On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:27:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 24 Jan 2019, at 15:19, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of >>> (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. >>> It's just a language, which is probably wrong. >>> >>> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out >>> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is >>> another matter (pun intended). >>> >>> >>> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal >>> machine which understand that language. But not all language are Turing >>> universal. Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) are >>> Turing universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically >>> not Turing universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either. >>> >>> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, >>> and that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about >>> theories (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of >>> beliefs), which avoids ambiguity. >>> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, >>> given that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) is >>> a tiny subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at >>> predicate logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of that >>> theory, not something proved in predicate calculus. >>> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one >>> symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is >>> too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a >>> number, which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, that >>> makes the notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are concerned. >>> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. Even >>> predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, >>> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven >>> axioms. Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, and >>> thus it cannot be Turing complete. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language: >> >> *More Analog Computing Is on the Way* >> https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way >> >> >> >> *The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is >> definitely open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s >> (ACM) conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, >> a paper <https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf>was >> presented that described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, >> abstraction language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring >> that defines the physical analog computing implementation. This research >> was done at MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory >> (CSAIL) and Dartmouth College. The main focus of their investigation was to >> improve the simulation of biological systems. * >> >> >> *Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco* >> https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf >> >> *Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful* >> *computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic* >> *and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new* >> *solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the* >> *form of a set of differential equations, generates physically* >> *realizable configurations for programmable analog devices* >> *that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.* >> *On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco* >> *generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28* >> *to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes.* >> >> >> - pt >> >> >> Intersting. >> >> Yet, that does not violate the Church-Thesis, even if very useful FAPP. >> But such computations arise in arithmetic, either directly, or through a >> infinite sequence of approximations. If all decimals of the analog >> phenomenon needs to be taken into account, then we are out of my working >> hypothesis, and even evolution theory becomes wrong, as evolution and life >> becomes sequences of miracles. But the goal of the authors here is not >> learning anything in metaphysics, just doing efficacious machine. In that >> case mechanism explains the plausible necessity of such moves, including >> quantum computations (which also do not violate Church’s thesis). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > > > I don't believe in (or know what are) miracles (although a real > hypercomputer - one you could give any statement of arithmetic to - e.g. > *Goldbach's > conjecture* - and it could check through all - infinite number of - > integers and tell you "true" or "false" within the hour - would be > basically a miracle), but I do think that* substrate matters*. > > Hence in the PLTOS view (program, language, transformer/compiler, object, > substrate), *substrate* can't be eliminated in the semantics of *program*. > In other words, in *real programming*, there are no such things as > substrate-independent programs. > > > Because you assume some primary substrate. And then you need, coherently, > to assume no-mechanism. No problem, but the current evidence favours > Mechanism, and there has never been any evidence for substrate. Adding > substrate in the picture makes the mind-body problem almost non soluble, at > least without invoking some precise non computationalist theory of mind. I > start from the computationalist of mind, shows that we have to derive a > phenomenology of matter in a special (self-referentially based) manner, and > nature seems to confirm this. The illusion of matter is easier to explain > once we have a theory of consciousness, than to derive a theory of > consciousness from some notion substrate (which are conceived usually as > being inert). > We are working in different theories. You might think about a way to > motivate your ontological commitment in some primitive substance. The books > in physics does not provide such motivation, as they do not aboard the > mind-body problem (even if Everett Quantum Mechanics already look like a > solution to the mechanist mind-body problem). > > Bruno > > > > > Just to note that the "substrate" terminology is used in computing (as above):
*Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful **computing substrate* * for performing complex neuromorphic **and cytomorphic computations. * It's a word combined with "computing" like love and marriage. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
