> On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 29 Jan 2019, at 15:03, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> On Tuesday, January 29, 2019 at 5:30:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 28 Jan 2019, at 15:07, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>> On Monday, January 28, 2019 at 6:27:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> On 25 Jan 2019, at 14:53, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:27:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> On 24 Jan 2019, at 15:19, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>>>>> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of 
>>>>>>> (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the 
>>>>>>> case. It's just a language, which is probably wrong.
>>>>>>> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out 
>>>>>>> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is 
>>>>>>> another matter (pun intended).
>>>>>> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal 
>>>>>> machine which understand that language. But not all language are Turing 
>>>>>> universal. Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) 
>>>>>> are Turing universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are 
>>>>>> typically not Turing universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either.
>>>>>> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, 
>>>>>> and that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about 
>>>>>> theories (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of 
>>>>>> beliefs), which avoids ambiguity. 
>>>>>> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, 
>>>>>> given that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) 
>>>>>> is a tiny subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at 
>>>>>> predicate logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of 
>>>>>> that theory, not something proved in predicate calculus.
>>>>>> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one 
>>>>>> symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is 
>>>>>> too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a 
>>>>>> number, which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, 
>>>>>> that makes the notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are 
>>>>>> concerned. 
>>>>>> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. Even 
>>>>>> predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, 
>>>>>> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven 
>>>>>> axioms. Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, 
>>>>>> and thus it cannot be Turing complete.
>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>> Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language:
>>>>>> More Analog Computing Is on the Way
>>>>>> https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way 
>>>>>> <https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way>
>>>>>> The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is 
>>>>>> definitely open. Last month, at the Association for Computing 
>>>>>> Machinery’s (ACM) conference on Programming Language Design and 
>>>>>> Implementation, a paper  
>>>>>> <https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf>was presented 
>>>>>> that described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, 
>>>>>> abstraction language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring 
>>>>>> that defines the physical analog computing implementation. This research 
>>>>>> was done at MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence 
>>>>>> Laboratory (CSAIL) and Dartmouth College. The main focus of their 
>>>>>> investigation was to improve the simulation of biological systems. 
>>>>>> Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco
>>>>>> https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf 
>>>>>> <https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf>
>>>>>> Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful
>>>>>> computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic
>>>>>> and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new
>>>>>> solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the
>>>>>> form of a set of differential equations, generates physically
>>>>>> realizable configurations for programmable analog devices
>>>>>> that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.
>>>>>> On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco
>>>>>> generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28
>>>>>> to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes.
>>>>>> - pt
>>>>> Intersting.
>>>>> Yet, that does not violate the Church-Thesis, even if very useful FAPP. 
>>>>> But such computations arise in arithmetic, either directly, or through a 
>>>>> infinite sequence of approximations. If all decimals of the analog 
>>>>> phenomenon needs to be taken into account, then we are out of my working 
>>>>> hypothesis, and even evolution theory becomes wrong, as evolution and 
>>>>> life becomes sequences of miracles. But the goal of the authors here is 
>>>>> not learning anything in metaphysics, just doing efficacious machine. In 
>>>>> that case mechanism explains the plausible necessity of such moves, 
>>>>> including quantum computations (which also do not violate Church’s 
>>>>> thesis).
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>> I don't believe in (or know what are) miracles (although a real 
>>>>> hypercomputer - one you could give any statement of arithmetic to - e.g. 
>>>>> Goldbach's conjecture  -  and it could check through all - infinite 
>>>>> number of -  integers and tell you "true" or "false" within the hour - 
>>>>> would be basically a miracle), but I do think that substrate matters.
>>>>> Hence in the PLTOS view (program, language, transformer/compiler, object, 
>>>>> substrate), substrate can't be eliminated in the semantics of program. In 
>>>>> other words, in real programming, there are no such things as 
>>>>> substrate-independent programs.
>>>> Because you assume some primary substrate. And then you need, coherently, 
>>>> to assume no-mechanism. No problem, but the current evidence favours 
>>>> Mechanism, and there has never been any evidence for substrate. Adding 
>>>> substrate in the picture makes the mind-body problem almost non soluble, 
>>>> at least without invoking some precise non computationalist theory of 
>>>> mind. I start from the computationalist of mind, shows that we have to 
>>>> derive a phenomenology of matter in a special (self-referentially based) 
>>>> manner, and nature seems to confirm this. The illusion of matter is easier 
>>>> to explain once we have a theory of consciousness, than to derive a theory 
>>>> of consciousness from some notion substrate (which are conceived usually 
>>>> as being inert).
>>>> We are working in different theories. You might think about a way to 
>>>> motivate your ontological commitment in some primitive substance. The 
>>>> books in physics does not provide such motivation, as they do not aboard 
>>>> the mind-body problem (even if Everett Quantum Mechanics already look like 
>>>> a solution to the mechanist mind-body problem).
>>>> Bruno
>>>> Just to note that the "substrate" terminology is used in computing (as 
>>>> above):
>>>>   Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful computing 
>>>> substrate
>>>>   for performing complex neuromorphic and cytomorphic computations.  
>>>> It's a word combined with "computing" like love and marriage.
>>> But those analog computations, although they could be very useful in 
>>> practice, do not change the consequence of the theory, unless you claim 
>>> that they provide us with a method to compute new functions, which would 
>>> violate the Church-Turing thesis (which I doubt very much). Keep in mind 
>>> that with mechanism, the physical reality has analog part, which might or 
>>> not be used by our bodies, although there are no evidences (that I know) 
>>> for this. I follow the idea of not adding any hypothesis in a theory, 
>>> unless there are strong evidences for them.
>>> Bruno
>>> "Analog" computing is a bit odd. Assuming real numbers (as commonly defined 
>>> in math) do not exist in nature (which I don't think they do) then there is 
>>> nothing in the Church-Turing sense of semantics that the analog computer 
>>> computes differently. But in other semantics (like taking physical aspects 
>>> into account - power consumption, for example - then analog substrate does 
>>> matter.
>> Liner logic handles the notion of resource, and a machine cannot distinguish 
>> a relative substrate as defined in some ontological primary matter/substrate 
>> setting or in arithmetic. Of course, by invoking an ontological commitment, 
>> you can doubt any theory. Maybe be car are driven by invisible horses, and 
>> thermodynamic is a fake theory.
>> As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I cannot use 
>> any ontological commitment other than the term of some arbitrary but fixed 
>> universal system. 
>> You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
>> evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
>> work with Mechanism.
>> Bruno
>> There is no mind|body problem.
>> Only a language|body problem.
> With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure third 
> person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the soul or 
> the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body problem consists 
> in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those two things. The 
> solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been refuted by Socrates (in 
> Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates argument, and rehabilitates 
> Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person knower is the true-believer).
> You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
> associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
> associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
> virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
> escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
> models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
> infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
> taken into account.
> Bruno
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ 
>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/>
>> - pt
> Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms for 
> consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern science 
> rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) panpsychism has 
> a updated version of it.

Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where they comes 
from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. Mechanism explains 
this entirely, up to the testability of all its consequences, which, like every 
where in fundamental science, needs a perpetual doubt and constant verification 
and re-verification. 

If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some evidence 
for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming primitive matter 
a priori seems like wanting to not understand the problem, or hiding it under 
ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 years, if not right 
since Aristotle.


> - pt
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