> On 15 Feb 2019, at 20:43, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Friday, February 15, 2019 at 12:01:26 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 15 Feb 2019, at 16:12, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, February 15, 2019 at 5:35:02 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 15 Feb 2019, at 08:25, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> On Wednesday, February 13, 2019 at 10:40:32 PM UTC-6, cdemorsella wrote: >>> Two fascinating (and very different) approaches are presented to derive >>> Quantim Mechanics main practical tool (e.g. Born's rule). Wonder what some >>> of the physicists on here think about this research? >>> >>> I find the argument that no laws is the fundamental law... and that the >>> universe and its laws are emergent guided by subtle mathematical >>> statistical phenomena, at the same time both alluring and annoying.... it >>> is somehow unsatisfactory.... like being served a quite empty plate with >>> nice garnish for dinner. >>> >>> One example of emergence from chaotic conditions is how traffic jams (aka >>> density waves) can emerge from chaotic initial conditions, becoming self >>> re-enforcing within local domains of influence... for those unlucky to be >>> stuck in them. Density wave emergence is seen across scale, for example the >>> spiral arms of galaxies can be explained as giant gravitational pile ups >>> with some fundamentally similar parallels to say a rush hour traffic jam, >>> except on vastly different scales of course and due to other different >>> factors, in the galactic case the emergent effects of a vast number of >>> gravitational inter-actions as stars migrate through these arms on their >>> grand voyages around the galactic core. >>> >>> This paired with the corollary argument that any attempt to discover a >>> fundamental law seems doomed to the infinite regression of then needing to >>> explain what this foundation itself rests upon.... leading to the "it's >>> turtles all the way down" hall of mirrors carnival house... head-banger. >>> >>> Perhaps, as Wheeler argued, the world is a self-synthesizing system, and >>> the seeming order we observe, is emergent... a law without law. >>> >>> Here is the link to the article: >>> >>> https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-born-rule-has-been-derived-from-simple-physical-principles-20190213/ >>> >>> <https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-born-rule-has-been-derived-from-simple-physical-principles-20190213/> >>> >>> >>> >>> One can (sort of) write all "physics" in a couple of equations: the >>> Einstein Field Equation (EFE) and the Standard Model Equation (SME): >>> >>> EFE: >>> https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/45/EinsteinLeiden4.jpg/620px-EinsteinLeiden4.jpg >>> >>> <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/45/EinsteinLeiden4.jpg/620px-EinsteinLeiden4.jpg> >>> + >>> SME: >>> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png >>> >>> <https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png> >>> >>> What caused this particular arrangement of expressions in these to be the >>> "law" of our universe I suppose can be "explained" by it's being one of any >>> number of possible arrangements. >> >> >> The tiny (sigma_1) arithmetical reality contains all “combinations” of all >> programs, and your explanation is a bit like digital physics, where the >> physical universe would be one special universal number, say U. That is >> possible, but this can explain the origin of the physical laws, in a >> coherent way with respect to the mind-body problem (the hard problem of >> consciousness) only in presence of an explanation of why that program U is >> winning, that is how such U can “multiply” you so much in the relative way >> that the laws of physics get stabilised. Arithmetical self-reference >> explains consciousness “easily”, but at the price of forcing us to derive >> the physical laws from any universal machinery. >> The physical reality is not a mathematical reality among others, it is the >> projective border of the universal mind, which is just the mind of the >> universal machine. It is a complex many-dreams structure, and its quantum >> aspects explain why negative amplitude of probability can play a role in >> making the aberrant histories relatively rare, despite them being also in >> that sigma_1 arithmetic. >> >> With mechanism, the idea that there is anything more than the sigma_1 >> arithmetical truth is absolutely undecidable. The sigma_1 truth emulates the >> sigma_n believers for all n, and beyond. If the physics which is in the head >> of the universal numbers departs too much from what we see, it will be time >> to suspect that there is indeed something more. But not only there are no >> evidence for that, but there are strong evidence for the completeness of the >> sigma_1 truth with respect to the metaphysical questions. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Whatever brand of scientist - physicist, chemist, biologist, even >> psychologist - it seems that they see any theory of whatever is within their >> domain is to be composed of a finite number of sentences (e.g. equations, >> for physicists). > > Yes, like a brain use a finite number of molecules, and mechanism eventually > only assumes the finite number 0, s(0), s(s(0)), …, which actually will be > used to code the finite things we are interested in. > > But the meaning of those things are formalised by infinite structure, like > the model (N, +, x), or like hide that a computable function associate any > number to a number. The understanding of “red” should make you able to > recognise *all* red things. With mechanism, such meaning are captured by > nameable, and non nameable, number relations. > > All theories assumes such potential, phenomenological, infinities. The > concept of understanding is itself infinite, and more or less well captured > by the comprehension axiom in set theories, or the abstraction Operation in > Lambda calculus. Compute science is concerned by the behaviour of finite > entities confronted to finite or infinite entities. > > > > > >> >> To have a theory that is composed of an infinite number of sentences is sort >> of outside of their way of thinking. > > All theories contains an infinite set of sentences. Classical propositional > logic contains as theorem “p -> p”, > “p -> (p -> p)”, “p -> (p -> (p -> p)), etc. Elementary arithmetic contains > infinite propositions: 1+1= 2, 2+2=4, 4+4=8, 8+8=16, etc. That is why we use > variables to say generalities, like Ax(x=x), that is, for all x it is the > case that x = x. Or we use scheme of axioms. > No need to put any ontology on this, with mechanism we need only 0, s(0), … > Mechanism explains, using only the laws of addition and multiplication (and > succession) how finite numbers get able to hallucinate other numbers, and why > some sheaves of hallucination can become persistent and associated to deep > and complex lawful histories. > > I might disagree with you, everyone’s theory is infinite, but what you are > perhaps saying is that at any moment of time, we consult only finite part of > those theories, to figure out some reality we bet on. But that is not unlike > the Turing machine, which consulte only finite portion of its tape, and asks > only a finite number of query to some Oracle. > > F=ma assumes already many infinite theories. Infinite theories are far > simpler to use than finite theories, due especially to the abundance of very > similar types of things, like photons, electro, water molecules, but also > numbers, functions, relations, space, etc. > > Digital Mechanism is a finitisme, not an ultrafinitism, to be clear. It also > an indexical, it concerns your willingness to say yes to a digitalist doctor, > or yes to a digital teleportation experience. I just show that in that case > the mind-body problem reduce to a body illusion problem in arithmetic. It is > more a problem asked in a theory of consciousness than in physics. Here the > theory of consciousness is basically the whole theology of the universal > machine, or the one common to all sound consistent extension of a little one > like PA. PA assumes induction, which we can put already in the phenomenology. > From the putself, we assume only RA(*). > > Bruno > > RA = Robinson’s Arithmetic (often called Q): > > 1) 0 ≠ s(x) > 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y) > 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) > 4) x+0 = x > 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y) > 6) x*0=0 > 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x > > An even cuter TOE is (without logic!): > > 1) If A = B and A = C, then B = C > 2) If A = B then AC = BC > 3) If A = B then CA = CB > 4) KAB = A > 5) SABC = AC(BC) > > Both are finite theories, or can be easily viewed as shemes of proposition.. > The second theory is purely equational. We cannot prove that SK = KI in that > theory, but that is not needed in the ontology, where they are indeed > different. > > > Both theories emulate all Löbian machines, which you can define by any > machine believing one of those axioms, + logic, + corresponding axioms of > induction. They are the machines we can interview on the theology, and the > key proper theological proposition, well they can communicate them only > conditionally to the computationalist hypothesis (of course), and some > “dangerous” self-soundness implicit assumption. It is here that there is a > theological trap (consistent in claiming that G* would necessarily apply to > us). > > Bruno > > > > > > I was really talking about every theory considered has a finite > specification. In Robinson Arithmetic (RA) above there are only 7 sentences > listed. Of course an infinite number of sentences can can be produced from > these via rules of the specification. > > One can have the axioms of True Arithmetic (TA): > > A sentence S is an axiom of TA if S is evaluates to be true over the > natural numbers. > > That would be an "infinite" theory.
Or better: an infinite “theory”. In the frame of Mechanism, I prefer to consider such necessary infinite, and not recursively enumerable “theory” as kind of model, instead of theory. I consider that a theory has to be effective. Its theorems has to be recursively enumerable, its axioms has to be recursive. The set of all true sentences of any Turing-complete theory is not recursively enumerable, and is better to be seen as a type of model/semantics. Initially I identify words, numbers, machines, finitely presentable thing, code, software/hardware, as opposed to meaning, infinities, models, realities, … Nuances are then brown au fur et à mesure. > > > (Consider a theory of physics that just accumulated all sentences S that > passed an experiment.) That is more like facts, than theorems or potential beliefs of a person. > > > > But also what I am talking about are theories with non-quantitative domains > (are not numerical at all, but are experiential). The experiential (qualitative) domain is obtained from the relation between (fixed point) semantics, but the one I used are intensional fixed point (like in the second recursion theorem) than extensional or denotational one. In particular the modes with “& p” is their definition provide the logic of first person experience, which have a form of knowledge which are not definable, indubitable, not provable, etc. That is possible thanks to incompleteness; despite we will have []p <-> ([]p & p), given that we limit ourselves to correct (souped) machine, and so their G*, or G1*, will prove that equivalence, but the machine concerned itself cannot, and apprehend that type of information in a non numerical, nor even 3p-describable way at all. Incompleteness refute the critics on Theaetetus made by Socrates. Church’s thesis and Gödel’s theorems (and Kleene’s second recursion theorem) rehabilitates Pythagorus and Neoplatonists. > > The Enactive Approach to Qualitative Ontology > https://philarchive.org/archive/PACITT I can understand you appreciate this, and I can agree with many ideas there, but their qualitative ontology is recovered as experiential. When they say: << The new categories proposed by the authors, then, point towards a qualitative conception of matter, conceived as characterized by a continuous actualization of the virtual, that in natural history proceeds as an underlying impulse towards the actualization of possibilities and tendencies. >>, they just add implicitly the equivalent of a sort of “reduction of the wave”, for having their inaction selecting the histories possible/consistent. They use an implicit ontological commitment in a primarily material conception of reality, which is natural from the 1p view, but is better to be seen as phenomenological, given that logic (incompleteness) imposes that phenomenology for the machines first person logics. Yes, that shows why it is hard for machine to believe that they are machine, and actually the sound machine is correct when saying that its soul (the knower) is not a machine, nor anything definable in any third person way. But incompleteness explains why such feeling is unavoidable, and 1p-true, but 3p-nonsensical. The universal machine, once she accepts enough induction axioms, knows that she has a soul, and knows that her soul is not a machine. All such “enough rich” machine cannot avoid qualities in the ([]p & p) and ([]p & <>t & p) modes of self-reference. With p sigma_1, that gives quantum logics acting as describing alternative measurement result related to the measure 1 on the computations accessible by the mind of the machine in the differentiating consciousness flux in arithmetic. We get a phenomenological reduction of the wave without a need to enact some of them in a reality/computation made more real than others by sheer will. Bruno > > from > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/ > > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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