) long dreams (computation seen from “inside” (to be short). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "Numbers" are merely (human-made) language entities used in >>>>> communicating (human-made) theories about "the stuff”. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I doubt less 2+2=4 than the existence of the humans. I need to assume >>>>> 2+2=4 to understand any experiment and theory in physics. With mechanism, >>>>> we explain human from relations on which everybody (enough serious) agree >>>>> on. If numbers were creation by human, why does that creation hits back >>>>> so >>>>> strongly? Personally, I tend to believe that elementary arithmetical >>>>> statement, provable or not, are true independently of us. Matter, human’s >>>>> psychology, etc… needs a simpler explanation than simply assuming them. >>>>> >>>>> All what Mechanism needs to assume is one (any one) universal machine >>>>> or machinery. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> The relationship between mathematics and matter (or, really, between >>>> math and science) - *Why does math work so well? - the *‘indispensability >>>> question’ - is discussed in depth: >>>> >>>> SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ >>>> IEP: https://www.iep.utm.edu/mathfict/ >>>> >>>> I wrote a post on a my 'cheap' version: >>>> >>>> *Mathematical pulp fictionalism* >>>> >>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/08/26/mathematical-pulp-fictionalism/ >>>> >>>> I have no reason to believe that all of mathematics (numbers, ..., >>>> (mathematical) Turing machines, ...) is nothing more than language - which >>>> is something generated by material beings. >>>> >>>> - pt >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> I have no reason to believe that all of mathematics (numbers, ..., >>> (mathematical) Turing machines, ...) is *anything* more than language - >>> which is something generated by material beings. >>> >>> >>> I caught that! >>> >>> - pt >>> >>> >> >> When one thinks of "1+1=2", "|+|=||", etc. one thinks of, say, "There's a >> stick and another stick side by side. What do you call that?" >> >> Where do people get the idea that there are numbers in heaven that they >> are thinking about? >> >> >> When we assume digital mechanism, only numbers (or equivalent) can think, >> and get deluded in confusing the (quite real) physical appearance, with an >> ontological being. >> >> The idea that mathematics is just language does not make sense to me. >> >> It is a confusion between “2+2=4” and the fact that 2+2=4. >> >> Once a mathematical realm is enough to possess Turing universal numbers, >> it kicks strongly back, and indeed such a realm is not amenable completely >> to *any* theory or language. >> >> The mathematical theories used language, and are limited by the language >> to get the whole truth, which shows that such a truth is fundamentally >> above language and larger than syntactical or mechanical construction. >> The beauty, is that once a universal machine is Löbienne, like when >> believing in sufficiently powerful induction axioms, the machine get aware >> of its own limitations with respect to some truth. That is how and why they >> develop religion, i.e. a conception of reality with the idea that such a >> reality is beyond their rational means, but not necessarily beyond personal >> reflection and personal experience. >> >> With mechanism, we have the proof that in between rationalism and >> irrationalism, there is a surrational corona, containing many true but >> unprovable (unjustifiable by purely rational means) statements. >> >> There are tuns of evidence for a physical reality, but no evidence at all >> for the idea that such a physical reality is primary. That is only believed >> by many today due to 1500 years of brainwashing by pseudo-religious people. >> >> To confuse matter with primary matter is the dogma of Aristotle. There >> has never been one experience confirming this, and with mechanism, quantum >> physics provide strong experimental reason to believe that the mechanist >> immaterialism is more plausible than a primary matter. My work did give >> hope to no-mechanist people, but eventually, the experimental conclusions >> do not side with their materialist metaphysical wishes. >> >> Materialism is just like “vitalism” in biology. It will disappear like >> all superstition get away with enough reflection, I think. Of course, that >> will take time, as the humans are not really interested in truth, and the >> religious field is, more than any others, a place driven by the wishful >> thinking. >> >> What many people misses is that computation is a purely arithmetical >> notion. Something I have been asked to put out of my thesis because it was >> judged to be too much easy and well known, ironically, as I have discovered >> since that this is not yet well grasped by most, except the expert in the >> field. >> >> Bruno >> >> > > Like "You go to war with the army you have" (Donald Rumsfeld), you make > reality out of the ontology you have. > > > By definition, the ontology describes the fundamental reality that we > assume. It is some primary matter for a materialist. It is any terms of a > first order Turing-complete theory for a Digital Mechanist (who understand > its consequences). > > > > > > Of course if "Numbers is all there is", then everything - people, dogs, > galaxies, ... - is a numerical entity (what I would call a numerical > simulation). Everything that is and is true, is and is true in that > ontology. > > > > ? > > A dog or a galaxy is not a numerical entity. If mechanism is true, that is > provable. All piece of observable things is a perception coming from the > selection by consciousness on a non computable domain made of many > computations. There are few chance this could be computable, and it can be > shown that indeed a part of it cannot be computed. > > Note also that the idea that what really exists are numbers is a > consequence of mechanism, not something assumed at the start. Mechanism is > the “theological” bet that we can survive in digital physical > reincarnation. This implied that we survive also in arithmetical > reincarnation, and that physics becomes a calculus on computations (“seen > from inside”). > > > > > > And that's it and there's nothing more to say. > > > ? > > No, it is only the beginning of the beginning. It is Platonic science, > that is, science which take into account the subject of experience. > > > > > > But if numbers do not exist (I don't believe they do), then there is > something else that does. And that something else is matter. > > > > Then you need to assume that digital mechanism is false. My point is only > that it is testable, and that contemporary physics confirms it. > > Bruno > > > > > But (as I think) contemporary physics is wrong - particularly when the thesis is *physics = information* ("Physics as information processing", etc.)
Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real materialists. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
