> On 24 Jan 2019, at 15:19, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of >>> (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. >>> It's just a language, which is probably wrong. >>> >>> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out >>> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is >>> another matter (pun intended). >> >> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal machine >> which understand that language. But not all language are Turing universal. >> Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) are Turing >> universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically not Turing >> universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either. >> >> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, and >> that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about theories >> (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of beliefs), which >> avoids ambiguity. >> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, given >> that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) is a tiny >> subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at predicate >> logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of that theory, not >> something proved in predicate calculus. >> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one >> symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is >> too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a number, >> which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, that makes the >> notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are concerned. >> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. Even >> predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, >> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven axioms. >> Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, and thus it >> cannot be Turing complete. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language: >> >> More Analog Computing Is on the Way >> https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way >> <https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way> >> >> >> The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is definitely >> open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s (ACM) >> conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, a paper >> <https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf>was presented that >> described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, abstraction >> language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring that defines the >> physical analog computing implementation. This research was done at MIT’s >> Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL) and >> Dartmouth College. The main focus of their investigation was to improve the >> simulation of biological systems. >> >> >> Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco >> https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf >> <https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf> >> >> Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful >> computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic >> and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new >> solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the >> form of a set of differential equations, generates physically >> realizable configurations for programmable analog devices >> that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system. >> On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco >> generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28 >> to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes. >> >> >> - pt > > Intersting. > > Yet, that does not violate the Church-Thesis, even if very useful FAPP. But > such computations arise in arithmetic, either directly, or through a infinite > sequence of approximations. If all decimals of the analog phenomenon needs to > be taken into account, then we are out of my working hypothesis, and even > evolution theory becomes wrong, as evolution and life becomes sequences of > miracles. But the goal of the authors here is not learning anything in > metaphysics, just doing efficacious machine. In that case mechanism explains > the plausible necessity of such moves, including quantum computations (which > also do not violate Church’s thesis). > > Bruno > > > > > > > I don't believe in (or know what are) miracles (although a real hypercomputer > - one you could give any statement of arithmetic to - e.g. Goldbach's > conjecture - and it could check through all - infinite number of - > integers and tell you "true" or "false" within the hour - would be basically > a miracle), but I do think that substrate matters. > > Hence in the PLTOS view (program, language, transformer/compiler, object, > substrate), substrate can't be eliminated in the semantics of program. In > other words, in real programming, there are no such things as > substrate-independent programs. >
Because you assume some primary substrate. And then you need, coherently, to assume no-mechanism. No problem, but the current evidence favours Mechanism, and there has never been any evidence for substrate. Adding substrate in the picture makes the mind-body problem almost non soluble, at least without invoking some precise non computationalist theory of mind. I start from the computationalist of mind, shows that we have to derive a phenomenology of matter in a special (self-referentially based) manner, and nature seems to confirm this. The illusion of matter is easier to explain once we have a theory of consciousness, than to derive a theory of consciousness from some notion substrate (which are conceived usually as being inert). We are working in different theories. You might think about a way to motivate your ontological commitment in some primitive substance. The books in physics does not provide such motivation, as they do not aboard the mind-body problem (even if Everett Quantum Mechanics already look like a solution to the mechanist mind-body problem). Bruno > > But matter is a mystery (this I've learned from Galen Strawson), so I do > think there are mysteries. > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
