> On 24 Jan 2019, at 15:19, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of 
>>> (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. 
>>> It's just a language, which is probably wrong.
>>> 
>>> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out 
>>> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is 
>>> another matter (pun intended).
>> 
>> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal machine 
>> which understand that language. But not all language are Turing universal. 
>> Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) are Turing 
>> universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically not Turing 
>> universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either.
>> 
>> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, and 
>> that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about theories 
>> (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of beliefs), which 
>> avoids ambiguity. 
>> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, given 
>> that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) is a tiny 
>> subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at predicate 
>> logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of that theory, not 
>> something proved in predicate calculus.
>> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one 
>> symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is 
>> too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a number, 
>> which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, that makes the 
>> notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are concerned. 
>> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. Even 
>> predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, 
>> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven axioms. 
>> Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, and thus it 
>> cannot be Turing complete.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language:
>> 
>> More Analog Computing Is on the Way
>> https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way 
>> <https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way>
>> 
>> 
>> The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is definitely 
>> open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s (ACM) 
>> conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, a paper  
>> <https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf>was presented that 
>> described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, abstraction 
>> language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring that defines the 
>> physical analog computing implementation. This research was done at MIT’s 
>> Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL) and 
>> Dartmouth College. The main focus of their investigation was to improve the 
>> simulation of biological systems. 
>> 
>> 
>> Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco
>> https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf 
>> <https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf>
>> 
>> Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful
>> computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic
>> and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new
>> solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the
>> form of a set of differential equations, generates physically
>> realizable configurations for programmable analog devices
>> that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.
>> On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco
>> generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28
>> to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes.
>> 
>> 
>> - pt
> 
> Intersting.
> 
> Yet, that does not violate the Church-Thesis, even if very useful FAPP. But 
> such computations arise in arithmetic, either directly, or through a infinite 
> sequence of approximations. If all decimals of the analog phenomenon needs to 
> be taken into account, then we are out of my working hypothesis, and even 
> evolution theory becomes wrong, as evolution and life becomes sequences of 
> miracles. But the goal of the authors here is not learning anything in 
> metaphysics, just doing efficacious machine. In that case mechanism explains 
> the plausible necessity of such moves, including quantum computations (which 
> also do not violate Church’s thesis).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I don't believe in (or know what are) miracles (although a real hypercomputer 
> - one you could give any statement of arithmetic to - e.g. Goldbach's 
> conjecture  -  and it could check through all - infinite number of -  
> integers and tell you "true" or "false" within the hour - would be basically 
> a miracle), but I do think that substrate matters.
> 
> Hence in the PLTOS view (program, language, transformer/compiler, object, 
> substrate), substrate can't be eliminated in the semantics of program. In 
> other words, in real programming, there are no such things as 
> substrate-independent programs.
> 

Because you assume some primary substrate. And then you need, coherently, to 
assume no-mechanism. No problem, but the current evidence favours Mechanism, 
and there has never been any evidence for substrate. Adding substrate in the 
picture makes the mind-body problem almost non soluble, at least without 
invoking some precise non computationalist theory of mind. I start from the 
computationalist of mind, shows that we have to derive a phenomenology of 
matter in a special (self-referentially based) manner, and nature seems to 
confirm this. The illusion of matter is easier to explain once we have a theory 
of consciousness, than to derive a theory of consciousness from some notion 
substrate (which are conceived usually as being inert).
We are working in different theories. You might think about a way to motivate 
your ontological commitment in some primitive substance. The books in physics 
does not provide such motivation, as they do not aboard the mind-body problem 
(even if Everett Quantum Mechanics already look like a solution to the 
mechanist mind-body problem).

Bruno





> 
> But matter is a mystery (this I've learned from Galen Strawson), so I do 
> think there are mysteries.
> 
> - pt
> 
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