On Tuesday, January 29, 2019 at 5:30:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 28 Jan 2019, at 15:07, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Monday, January 28, 2019 at 6:27:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 25 Jan 2019, at 14:53, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:27:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 24 Jan 2019, at 15:19, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of >>>>> (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. >>>>> It's just a language, which is probably wrong. >>>>> >>>>> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out >>>>> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is >>>>> another matter (pun intended). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal >>>>> machine which understand that language. But not all language are Turing >>>>> universal. Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) are >>>>> Turing universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically >>>>> not Turing universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either. >>>>> >>>>> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, >>>>> and that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about >>>>> theories (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of >>>>> beliefs), which avoids ambiguity. >>>>> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, >>>>> given that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) >>>>> is >>>>> a tiny subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at >>>>> predicate logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of >>>>> that >>>>> theory, not something proved in predicate calculus. >>>>> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one >>>>> symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is >>>>> too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a >>>>> number, which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, that >>>>> makes the notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are >>>>> concerned. >>>>> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. >>>>> Even predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, >>>>> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven >>>>> axioms. Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, >>>>> and >>>>> thus it cannot be Turing complete. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language: >>>> >>>> *More Analog Computing Is on the Way* >>>> https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is >>>> definitely open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s >>>> (ACM) conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, >>>> a paper <https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf>was >>>> presented that described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, >>>> abstraction language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring >>>> that defines the physical analog computing implementation. This research >>>> was done at MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory >>>> (CSAIL) and Dartmouth College. The main focus of their investigation was >>>> to >>>> improve the simulation of biological systems. * >>>> >>>> >>>> *Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco* >>>> https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf >>>> >>>> *Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful* >>>> *computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic* >>>> *and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new* >>>> *solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the* >>>> *form of a set of differential equations, generates physically* >>>> *realizable configurations for programmable analog devices* >>>> *that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.* >>>> *On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco* >>>> *generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28* >>>> *to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes.* >>>> >>>> >>>> - pt >>>> >>>> >>>> Intersting. >>>> >>>> Yet, that does not violate the Church-Thesis, even if very useful FAPP. >>>> But such computations arise in arithmetic, either directly, or through a >>>> infinite sequence of approximations. If all decimals of the analog >>>> phenomenon needs to be taken into account, then we are out of my working >>>> hypothesis, and even evolution theory becomes wrong, as evolution and life >>>> becomes sequences of miracles. But the goal of the authors here is not >>>> learning anything in metaphysics, just doing efficacious machine. In that >>>> case mechanism explains the plausible necessity of such moves, including >>>> quantum computations (which also do not violate Church’s thesis). >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> I don't believe in (or know what are) miracles (although a real >>> hypercomputer - one you could give any statement of arithmetic to - e.g. >>> *Goldbach's >>> conjecture* - and it could check through all - infinite number of - >>> integers and tell you "true" or "false" within the hour - would be >>> basically a miracle), but I do think that* substrate matters*. >>> >>> Hence in the PLTOS view (program, language, transformer/compiler, >>> object, substrate), *substrate* can't be eliminated in the semantics of >>> *program*. In other words, in *real programming*, there are no such >>> things as substrate-independent programs. >>> >>> >>> Because you assume some primary substrate. And then you need, >>> coherently, to assume no-mechanism. No problem, but the current evidence >>> favours Mechanism, and there has never been any evidence for substrate. >>> Adding substrate in the picture makes the mind-body problem almost non >>> soluble, at least without invoking some precise non computationalist theory >>> of mind. I start from the computationalist of mind, shows that we have to >>> derive a phenomenology of matter in a special (self-referentially based) >>> manner, and nature seems to confirm this. The illusion of matter is easier >>> to explain once we have a theory of consciousness, than to derive a theory >>> of consciousness from some notion substrate (which are conceived usually as >>> being inert). >>> We are working in different theories. You might think about a way to >>> motivate your ontological commitment in some primitive substance. The books >>> in physics does not provide such motivation, as they do not aboard the >>> mind-body problem (even if Everett Quantum Mechanics already look like a >>> solution to the mechanist mind-body problem). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> Just to note that the "substrate" terminology is used in computing (as >> above): >> >> *Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful **computing >> substrate* >> * for performing complex neuromorphic **and cytomorphic computations. * >> >> It's a word combined with "computing" like love and marriage. >> >> >> But those analog computations, although they could be very useful in >> practice, do not change the consequence of the theory, unless you claim >> that they provide us with a method to compute new functions, which would >> violate the Church-Turing thesis (which I doubt very much). Keep in mind >> that with mechanism, the physical reality has analog part, which might or >> not be used by our bodies, although there are no evidences (that I know) >> for this. I follow the idea of not adding any hypothesis in a theory, >> unless there are strong evidences for them. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > "Analog" computing is a bit odd. Assuming real numbers (as commonly > defined in math) do not exist in nature (which I don't think they do) then > there is nothing in the Church-Turing sense of semantics that the analog > computer computes differently. But in other semantics (like taking physical > aspects into account - power consumption, for example - then analog > substrate does matter. > > > > Liner logic handles the notion of resource, and a machine cannot > distinguish a relative substrate as defined in some ontological primary > matter/substrate setting or in arithmetic. Of course, by invoking an > ontological commitment, you can doubt any theory. Maybe be car are driven > by invisible horses, and thermodynamic is a fake theory. > > As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I cannot > use any ontological commitment other than the term of some arbitrary but > fixed universal system. > > You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without > evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not > work with Mechanism. > > Bruno > > > > There is no mind|body problem. Only a language|body problem.
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